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ABSTRACT
The need for affordable housing is as critical now as it has ever been. Mixed-income housing has been
adopted by federal policymakers and many state housing agencies as a means to address this pressing
issue. Two mixed-income programs with contrasting results are examined and the strengths and
weaknesses of each discussed. Based upon the lessons learned, the authors use a variety of financing
mechanisms to create a new financial architecture for the development of mixed-income housing in
Massachusetts.
The thesis begins with a general overview of the history of U.S. housing policy and the current need for
affordable housing. It follows with a detailed description of the various mechanisms used to finance and
promote the supply of low-income housing. Two mixed-income housing programs, the SHARP Program
and the 80/20 Program, are examined. Using a variety of financing mechanisms, a new financial
architecture is advanced based upon a new public/private partnership. Current construction and operating
costs from the greater Boston area are used to simulate the development and operation costs of an 80/20
project. Growth rates extracted from a portfolio of 23 mixed-income properties financed by the
Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency (MHFA) under the SHARP Program are superimposed on a
baseline scenario to subject it to the same financial stresses that the SHARP properties experienced during
the recession of the early 1990s. The risks and potential returns to the public/private partnership are
analyzed and recommendations made so the returns to each party are commensurate with the risks that
party bears when investing in mixed-income projects. The Model is run through a variety of sensitivity
analyses to measure the impact of changes in key variables on the resulting returns of principle partners.
The conclusion drawn is that that the long-term viability of mixed-income projects can be tenuous, but
with the proper alignment of interests and through the use of carefully interwoven finance mechanisms
and public policies, mixed-income projects can help address the affordable housing crisis while
successfully meeting the goals of each party to the partnership.
Thesis Supervisor: W. Tod McGrath
Title: Lecturer
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Introduction
Over the past decade, mixed-income housing has steadily gained attention as a viable approach to make
inroads against the overwhelming need for affordable housing. The social and economic ramifications of
this concept are highly touted. There exist many examples of mixed-income projects in which households
of various income levels live side-by-side in harmonious communities. To the casual observer, the
affordable units are virtually indistinguishable from the market-rate units. This is a far cry from many of
the affordable units built in the past. For many people, the words "affordable housing" still conjure up the
image of featureless boxes in concentrated clusters. Only twenty years ago this approach to housing "the
needy" was thought by policymakers as the most viable solution to the lack of affordable housing the
United States. The government had already attempted to construct housing on its own which ended with
dismal results. Public/private partnerships were later formed to tap into the efficiency of the private
market, but the frameworks for these partnerships were riddled with problems. However, we should not
look upon these past attempts as complete failures, as valuable lessons have been learned that are shaping
current policy which is clearly endorsing the concept of mixed-income. The framework and policy
governing mixed-income projects continues to be re-worked as the various players to the private/public
partnership search for the optimal solution. The focus of this thesis is to use the framework of the
established 80/20 Program, and through the mixing of various financing and cost reduction mechanisms,
create a new financial architecture for developing mixed-income housing in Massachusetts. The
framework created calls for a new public/private partnership in which returns are commensurate with the
risks taken, and the expectations of each party clearly defined and outlined in what could be phrased "a
private market approach to a public need".
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Background
1.1 Brief Summary of Federal Legislation on Affordable Housing
The lack of safe, decent and affordable housing is not a recent phenomenon; it has plagued our society
and challenged both federal policymakers and the real estate development community for years.
Congress took a bold first step to address the problem with the passage of the Housing Act of 1937. This
landmark legislation created the first Federal framework for government-owned affordable housing.
Federal subsidies were directed to Public Housing Authorities that in turn used the money to construct,
own, and manage the public housing. However, little housing was actually created as the program was
mired in political controversy and funding was soon cut off.
After a decade of heated debate, Congress authorized the Housing Act of 1949 which was written into law
with the noble goal of "a decent home and suitable living environment for every American family."
Federal loans and grants were established to build 810,000 new low-rent housing units over the next six
years. Restrictions were placed on construction costs and tenant incomes and rents were set at least 20
percent below the lowest rents for comparable private units in the same community. But even with the
support of the Act, the production of public housing continued to be held up by political opposition and
was further obstructed by the real estate and building industries which lobbied strongly against it. Annual
production was curtailed to the point that it would eventually take almost 20 years to meet the goal of
810,000 units which the Act of 1949 had set to accomplish in only six.'
The Housing Act of 1959 contained Section 202 that marked a turning point in federal policy as direct
government loans were made to the private sector to develop and maintain subsidized housing units.
These loans, however, were restricted to private non-profit sponsors of housing for the elderly or disabled.
Section 202 accounted for over 45,000 units before being modified in 1970.2
During the 1960s, support for public housing strengthened with a shift towards liberalism and the gradual
acceptance of the program by the real estate and building industries. President Johnson placed urban
issues at the forefront of his administration and established the Department of Housing and Urban
1 Alexander von Hoffman, Seminar in Affordable Housing, Harvard University, July 18, 2000.
2 Diane R. Suchman, Public/Private Housing Partnerships, (Washington, D.C.: Urban Land Institute) 1990, p. 6.
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Development (HUD) giving it a cabinet position. A few years later, Johnson pushed through the Housing
and Urban Development Act of 1968. This Act marked the beginning of large-scale federal programs
aimed to support the construction of low and moderate-income housing. Included in the Act was a shift
away from public housing towards programs that were dependent on the private sector. Section 236 of
the Act reduced interest rates paid by developers who agreed to construct low-income housing to one
percent and backed the loans by private lenders with the security of FHA mortgage insurance. The
Housing Act of 1968 was ultimately responsible for the production of 21.5 million housing units between
1968 and 1984 of which 18.8 million were built by the private sector.3 The new partnership with the
private sector eventually faltered due to high costs leading it to become entangled in controversy.
A number of well documented public housing failures and the high expense of the programs led President
Nixon to place a moratorium on all federal housing programs in 1973. A year later the Housing and
Community Development Act of 1974 was enacted. This Act created the Section 8 Program and the
Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) Program, both of which provided a more flexible source
of funding. Section 8 also steered affordable housing policies in a new direction. Unlike the public
housing program in which the government developed and managed the housing projects, Section 8
created rent subsidies for projects developed, owned and maintained by the private sector. The subsidies
offered were either project-based or tenant-based assistance. Subsidies were delivered through a number
of different mechanisms to subsidize the rent in exchange for the owner committing to maintain the units
as affordable for a specified period of time. The Section 8 program quickly replaced public housing as
the most important source for new Federal subsidies for rental housing. By 1980, housing units produced
through the Section 8 Program equaled those created over the 40-year period by the Housing Act of 1939
- approximately 1.2 million units.4
During the 1980s, housing policy changed dramatically as funding for a wide range of federal programs
was cut. HUD's FY 1981 budget of $31.9 billion had been slashed to $15.4 billion by FY 1988. In 1983,
the Section 8 new Construction and Substantial Rehabilitation programs were terminated and replaced by
a housing voucher system. Vouchers were created as policymakers changed from a housing policy that
previously emphasized subsidy for production to direct subsidies for tenants. Although the voucher
system is much less expensive to fund, it has come under criticism from affordable housing advocates for
not directly producing low cost housing units.
'Ibid., p.6.
4 U.S. Department on Housing and Urban Development, Opting In: Renewing America's Commitment to Affordable Housing,
<http://hud.gov/worscase.html> (Washington D.C., April, 1999).
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In response to the deep cuts in federal funding for housing production programs, the government
developed a number of financing and funding mechanisms to encourage the private sector to develop low-
income housing. The 1981 Economic Recovery Tax Act (ERTA) allowed preferential treatment of
capital gains and 15-year accelerated depreciation. The 1986 Tax Reform Act eliminated the preferential
treatment of capital gains and lengthened the depreciation schedule to 27.5 years for rental properties.
"These swings in tax policy have motivated housing production and overproduction and then caused a
near collapse of multi-family production before the recovery of multi-family production in the 1990s."5
The 1986 Tax Act also introduced the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC). LIHTCs allow
investors a dollar-for-dollar reduction of their federal taxes received when they invest in low-income
housing projects. This has greatly increased the equity available for affordable housing projects and the
LHTC program has been has been estimated to be responsible for up to 94 percent of the affordable
rental production in the U.S.6 Critics charge that the tax credit alone is not sufficient to reach the poorest
of the poor. "Section 8 or other operating expense assistance is needed to make the projects work for
tenants having incomes of 50 or 60 percent of median, never mind reaching lower in the income
distribution."7
In the last decade, The 1990 National Affordable Housing Act was placed into law and created the
HOME Investment Partnership Program which provides federal funding for state and local housing
programs. The Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998 (QHWRA) was signed into law in
October, 1998. The objectives of the Act are to substantially reform public housing by:
- reducing the concentration of poverty in public housing and allowing income targeting;
- raising the performance standards of Public Housing Agencies and rewarding high performance;
- authorizing the HOPE VI revitalization program;
- transforming the public housing stock through new policies and procedures for demolition and
replacement; and
- merging the Section 8 voucher and certificate programs.
5 James Wallace, Housing in the 21" Century, (Washington, D.C.: Symposium Sponsored by the Urban Land Institute and the
Center for Public Housing, March 29-30, 1999) p. 29.
6 Robert Sheehan, "Working Together: Public-Private Partnerships for Affordable Housing", (Units, April 1998) p. 33.
7 Wallace, op. cit., p. 30.
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Table 1.1.1
Major Federal Policies Affecting Affordable Housing
Policv Main Features
- I.
Housing Act of 1939
Housing Act of 1949
Housing Act of 1959
Housing & Urban
Development Act of 1968
Housing & Community
Development Act of 1974
Community Reinvestment
Act of 1977
Tax Act of 1981
Tax Act of 1986
Quality Housing and Work
Responsibility Act of 1998
First federal framework for
government-owned affordable
housing
Federal loans & grants were
established to build 810,000
low-rent units over the next 6
years
Turning point in federal policy as
direct government loans were
main to the private sector - units
restricted to elderly or disabled
Clear shift away from public
housing, sought to partner with
private sector
Created Section 8 & CDBG
Programs
Requires banks to investment in
low-income communities
Very generous tax benefits for
investors in rental real estate
Reduced 1981 tax benefits and
created LIHTC
Prohibits concentration of
poverty in public housing and
allows income targeting;
reformed Public Housing
Agencies; authorized HOPE VI
revitalization program
Accomplishments
Little housing was produced due
to political controversy leading to
elimination of funding
Actual production levels were
quite low due to political
opposition
Limited amount of units were
produced
Responsible for creation of over
20M units before faltering due to
high costs
Section 8 quickly replaced public
housing as most important
federal program
Increased supply of capital for
development
Created boom but projects built
for tax reasons largely ignoring
the underlying real estate market
leading to much financial distress
LIHTC has become main
mechanism fueling the
production of affordable housing
today
Responsible for a major
reforming of Public Housing
Federal policies that encourage private development of affordable housing have also been aimed at the
lending industry. The Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 placed requirements on banks and thrifts to
increase investment in low-income communities. Later, additional legislation to promote development of
affordable housing included the 1989 Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act
(FIRREA); the 1992 Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act; and the 1992
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Housing and Community Development Act. These Acts placed requirements on lending institutions,
Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac HUD, respectively, in order to generate more loans for affordable housing.
1.2 Need for Affordable Housings
The desperate need in America for affordable rental housing is outlined in HUD's report Rental Housing
Assistance - The Worsening Crisis. HUD's Secretary, Andrew Cuomo, presented this report to Congress
with a letter9 which included the following comment "there is an urgent need to strengthen federal efforts
to assure adequate supplies of decent, safe and affordable housing for America's lowest-incomel*
families". Key findings in the report include the following:
- Despite continued robust economic expansion, in 1997 worst case housing needs" reached an all-
time high of 5.4 million families. This was an increase of 4 percent from 1995 - twice the rate of
growth in the number of all U.S. households.
- The housing stock affordable to the lowest income Americans continues to shrink. The number
of rental units affordable to families with incomes below 30 percent of area mean income (AMI)
decreased by 5 percent between 1991 and 1997 - a loss of over 370,000 units.
- Although the majority of worst case needs reside in the central cities, a large and growing number
live in the suburbs. In 1997, one of every three households with worst case needs was located in
the suburbs. "
The Joint Center for Housing Studies' State of the Nation's Housing 2000 supplements these findings
with additional facts.
- There were 3.9 million very low-income households living in unsubsidized housing with salaries
and wages equal to, or greater than, the equivalent of full-time employment at the federal
minimum wage. But over two-thirds of these "working poor" paid 30 percent or more of their
incomes for housing and one in every four paid over 50 percent. Within this group, unsubsidized
renters were particularly burdened as 71 percent faced high housing cost burdens.
- Although housing problems are concentrated in urban areas (with half of the urban renters not
receiving subsidies paying over 50 percent of their income on housing), the rural areas have
8 Affordable housing is defined as housing that serves households with income at or below 80% area median income (AMI)
whose monthly housing costs do not exceed 30% of gross income.
9 Andrew Cuomo, Letter to Congress, <http://hud.gov/worscase.html>, March 2000.
10 HUD has categorized income levels as follows: low-income: household income at, or below, 80% AMI; low to moderate-
income: household income between 50% and 80% AMI, very low-income: household income below 50% AMI; extremely low-
income: household income below 30% AMI.
" Households with worst case needs are defmed in this report as unassisted renters with incomes below 50% of the local median,
who pay more than half of their income for rent or live in severely substandard housing.
12 U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Rental Housing Assistance - The Worsening Crisis: A Report to
Congress on Worst Case Housing Needs, (Washington, D.C., March 2000).
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significant problems too. In 1997, about one in three rural renters spent more than half their
incomes for housing and were even more likely than urban families to live in severely inadequate
housing.
Table 1.2.1
Housing Conditions of Very Low-income Rental Households, U.S., 1997
Working
Total Rural Urban Poor
Total Rental Households 10,253,000 1,529,000 8,724,000 2,523,000
Moderately Cost Burdened 3,003,000 398,000 2,605,000 1,292,000
Severely Cost Burdened 4,879,000 557,000 4,322,000 505,000
Living in Severely Inadequate Housing 460,000 66,000 394,000 81,000
Share (%)
Moderately Cost Burdened 29.3% 26.0% 29.9% 51.2%
Severely Cost Burdened 47.6% 36.4% 49.5% 20.0%
Living in Severely Inadequate Housing 4.5% 4.3% 4.5% 3.2%
Notes: Due to changes in the American Housing Survey in 1997, these data are not comparable with data from
previous years. Estmates exclude renter households that receive housing subsidies or for which subsidy status was
not reported. Numbers may differ from official HUD estimates because of differences in subsidy definiton. Very low-
income households defined as having less than 50% of area median income. Moderately cost burdened defined as
paying 31-50% of income for housing. Severely cost burdened defined as paying more than 50% of income for
housing. Severely inadequate housing defined as having severe problems with plumbing, heating, electrical systems
upkeep, or hallways. Rural defined as living in rural suburbs or rural non-metropolitan areas according to the
American Housing Survey. Working poor defined as having wage and salary income equal to, or greater than, full-
tme federal minimum wage income ($5.15 per hour).
Source: The State of the Nation's Housing: 2000.
The severe affordable housing crisis is accelerating - as the number of low-income households with
housing needs increases, the supply of unsubsidized units affordable to these households is decreasing.
Between 1993 and 1995, the number of unsubsidized units affordable to very low-income households was
down 8.6 percent - a decrease of nearly 900,000 units. Over the same period, the number of units
affordable to extremely low-income households (those with incomes less than 30 percent of area median)
fell by an alarming 16 percent.13
The major federal low-income housing programs are doing little to ease the crisis:
Tenant-based Vouchers and Certificates: There are currently approximately 1.5 million tenant-based
certificates and vouchers across the country. The average waiting time for a voucher rose from 26 to 28
months between 1996 and 1998. In New York and Los Angeles, the wait is 8 and 10 years, respectively.
13 Joint Center For Housing Studies of Harvard University, The State of the Nation's Housing 2000 (Cambridge, 2000) p. 25.
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In 1995, for the first time ever no new housing vouchers were issued. Funding began again in 1998 with
50,000 vouchers being approved by Congress. Another 60,000 were added in 1999 and the President's
FY 2001 budget calls for an additional 120,000 incremental vouchers. Unfortunately, vouchers and
certificates do not add to the supply of affordable units as they do not induce new construction.
Public Housing: As of 1997, there were approximately 1.3 million public housing units available for
occupancy. Due to neglect, 60,577 of 86,000 seriously distressed units are scheduled to be demolished.
By the end of 1999, over 27,600 units had been torn down. HUD set a replacement goal of 45 percent,
but to date only 7,273 units have been built or rehabbed.14
Project-based Section 8: As of 1997, project-based Section 8 housing units totaled 1.7 million. The
stock of these units is shrinking as owners with contracts that have expired are opting out of the program
in search of higher returns in the open market. In 1998 alone, 17,000 units opted out and through 1999
over 90,000 units have been lost. During the next five years, contracts on two-thirds of all Section 8 units
(almost 1 million units) are set to expire. Forty-four states stand to lose more than 50 percent of their
affordable units subsidized through Section 8. The current policy is to renew contracts for only one year
which adds a great deal of uncertainty to the how much stock will be available over the coming years.
Low-Income Housing Tax Credits: Currently the largest federal rental production program, LIHTC
have supported the construction of over 1 million units affordable to people earning 60 percent or less of
median income. Compliance periods for the first units constructed in the program will begin to expire in
2002 and there is fear these affordable units will be lost to the private market. The tax credit has not been
adjusted for inflation since its inception in 1986 resulting in allocations falling from a high of 117,099 in
1994 to just 67,822 in 1998.
In the report, Housing America's Working Families, the authors point out that the need for affordable
housing is not just limited to those families who fall into the "worst case" needs definition. "There are
13.7 million families with critical housing needs - from all walks of life. Some are elderly. Others are
unemployed and dependent on welfare. Some have physical or emotional handicaps that limit their full
participation in the economic mainstream. Others are working families16 whose modest incomes do not
"Ibid., p. 26.
" Ibid., p. 26.
16 In this report, the author's definition of "working households" includes families who earned at least half of their income from
employment and whose total income fell between $10,700 a year (the equivalent of a full-time job at the minimum wage) and
120% of the local median income.
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support the costs of decent housing. Still others have incomes that place them squarely in the ranks of the
middle class and, in some cases, even higher." 7 Their report cites the following data which is graphically
displayed in Figure 1.2.1.
One out of every seven American families (or 14%) has a critical housing need'".
Of the 13.7 million working families with critical housing needs:
- 3.7 million are elderly;
a 4 million are unemployed and/or dependent on welfare; and
a 6 million are working families, of which 3 million are only marginally attached to the labor
market (their income from wages is less than the equivalent of one full-time minimum wage
earner); and 3 million are working families whose incomes go all the way up to 120 percent of
median income.
Figure 1.2.1
Working Status of All Households With Critical Housing
Needs, U.S., 1997




% Moderate-Income Working Families**
*Marginally employed include families with earnings of $2,675-$10,700 (e.g. between one quarter and one, full-
time minimum wage equivalent).
**Moderate income are families whose total income is between $10,700 and 120 percent of area median income,
and where earnings account for at least haff the family's total income.
Source: Housing America's Working Families
As of 1997, there were roughly 3 million moderate-income working families with critical housing needs.
These families have critical housing needs despite working the equivalent of a full-time job. While
nationally almost 10 percent of all moderate-income working families have critical housing needs (see
figure 1.2.2), there are a number of cities that are at levels exceeding twice the national rate (San Jose,
27%; San Francisco, 26%; Boston and Tampa, 20%). Some of these cities such as Boston, San Francisco
and New York have reached levels where over 20 percent of all households have critical housing needs.
" Michael A. Stegman, Roberto G. Quercia and George McCarthy, Housing America's Working Families, (New Century
Housing, Center for Housing Policy, Washington DC, Vol. 1, Issue 1, June 2000) p.1.
1 A family is defined as having critical housing needs if it spends more than 50% of its total income on housing and/or lives in a
severely inadequate unit.
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Between 1995 and 1997, the number of moderate-income working families with critical housing needs
rose by roughly 440,000 - a 17 percent increase in only two years. The sharp rise is largely due to the
rapid increase in housing prices that has occurred recently. During this same time period, average
monthly rents rose at about twice the overall rate of inflation as measured by the Consumer Price Index.
Figure 1.2.2
Source: Housing America's Working Families
The supply of affordable units for working families continues to tighten as private developers focus new
construction on the high-end market where higher profit margins can be attained. Of all the new two-
bedroom unfurnished private market apartments completed in 1998, only six percent had an asking rent of
under $450 a month (the rent affordable to working families with a $9.00 per hour full-time equivalent
income). Less than 20 percent had an asking price of under $550 (a rent affordable to families working
full-time at $11.00 per hour). In the Northeast, the market constructed less than 11,000 new rental units
in 1998 and of these, less than three percent had an asking price of under $450 while just five percent had
an asking rent of between $450 and $549.'9
Critical housing needs are not restricted to the nation's cities. In fact, the number of working families
with critical housing needs is greater in the suburbs (1.3 million) than it is in the central cities (1.2
million).20
19 Ibid., p. 20.
20Ibid., p. 13.
The Income of Working Families With Critical





E 50-80% of Median
080-120% of Median
Chapter 1
It is hard to imagine that the need for affordable housing in the U.S. continues to be great even during the
unprecedented prosperity for our nation as a whole, but the numbers do tell the story. Millions of families
continue to have inadequate shelter or are severely cost burdened attempting to secure habitable shelter.
As Eric Belsky from the Joint Center for Housing Studies at Harvard University remarked at a recent
lecture at Harvard University, "if we can't make inroads (against the problem of the lack of affordable
units) now, will we ever be able to."21 Over the past decade, public policymakers have come to accept the
strategy of partnering with the private sector. The potential efficiencies of the private market have the
capability of delivering affordable units in a very cost effective manner. Using a framework to create
developments that consist of a mix of households with different levels of income has gained attention as a
means to both combat the social ills of segregating low-income households, and ease the cost burden of
providing affordable units. Mixed-income housing holds great promise as a way to mitigate some of the
affordable housing crunch as well as provide incentives for all parties involved at a reasonable cost to the
government.
1.3 Mixed-Income Housing: A Current Trend
Mixed-income housing is indeed the current direction of US housing policy but its appeal has also
reached private developers and investors. It intends to remedy the social ills of concentrated poverty and
relieve the economic burden of housing the very poor in large developments. Defined as a housing
development that includes both affordable and market-rate units, mixed-income housing requires the
concurrent support of both the public and private sectors through an effective public/private partnership.
From a social point of view, there are a number of benefits for low-income households to live in a mixed-
income environment as opposed to "ghettos" where the "culture of poverty" leads to "joblessness, drug
abuse, and welfare dependency". Simply put, a safe and secure physical environment coupled with a
beneficial social milieu is believed to improve the lives of low-income people significantly and,
ultimately, help break the cycle of poverty. Numerous studies have concluded that: "concentrating poor
people in poor neighborhoods perpetuates social and economic problems, and that moving to a more
diverse environment encourages and enables families to improve their employment, earnings, and
educational achievement"23 . From an economic perspective, adding market-rate rents to various other
public and private resources targeted at low-income units helps secure the financial feasibility and long-
21 Eric Belsky, Lecture at Harvard University for a Seminar in Affordable Housing, July 17, 2000.
2 Paul C. Brophy and Rhonda N. Smith, "Mixed-Income Housing: Factors for Success", Cityscape: A Journal ofPolicy
Development and Research, Volume 3, Number 2, 1997, p. 4
23 Diane R. Suchman, Mixed-Income Housing, (The Urban Land Institute, 1995), p. 1
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term viability of this type of residential development, thereby opening the doors for sufficient incentives
and profits for developers.
Mixed-income housing is not a new concept. It has been a vital component of many urban areas in
America and other countries in the world. For example, two new towns of the 1960s and 1970s,
Columbia, Maryland and Reston, Virginia were conceived as mixed-income communities. In New York
City, mixed-income housing has been practiced for many decades as a result of rent regulation and the
public housing authority's decision to bring relatively higher income families into public housing, in spite
of federal pressure to house the very poor. The Commonwealth of Massachusetts has engaged in the
development of mixed-income housing since the inception of the Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency
(MHFA) in 196624. Although largely successful, these have been primarily isolated efforts by progressive
agencies or individuals in communities with an acute need for affordable housing.
In recent years, however, there has been a renewed interest in a more concerted public/private effort to
build mixed-income housing. This mainly stems from the need to use increasingly scarce public dollars
to leverage private funds in order to create and preserve affordable housing and to de-concentrate poverty.
Mixed-income housing is being successfully built in a wide range of urban and suburban locations. Such
housing is developed to meet a variety of goals including transforming distressed public housing,
stimulating the revitalization of a deteriorated section of the city, or providing affordable housing in
expensive suburban neighborhoods. The federal government has recently embraced this concept,
predominantly as a means to revitalize public housing. HUD's HOPE VI program, established in 1993,
and the 1996 Mixed-Financing Rule, exemplify the federal government's shift toward policies that mix
households with varying income levels and promote the infusion of private dollars in the development of
affordable housing. Mixed-income housing strategy, as implemented by HOPE VI, is an attempt to
attract higher income households to housing developments that are also occupied by low-income families
and individuals. Most critical in revitalizing declining urban areas, the urban mixed-income approach
depends on the buying power of higher-income residents to support local businesses. This is distinctly
different than the dispersal strategy of the Section 8 rental voucher system that scatters the low-income
families into more affluent neighborhoods.
This thesis is focused on a third strategy that uses public and private resources to build new mixed-
income housing in suburban communities (the "suburban mixed-income strategy"). Advancing this
approach is not intended to challenge the viability of the other two strategies, nor is meant to undermine
2 4 Brophy and Smith, op.cit., p. 5
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their achievements in meeting the affordable housing needs of the central city and suburban
neighborhoods. Rather, it is intended to meet a need that is often overlooked, yet can be addressed in a
financially viable manner. There are few major reasons for an emphasis on this particular approach:
- Bringing low-income families into well-served and expensive communities already benefiting
from superior school systems, greater police protection, improved sanitation, and other public
services is believed to have more positive social effects. There is inconclusive research on the
effect of mixed-income housing on the delivery of better services to low-income communities
because of the introduction of more affluent households".
" The real estate boom has resulted in the displacement of many moderate-income residents
including teachers and city employees whose income does not keep up with the rise in real estate
prices. Mixed-income housing offers affordability to long-term residents who play an important
role in the health and stability of these communities. The suburban mixed-income strategy fills
the affordability gap for stable working families who are priced out of housing in their own
communities.
As many practitioners have observed, developing mixed-income housing, particularly in affluent
suburban neighborhoods, has additional challenges when compared to other types of residential
development:
- These projects are often faced with neighborhood opposition mainly due to a NYMBY ("Not In
My Backyard") stance within the most affluent suburban communities.
= Due to the impact of these developments on public services, schools, and other related concerns,
some local governments have set burdensome public approval processes and regulatory barriers
with respect to this type of housing.
. Heavy reliance on the regional and local housing market conditions adds more uncertainty to
these investments and more complexity to the transactions.
- Though less severe in suburban settings, market rate units are more vulnerable to vacancy losses
and turnover. This is because higher income households have more housing choices and thus are
more mobile.
- To attract market-rate tenants and minimize vacancy losses, mixed-income developments must
offer superior design amenities and invest more resources in construction, management and
maintenance, thereby increasing the cost of development and operation.
2 5Alex Schwartz and Kian Tajbakhsh, "Mixed-Income Housing: Unanswered Questions" Cityscape: A Journal ofPolicy
Development and Research, Volume 3, Number 2, 1997, p. 74
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In short, the combination of physical characteristics, market conditions, and community support shapes
the feasibility of any mixed-income development. The 1997 analysis of seven successful mixed-income
housing developments by Brophy and Smith26 concluded that successful mixed-income housing:
= must emphasize the basics of real estate development and management including location, design
quality, excellent management and maintenance, and financial viability;
= must do more than income-mixing and good management where the goal of mixed-income
housing is upward mobility;
= will work only where there is a critical mass of the higher income market-rate units;
= works best when there are no differences in the nature and quality of units being offered; and
= is more difficult to manage when there is dichotomy between the subsidized and market-rate
renters rather than a gradual climb represented by moderate-income tiers.




Financing mixed-income rental housing is not feasible through conventional financing methods and
funding sources. Funding/feasibility gaps have been always a reality in the development of affordable
rental units because adding affordable units to the mix typically results in an aggregate rental income that
does not generate sufficient net operating income to cover the cost of debt. Thus, financing these projects
typically involves piecing together the required capital from a multitude of private and public sources.
This chapter provides a brief overview of available sources of financing commonly used by developers of
mixed-income rental housing.
In the past decades, the federal government has been the primary source of support for affordable
housing. Federal support for privately-owned multifamily rental properties has been provided through a
number of mechanisms. In tandem with federal support, state and local governments also play a critical
role in providing technical and financial assistance to developers as well as regulatory and property tax
relief to further encourage the provision of affordable housing. In this chapter we detail a number of the
mechanisms that are currently being used to produce mixed-income housing. These financing mechanism
are also summarized in Table 2.1.
2.1 Development Cost Financing Sources & Mechanisms
The following are typical sources of capital that can be accessed to help fund the cost of development or
mechanisms that can be used to reduce total development costs.
Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC)
The Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) was created as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1986.
Through the use of LIHTC, federal tax credits' are offered to private investors in exchange for their
investment in for the development of affordable housing. In recent years, the LIHTC has been widely
regarded as the primary vehicle generating the production of affordable housing as well as a significant
1 A tax credit is a dollar-for-dollar reduction in the amount of taxes due as opposed to a tax deduction that only reduces the
amount of income against which taxes are calculated.
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contributor to the construction of multifamily housing in general. "Two hallmarks of the federal low-
income housing tax credit program are its flexibility and decentralized character. As it has matured, the
LIHTC has not only become the centerpiece of a sophisticated and increasingly efficient production
system for low-income rental housing but has also provided critical financing for a broader segment of the
multifamily market."2 Projects may be either new construction, rehabilitation, or acquisition and
rehabilitation. For the purpose of this thesis, we will focus on new construction.
Allocation and oversight of the tax credits is typically the responsibility of state housing agencies. The
agencies establish specific criteria, review proposed projects, and award the credits based upon the
established criteria. These agencies must follow federal guidelines governing the tax credit program but
are allowed flexibility to establish further criteria to more efficiently target the credits towards the
affordable housing needs within their state. The evaluation process generally looks at how well proposed
projects meet the following objectives.
- Affordability - federal law requires states to give preference to projects with rents below the
mandated maximums, and/or projects that commit to maintaining affordable units for a longer
period than the minimum.
- Cost - states may favor projects that are less costly to build or operate.
m Location - states may favor projects in particular areas over others. For instance, they may give
preference to projects in the inner cities or rural areas.
M Project and Tenant Characteristics - states may favor projects with non-profit sponsors, which
serve the homeless, and/or projects that ease the pressure on public housing waiting lists.
The LIHTC provides developers of affordable housing a vehicle through which additional capital for the
project may be attained from the private sector. Typically, the developer teams up with a syndicator to
market the tax credits allocated to the project to investors. A limited partnership is formed for the
management and development of the project. The limited partnership allows the pass through of the tax
credits generated by the property to the investor(s). The syndicator acts as an intermediary and "sells" the
tax credits to the investor(s) who become limited partner(s) in the project. The tax credits are claimed
annually in equal installments over a 10-year period. The timing of the capital contribution from the
investor(s) is open to negotiation between the general partner(s) (the developer) and the limited partner(s)
(the investors). The capital may be made at the beginning of the project (thereby reducing the initial
equity the developer has to contribute) or it may be paid over the course of several years (which generally
2 Mchael A. Stegman, State and Local Affordable Housing Programs- A Rich Tapestry, (Washington D.C., Urban Land Institute,
1999), p. 71.
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requires a "bridge loan" to be secured for this interim). "As the sale of credits has moved primarily to
corporate limited partners able to use the depreciation benefits as well as the full value of the tax credits,
the efficiency of capture of capital has increased. Developers of tax credit projects now are often able to
raise invested amounts on the order of 70 percent or more of the ten-year value of the tax credits." 3
Although the tax credits are allocated over a 10-year period, the project is required to maintain the
affordable units for a minimum of 30 years.4 After the required holding period is fulfilled, the project is
usually sold and the partnership dissolved.
The federal government allocates each state $1.25 in tax credits for each person residing in the state.
Ten percent of each state's allocation must be reserved for non-profit sponsors with many states reserving
well above this minimum threshold. The limited amount of tax credits coupled with the demand from
investors for these credits has made competition for the credits quite intense among developers. In
general terms, the amount of tax credits awarded to a project is based upon the total depreciable cost of
the project multiplied by the percentage of units within the project that are set aside as affordable. This
"qualified basis" is then multiplied by either 4 or 9 percent to establish the annual tax credit the project is
eligible to receive.6 Whether a project receives either 4 or 9 percent credit depends on the type of project
being developed and the source of financing as outlined below.
Affordability Requirements - As mentioned earlier, in order to qualify for the LIHTC, owners must
adhere to the guidelines of the program as outlined in Section 42 of the Internal Revenue Code as well as
any further criteria set forth by the agency administering the tax credits in the state in which the project is
located. The general guidelines are as follows:
= The tax credit only applies to the units in a project that are set-aside for low-income households.
A project must set aside at least 20 percent of its units for households with incomes of 50 percent,
or less, of area mean income (AMI); or at least 40 percent of the units must be set aside for
households with incomes of 60 percent, or less, of AMI.
3 James Wallace, (From Speech given at a Symposium Sponsored by the Urban Land Institute and the Center for Housing Policy
on Housing in the 2l" Century), March 29-30, 1999.
" The original legislation called for a commitment period of 15 years. The Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1989 lengthened the
commitment period to 30 years. Project owners are allowed to sell or convert the project to market rate housing but before doing
so, the owners are required to allow the state credit allocation agency to try and locate a buyer (generally a nonprofit
organization) that is willing to purchase and maintain the project with the number of affordable units that were originally agreed
to be set-aside. If a buyer cannot be located, the tenants are protected with assistance for up to 3 years or when they move out.
5 Legislation has been introduced to increase the amount of LIHTC states are allocated to $1.75 per resident and index it to
inflation.
6 The tax credit statute allows the qualified basis to be increased if the project is located in a Difficult Development Area or a
Designated Low Income Census Tract. In these locations, the tax credit amount is calculated based on 130% of the qualified
basis.
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- Low-income rents for the affordable units are restricted and are based upon the number of
bedrooms in the unit and 30 percent of the corresponding AMI less estimated utility expenditures.
" The project must remain in compliance with the restrictions imposed upon it for at least 30 years.
Capital Structure Requirements - In addition to these requirements, the tax credits a project is eligible
to receive are determined by the type of financing that will be used. Projects that are financed with
conventional (taxable) debt generally qualify for the 9 percent tax credit. When federally subsidized
funding is used, the general rules are as follows:
Federally subsidized funding that allows for the 9 percent tax credit (does not mandate the use of the
4% tax credit) includes:
" Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) Program.
- Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) Affordable Housing Program (AHP).
= HOME Funds - A project may utilize the one percent HOME money and retain the 9 percent tax
credit rate if at least 40 percent of the project is occupied by households with very low-incomes.
Federally subsidized funding which mandates the use of a 4 percent tax credit rate:
a Tax-exempt Bonds - If the source of a project's financing is tax-exempt bonds, the 4 percent tax
credit rate is automatically triggered. However, the project does not have to compete with other
projects for allocation of the LIHTCs and the tax credit allocation received does not count against
the state's cap of $1.25 in tax credits per capita.
One of the appealing aspects of this program to lawmakers is the fact that projects receiving tax credits
effectively capture the business discipline of the private sector to make sure these projects perform as
promised. Tax credits are awarded to projects contingent upon the owner committing to maintaining the
agreed upon number of affordable units for a period of 30 years. If the owners allow the project to fall
out of compliance, a pro-rata portion of the tax credits are recaptured by the Internal Revenue Service.
This provides a strong financial incentive for the investors of a project to make sure that management
keeps the property in compliance during the entire commitment period.
Qualified Allocation Plans (QAPs) - Each year, states develop their QAPs to set their scoring system
and priorities for the distribution of tax credits among eligible projects. QAPs are essentially the means
for each state to develop, with public input, innovative housing strategies that address local needs. For
example, many states are using their tax credits as a financial mechanism to preserve both their aged stock
of assisted housing and continued affordability. Other states target the credits towards social service
provisions, or geographically to locations with dire housing needs. The common goal of all of these
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efforts is to maximize the value of the credit and stretch thee dollars to address the most pressing local
housing issues. The following are specific examples of how states are "using tax credits to steer rather
than row"7
Massachusetts' Preservation Strategy - In 1998, the Department of Housing and Community
Development targeted 60 percent of available federal LIHTC to the preservation of existing federally-
assisted housing including expiring use and HOPE VI projects. While this 60 percent set-aside serves the
larger projects, the state has limited the use of the remaining 40 percent to small projects with 50, or
fewer, units.
New Jersey's Multiple Priorities Strategy - To deal with a variety of competing demands, this state has
established six funding cycles since 1995: urban, suburban/rural, HOPE VI, mixed-income, special needs,
and a final cycle (all type of eligible projects). The mixed-income cycle is for projects in which 50
percent of the units are for low-income households and at least 20 percent are market-rate units.
California's Deep Income Targeting Strategy - In 1996, California developed a different ranking method
for the evaluation of tax credit applications. The objective was to balance the goal of efficiency with deep
income targeting. The state sponsors two different types of competitions: one that ranks more
affordability higher, and one that rewards efficient use of tax credits (larger number of affordable units).
In the affordability competition, the projects that target households with income lower than levels
required by LIHTC gain additional points. To ensure the financial feasibility of these projects, "income
floors" (i.e. 35%-40% of AMI) are established.
Minnesota's Funding Cycle Adjustment Strategy - As missing the construction season in this northern
state adversely impacts the construction budget, in 1998, Minnesota adjusted the timing of the award
cycle to the building cycle (spring construction start) to maintain lower construction costs.
Indiana's Mixed-Income Housing Strategy - In 1998, this state modified its scoring system to reward
mixed-income developments located in large cities. Under the system, the number of points increases if
the projects meet two criteria simultaneously: 20 percent of the units are allocated to households whose
income are at, or below, 40 percent AMI, and up to 50 percent of the units are reserved for market-rate
tenants.
7 Stegman, op.cit., pp. 75-86.
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Accomplishments - In total, the tax credit has financed almost 800,000 housing units for lower income
families. Annual production is estimated to be 100,000 housing units representing 94 percent of all low-
income rental apartments in the country.' "The program has produced a wide variety of housing types
and served a broad range of populations, suggesting that the flexibility in the program's design to permit
state and local governments to pursue their own policy goals is working."'
One of the primary objectives of the LIHTC program was to attract the private sector to the construction
of affordable housing in order to leverage the limited subsidies available. This has been accomplished
with the program generating $12 billion in private investment since the mid-1980s.10 Private banks have
been a significant source of mortgages and the number of different investors taking part in the program
has increased steadily. "We find strong evidence that the growth of the program and the increased
competition from developers and investors has led to increased efficiency in raising LIHTC equity. Over
time, more of each tax credit dollar has gone directly into the projects. In addition, returns to investors
have decreased over time, especially for central-city projects, perhaps indicating decreased perception of
risk for these projects.""
But the program is not without its critics. "Criticisms remain because the program, through the tax credit
subsidy alone, does not reach the poorest of the poor. It must be supplemented by other subsidies, such as
Section 8 rental assistance or special grants and concessions from local governments or other sources."12
State Low Income Housing Tax Credits
Due to the success of federal LIHTC, a number of states (seven as of June 1999) are currently offering
their own state tax credits to help expand their affordable housing stock. In addition, nine more states
have expressed interest in their own state housing credit programs. State housing credits differ in size,
amount available, and term. Similar to the federal LIHITC, most are claimed over a 10-year period with a
few exceptions such as Massachusetts (5 years), California (4 years) and Virginia (5 years). Most state
credits are determined as a percentage of the federal LIHTC. For instance, Arkansas' credit is equal to 20
SThe Enterprise Foundation. Pantnerships That Perform: The Low-Income Housing Tax Credit.
<http://enterprisefoundation.org/policy/monographs/pubpul1.asp> accessed June 22, 2000.
9 Jean L. Cummings and Denise DiPasquale, The Low-Income Housing Tax Credit: An Analysis of the First Ten Years (Housing
Policy Debate, Vol. 10, Issue 2), p. 303.
10 The Enterprise Foundation, op. cit.
" Cummings and DiPasquale, op.cit., p. 304.
12 James Wallace, (From Speech given at a Symposium Sponsored by the Urban Land Institute and the Center for Housing Policy
on Housing in the 2 1st Century), March 29-30, 1999.
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percent of the federal credit. Some states have placed a limit on the total annual allocations such as
California and Connecticut with $50 million and $1 million respectively. In Connecticut, eligible firms
receive a dollar-for-dollar reduction in their corporate business taxes in exchange for their contributions
that are capped at $50,000 per year.
State housing credits are valued at a lower price than federal tax credits. While federal LI-ITC offer
investors a dollar-for-dollar tax relief for each tax credit, the state credits offer approximately 65 cents on
the dollar, assuming the taxpayer is in a 35 percent tax bracket. Although state credits give relief from
state income taxes, this reduction results in a higher federal income than without the state tax credits
because investors can take deductions for state tax payments on their federal income tax return. The end
result with state tax credits is a lower state income tax liability combined with a slightly higher federal
income tax liability.
A drawback with the state housing tax credit is that it is only attractive to investors that are conducting
business and paying state taxes in the state in which the qualifying project is located. This results in a
more limited pool of investors. A key condition for the credit to reach its full potential is that it be
"portable". Portable state tax credits can be allocated separately from the federal low-income housing tax
credits and sold to a different investor. This greatly increases the market for the credits and also allows
for more structuring alternatives which in turn allows for additional equity to be brought into the deal.
Currently, of the seven states that offer state tax credits, only two (Arkansas and Missouri) offer portable
tax credits.
Affordability Requirements - Similar to the federal LIHTC, to qualify for state tax credits a project must
have restricted rents that do not exceed 30 percent of the applicable imputed income limitation for (i) at
least 40 percent of the units occupied by households having incomes of 60 percent, or less, of AMI; or (ii)
at least 20 percent of the units occupied by households having incomes of 50 percent, or less, of AMI.
Massachusetts LIHTC" - In January 2000, Massachusetts signed into law a State LIHTC program. The
Department of Housing and Community Development (DHCD) is charged with the responsibility to
authorize, administer, and determine eligibility for the SLIHTC and to allocate the credit in accordance
with the standards and requirements as set forth in Section 42 of the 1986 Internal Revenue Code. The
credits will be provided to qualified Massachusetts' projects that will be placed in service on, or after,
1 Amendment to Chapter 63 of Massachusetts General Law, Section 31 H.
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January 1, 2001. DHCD can authorize credits annually for the next five years, ending Dec 31, 2005. The
credit will be claimed over a five-year period against state corporate income tax, equal in size to the lesser
of 50 percent of the federal per capita tax credit awarded to the commonwealth, or $4,000,000, and would
be "portable". The state credits can be also used in conjunction with federal credits on the same project.
Any amount of the SLIHTC that exceeds the tax due for a taxable year may be carried forward to any of
the five subsequent taxable years.
California LIHTC14 - At the other end of the spectrum, California has a state tax credit program that is
not a stand alone program, but rather a supplement to the federal LIHTC. This "piggy-back" LIHTC is
only available for projects that are already awarded the federal credits but are not financially feasible
without more equity. This particular program is designed to cover the budget shortfall for affordable
housing projects in a state with excessively high development costs. Approved projects must remain
affordable for 55 years. The credits are given over a four-year period using the same formula as the
federal credits.
HUD HOME Investment Partnership Block Grants"
In 1990, HUD established the HOME program to provide annual housing block grants on an entitlement
basis to states, larger cities, and a consortium of small communities. Grantees can use the HOME funds
for four types of housing programs including rental housing production and rehabilitation loans and
grants, and a 2-year tenant-based rental subsidy.
Major Requirements - The "participating jurisdictions" must use these funds in accordance with a HUD-
approved Consolidated Plan; they must provide a local funding match of 25 percent of their grant; and
they must award 15 percent of these funds to non-profit organizations that meet HUD specific criteria.
Affordability Requirements - At least 90 percent of the HOME units must be occupied by households
earning no more than 60 percent of AMI. The remaining 10 percent is restricted to households earning no
more than 80 percent AMI. In larger rental projects with more than five HOME units, at least 20 percent
of all units must be rented to households earning no more than 50 percent of AMI. States are allowed to
adopt more stringent income targeting rules. In Massachusetts, for instance, the Department of Housing
and Community Development (DHCD) requires that 100 percent of HOME-assisted rental units be
" Stegman, op.cit., pp. 92-93.
15 Citizens' Housing and Planning Association (CHAPA), "Housing Guidebook for Massachusetts", Update June 1999 Edition,
pp. 16-17.
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occupied by low-income households earning up to 60 percent of AMI and 20 percent reserved for
households at, or below, 50 percent AMI. HUD limits the gross rents that can be initially charged for
HOME units. In 1999, "high rent" limits (below 60%) for a 2-bedroom apartment in the Greater Boston
area was $895, and the "low rent" (below 50%) was $705 per month.
HUD Community Development Block Grant (CDBG)
The CDBG program was created under the 1974 Housing and Community Development (HCD) Act.
CDBG merged seven categories of grant programs into a block of flexible community funds. This
pioneering program gave complete discretion and an unprecedented level of control over the use of
federal funds to local governments. At first, these funds were distributed as annual block grants to larger
cities and counties known as the entitlement communities. In 1981, the HCD Act was revised to allow
states to administer the allocation of funds to small cities and counties (non-entitlement communities).
These funds are earmarked for a wide range of activities including the provision of affordable housing.
HUD determines the amount of each entitlement using an objective set of population and distress
measures including poverty, age of housing, and growth lag relative to other metropolitan areas.
Major Requirements - To receive its grant, a city or county must develop and submit to HUD its
Consolidated Plan (the jurisdiction's comprehensive planning document and funding application). Also,
a grantee must develop and implement a detailed citizen participation plan that provides for, and
encourages public participation, especially by members of low and moderate income households, in the
planning process for, and actual use of these funds 6.
Affordability Requirements - HUD requires several certifications including that not less than 70 percent
of the CDBG funds be used over one, two, or three-year periods for activities that benefit low and
moderate-income households whose income does not exceed 80 percent AMI.
Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB)
In response to the Great Depression, the Federal Home Loan Bank System was created in 1932 by the
Federal Home Loan Bank Act to re-establish the housing market and make funds available for home
financing. There are twelve District Banks that are government chartered member-owned corporations
regulated by the Federal Housing Finance Board. FHLB System members include thrift institutions,
16 Department of Housing and Urban Development "CDBG Program: Entitlement Community Grant" Web Posting January 18,
2000, <http://www.hud.gov/cpd/cdbgfct.html> ,accessed July 13, 2000
' Ibid.
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commercial banks, credit unions, and insurance companies. There are currently 7,220 members". Since
1989, FHLB's mission has been broadened to include affordable housing and Community Development
lending. The Affordable Housing Program (AHP) provides subsidies to assist financial institutions in
supporting the production and preservation of affordable housing for the lower-income families and
individuals. Since 1990, the AHP has provided over $900 million to help develop or redevelop over
200,000 housing units19.
Flow of Funds - As a government-sponsored enterprise (GSE) with Triple-A bond rating, the FHL Banks
can raise debt at rates only slightly higher than US Treasury securities. Each FHLB funds its own
Affordable Housing Program with 10 percent of its annual income. Financial assistance (loans or grants)
is awarded through regional competition to member institutions that submit an application in partnership
with for-profit, non-profit, or a government housing developer. Member lenders then use these funds to
offer affordable housing grants or reduced-rate mortgages20
Major Requirements - Financial institutions can become a member if they meet certain statutory
requirements including the provision of long-term mortgage loans and keeping of at least 10 percent of
their total assets in residential loans21 .
Affordability Requirement - Housing produced with FHLB funds must serve households earning less
than 80 percent AMI. In 1994, 75 percent of the units subsidized under AHP were for very low-income
households (below 50% AMI) and 25 percent were for low-to-moderate income households (between
50% and 80% AMI)22
State Housing Trust Funds (HTF) 2
Housing trust funds were the local response to the severe cutbacks of the federal support for affordable
housing imposed by the Reagan Administration. They were created to protect housing assistance from
political swings and shifts in housing policies, and make affordable housing projects financially feasible
by filling capital shortfalls. It has been estimated that since the mid-1980s, housing trust funds have
collectively invested about $1.5 billion to create and preserve approximately 200,000 units of affordable
18 Federal Home Loan Banks Web Posting <http://www.fhlbanks.com>, accessed July 14, 2000
19 id.
20Federal Housing Finance Board System Web Posting <http://www.ffitb.gov/fhlbank.htm>, accessed July 14, 2000
2 Ibid.
22 Michael J. Lea and James E. Wallace, "Current Practices for Financing Affordable Housing in the United States" 1996 Tri-
Country Conference on Housing and Urban Issues, p. 23
23 Stegman, op.cit., pp. 199-206.
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housing (average $7,500 per unit). HTFs generate their revenues from a variety of sources including
recording fees for real estate, real estate transfer taxes, impact fees, or negotiated fees with developers
during the public approval process. Funds are awarded as loans or grants to non-profit and for-profit
entities as well as public housing authorities, social service providers, and government agencies. These
funds support a variety of housing activities including new construction, rehabilitation, rental assistance,
acquisition, project-based subsidies, and social services to needy families. Listed below are two examples
of HTFs.
Florida HTF - Created in 1992, this is the largest HTF in the United States. Its revenues are generated
through an increase of $0.10 per $100 valuation in its documentary stamp tax which was further increased
to $0.20 in 1996-1997. The trust is administered by the Florida Housing Corporation that supports many
programs including:
State Apartment Incentive Loan Program - provides second mortgage loans at low-interest rates for new
construction, or substantial rehabilitation of multifamily rental properties. A requirement is that 20
percent of the units must be reserved for very-low income households (between 30% and 50% AMI).
Florida Affordable Housing Guarantee Program - offers guarantees on both taxable and tax-exempt loans
and thus bridge financing shortfalls for the construction, acquisition, rehabilitation, or refinancing of
affordable housing.
Illinois HTF - Created in 1989, this program aimed at increasing the stock of low-income and very low
income housing in the state. Awards are used to finance any deficits and are provided to non-profit, or
for-profit developers as grants or loans typically in the amount of $750,000, or less. The majority of
funds are allocated to projects that assist households below 50 percent AMI with the 80 percent AMI as
the upper limit. The HTF's revenues are generated from the transfer tax fee charged on all residential real
estate transactions.
Tax Increment Financing (TIF)"
This is a tool used by some states to encourage development in designated "blighted" or urban renewal
areas. TIF uses the incremental increase in taxes generated by a new project to help finance development
related costs. The development related costs that are eligible for TIF are limited to activities that promote
a public benefit such as site acquisition, site clearance, construction and/or reconstruction of streets,
" Denver Urban Renewal Authority Web Posting <http://www.denvergov.org/content/466faq450.asp#link 3>, accessed
August 14, 2000
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utilities, parks, or other public infrastructure or the remediation of hazardous waste. The specific criteria
and eligibility for TIF vary from state to state. Most state statutes require that a TIF project be located in
a designated "blighted area" or an "Enterprise Zone". Generally, the geographic boundaries of this urban
renewal area also serve as the boundaries of the tax increment area. It is possible, however, to establish
separate tax increment areas for individual projects within the urban renewal area. Upon adoption of the
urban renewal plan, or on a project-by-project basis, property taxes are "frozen" at their existing level.
The taxing authorities continue to receive tax revenue at the "frozen" base level. All supplemental tax
revenue generated by new taxes above the "frozen base" is earmarked as TIF funds. This revenue can
then be used to reimburse developers for their expenditures on public improvements, or can be used to
secure the issuance of bonds to finance the public benefit activities listed above.
Comprehensive Permit/Anti Snob Zoning (Massachusetts)"
In 1969, Massachusetts passed legislation that overrode local zoning in order to facilitate the development
of affordable housing. The law (Chapter 40B of Massachusetts General Law) was enacted to stimulate
the statewide development of affordable housing in cities and towns that had created a high barrier-to-
entry for developers through local zoning restrictions (large lot zoning) and onerous local approval
processes. 26 This law, which is commonly referred to as "anti-snob zoning" created two tools to achieve
its goal:
. A requirement that all communities use a more expedited public approval process called the
Comprehensive Permit (CP) process for proposals to develop low and moderate-income housing
which require zoning and/or other regulatory relief (e.g., density bonuses and/or zoning use
changes).
. A provision that a State Housing Appeals Committee can overrule an adverse local decision if
less than 10 percent of the total year-round housing units in that community are affordable to low-
and moderate-income residents.
Affordability Requirements - The following criteria must be met for projects to be considered
affordable:
- Projects must receive federal or state funding for construction or substantial rehabilitation;
. At least 25 percent of the units must be both affordable to, and restricted for, households with
incomes not exceeding 80 percent AMI, adjusted for household size at the time of admission, or
at least 20 percent of the units reserved for households earning 50 percent AMI, or less;
25 Citizens' Housing and Planning Association, "Using Chapter 40B to create Affordable Housing in Suburban and Rural
Communities of Massachusetts-Lessons Learned and Reconmendations for the Future" October 1999
26 Under conventional permitting process, a developer must file separate applications to all applicable local boards including
planning board, conservation commission, board of health, etc.
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- Rent and income restrictions must remain in place for at least 15 years for new construction and 5
years for substantially rehabilitated units;
- Projects must receive oversight by the subsidizing agency governed by a regulatory agreement
which restricts rents and income levels;
- Projects must be subject to an affirmative fair marketing plan approved by the subsidizing
agency;
m All subsidized units in rental projects count toward the 10 percent affordable housing threshold,
even if not all units are affordable. For example, if a rental project is financed with a MIHFA
mortgage, all units count towards the 10 percent requirement, not just the affordable ones (as of
1999, approximately 86 percent of subsidized units in the state are considered affordable).
Chapter 40B is essentially an indirect form of development cost reduction tied to state and local housing
programs. It can, in effect, reduce the land cost through a higher allowable density, allow residential
development of land previously zoned for other uses, or result in cost efficiencies during the design and
entitlement phases with a more streamlined and less costly approval process.
Even though the recent cutbacks in conventional federal and state assistance have slowed down the
development activity under Chapter 40B, the statute has indeed increased the supply of affordable
housing in suburban and rural communities. Studies show that close to 21 percent of all units added
between 1970 and 1997, and approximately half of all suburban units between 1970 and 1986, used the
CP process. Chapter 40B is believed to have played an important role in virtually all suburban
developments because the threat of the CP appeal process has led many communities to negotiate in good
faith with developers.
Density Bonus Program (Seattle, Washington)27
Density bonus programs are standalone programs that provide a strong incentive for developers to
contribute directly (build), or indirectly (provide cash), to the production of affordable housing. In 1985,
Seattle created a Housing Bonus Program as part of its downtown revitalization plan to construct and
preserve affordable housing (defined as housing occupied by low-income and low-to-moderate income
households earning less than 50 percent, or 80 percent AMI, respectively) throughout the city.
The Density Bonus Program allows the developers to increase the density on their commercial projects in
exchange for one of the following three options:
27 Stegman, op.cit., pp. 218-220.
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- Build affordable housing as part of a mixed-use project (i.e., build on the same site that the
density bonus is applied to) or at a different downtown site; or
- Contract with an affordable housing developer to build the required number of units; or
= Make a cash contribution to the city housing trust fund.
Inclusionary Zoning
Inclusionary zoning is a mechanism that creates affordable housing through either mandatory government
regulation or zoning incentives to developers. The proposed projects are required to set-aside a small
percentage of the units as affordable (typically for households earning less than 50% AMI). There are
basically three ways in which the program can be implemented with many variations off these options.
Mandatory government regulation with no "bonus" - this requires that under specific conditions,
developers of residential real estate projects must set-aside a certain percentage of units as affordable.
For instance in Boston, any residential development of ten units or greater financed by a city agency,
developed on city owned property, or requiring zoning relief must conform to the regulation. This can be
accomplished in two ways:
- Inclusionary set-aside - agreeing to make 10 percent of the units on site affordable; or
- Off-site, 15 percent set-aside - developers can comply with the order by constructing affordable
units off-site. The number of units created must be equal to 15 percent of the total units in the
new development. Instead of actually building new affordable units, developers also have the
option of making a financial contribution equal to the number of affordable units required
multiplied by $52,000 (the total average public subsidy required to develop a unit of affordable
housing).
Under this program, half of the newly created affordable units must be affordable to households making
80 percent of AMI in the Boston metro area and the other half affordable to households making up to 100
percent of the Boston metro AMI.
Mandatory government regulation with "bonus" - this regulation is similar to the one listed above
with the main difference being that the developer is given some sort of "density bonus" to help offset the
affordable set-aside requirement. The density bonus permits more units to be built on the parcel thereby
reducing the overall cost of land per unit to the developer. This savings in land cost per unit helps offset
the cost of providing the mandatory affordable units. An example of a successful program of this type
that has worked effectively for over 25 years is the Montgomery County, Maryland's Inclusionary Zoning
Ordinance. The Moderately Priced Dwelling Unit (MPDU) ordinance requires that between 12.5 and 15
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percent of the total number of units in every subdivision, or high-rise building of 50 or more units, be
affordable to households earning less than 50 percent of the area's median income. Two-thirds of the
affordable units are sold to moderate-income first-time buyers (with conditions of sale placed on the
units) and the remaining third can be purchased by local housing commissions or non-profits to be added
to their affordable rental programs. The ordinance allows a density increase of up to 22 percent above the
normal density permitted by local zoning. The density bonus essentially creates some "free" lots upon
which the MPDU units are constructed. As a further incentive, the developer generally is able to obtain
some additional market rate units equal to the difference between the density bonus and the MPDU
requirement. Due to a number of factors, the majority of the housing constructed under this program has
been built "for sale". The rental housing that has been built has been done so using LIHTCs. The County
is now offering construction and permanent financing to encourage more construction of rental housing.
Zoning incentives - the voluntary, or incentive-based inclusionary zoning ordinance is similar in nature
to that described above but relies strictly on the market for success. If a developer agrees to set aside a
certain percentage of the units in the project as affordable, he/she will be rewarded with reduced land-use
restrictions. This may include diminished site design requirements, waiver of development fees,
increased density (the most common bonus) and/or reduced setback requirements. Whether or not a
developer seeks the zoning relief will largely be based upon the perceived value of the bonus or relief.
2.2 Debt Sources & Cost Reduction Mechanisms
There are a variety of debt financing sources that provide below-market interest rates, longer mortgage
loan terms, lower debt service coverage factors, and soft second loans. Some of the mechanisms
described above, such as HOME, CDBG, Housing Trust Funds, and FHLB AHP can be also categorized
as debt sources because their allocated funds can be in the form of loans as well as grants.
Tax-Exempt Bonds
Federal law allows state housing agencies to issue bonds for a variety of purposes for which the interest is
exempt from federal income taxes. The Internal Revenue Code of 1986 restated that bonds issued by
state and local governments shall be exempt from federal income taxes. The Mortgage Subsidy Bond Tax
Act of 1980 (The Ullman Act) set annual caps on total bond volume for each state and imposed income-
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targeting requirements on the beneficiaries28 . Tax-exempt bonds are subject to the annual state's private
activity bond volume cap. This fixed amount of allocations ($50 per capita per annum) results in
tremendous competition for a project to be financed. As tax-exempt bondholders do not pay income taxes
on interest earned on their investment, they are able to retain more of their investment income (the higher
their marginal tax rate the greater the return on investment), and are therefore willing to buy these bonds
at below-market interest rates. Consequently, as state and local governments borrow at a lower cost, they
can pass on the such savings in the form of lower interest rates to promote the production of affordable
housing. Bond transaction costs are relatively high making projects with less than $5 million in tax-
exempt bonds generally uneconomical 29.
Major Requirements - Developers must use at least 95 percent of bond proceeds toward "Qualified
Project Costs", including land acquisition (up to 25 percent of bond proceeds) and construction costs.
The cost of bond issuance paid with bond proceeds may not exceed 2 percent of the face bond amount.
Also, not more than 5 percent of total square footage of a project may be set-aside for non-residential
space and not more than 5 percent of total project income may be derived from commercial rents.
Affordability Requirements - Tax-exempt bond financed projects must set aside either 20 percent of the
units to for residents earning 50 percent AMI, or less. These rent restrictions must be maintained for 15
years after occupancy of 50 percent of the units has been achieved. For all low-income units, rents
charged cannot exceed 30 percent of the 50 percent AMI limit for each specific family size. The Code
establishes two methods to monitor continuous compliance. First, the "Non Deep Rent Skewed Projects"
must be selected by the owner of a project in which the difference between the market rents and low-
income rents is not significant. The second, "Deep Rent Skewed Projects" are for projects with market
rents exceeding two times the average rent charged for low-income rents.
Credit Enhancement
Credit Enhancements are essentially default protection provisions incorporated into bonds and other
financing instruments. These are typically financial guarantees, insurance or other types of protection
(e.g. collateralization 30, credit downgrade triggers31) that improve the credit of underlying debt
28 Lea and Wallace, op.cit., p. 1929 Michael J. Novogradac, "Financing Affordable Housing" Commercial Investment Real Estate, March/April 1999
30 "One or more parties may agree to post collateral. Collateral levels may be fixed or vary over time, depending on the market
value of the deal" in www.contingencyanalysis.com/glossarycreditenhancement.htm
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obligations. This enhanced credit protection reduces the default risk and thus results in reduced interest
costs and increased marketability of bond issues. The standard affordable housing industry practice has
been the use of HUD/FHA Risk Sharing (mortgage credit enhancer) and investment grade Third Party
(bond credit enhancer) mechanisms.
HUD/FHA Risk Sharing32 - HUD Multi-family Insurance Partnership Program is a pilot mortgage
insurance program for qualified state and local housing finance agencies. Loans originated under pre-
approved guidelines receive FHA insurance for fixed-rate, long-term (40-year) mortgages. HUD has
delegated the lending responsibilities that include mortgage processing, underwriting, closing, servicing,
and work outs to the housing finance agency. In exchange, the agency shares the risk and participates in a
percentage of any losses. Typically, developers are able to obtain loans of up to 90 percent value. This
innovative and efficient insurance vehicle has been very effective in reducing transaction time and
increasing access to the capital markets for the production of affordable housing. A drawback of credit
enhancements is their added cost. FHA application and processing fees total 1.8 percent of the loan
amount. Thereafter, FHA charges an annual insurance premium of 0.5 percent of the outstanding
mortgage amount33. This cost, however, is often offset by the reduction in the rate of interest charged by
HFA.
Third Party Guarantees34 - This type of credit enhancement insures the timely repayment of bonds
issued to provide affordable housing mortgages. Credit enhanced bonds are sufficiently secured to
receive an investment grade rating from Standard and Poor's and/or Moody's. This guarantee is intended
to protect the bondholders from the real estate development and market risks. The following are
examples of third party credit enhancement.
Bank Letter of Credit (LOC) - Major Commercial Banks with active real estate finance departments issue
LOCs to insure repayment of the bonds. These LOCs have typically a 7- to 10-year term, covering the
construction period and 5 to 8 years of the operation period. LOCs are mortgage-backed and can be
renewed, or paid in fill, upon expiration. LOC fees generally range from 125 to 200 basis points
31 "In the event that one of the parties' credit rating is downgraded below a certain level by a specified credit rating service, the
deal is restructured or terminated" in <http://www.contingencyanalysis.com/glossarycreditenhancement.htm> accessed July 22,
2000
32 New York Homes Web Posting <http://www.nyhomes.org/hfa/creditenhance.html>,accessed July 22, 2000
3 New York City Housing Development Corporation NYCHDC Web Posting on 80/20 rental housing Tax-exempt Finance
Program, <http://www.nychdc.com/8020.html> accessed July 13, 2000.
31 Ibid.
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annually on the outstanding debt amount in addition to an up-front fee paid at closing (this fee can be also
built into the interest rate).
Surety Bonds/Bond Insurance - If the bank providing the LOC has an investment grade rating of only A
or A-, the bonds will have a lower rating and, consequently, a higher coupon rate. Additional credit
enhancement may be provided by a AAA insurance company or bond insurance company to reduce the
interest cost. Surety bonds or bond insurance are contracts that guarantee the obligation of the bank to
honor its LOC, or the issuer (HFA) to repay its bonds. Fees are typically in the range of 35-50 basis
points per year in addition to the LOC fee.
2.3 Operating Cost Reduction Mechanisms
This type of mechanism assists the developer in attaining a higher NOI by reducing operating costs. The
most common means of reducing operating costs of privately owned rental housing is a real estate tax
abatement and/or exemption.
Tax Abatement/Exemption
Property taxation is an effective tool for local governments to regulate development and to exclude, or
promote, certain uses. In exchange for affordable housing, some municipalities make concessions on
property taxes, their major source of revenue. To assess the level of these concessions, local governments
must strike a balance between the loss of revenue to support public services and the benefits of providing
housing for lower-income working families. The following are examples of state and local tax incentive
programs currently in place.
Massachusetts Chapter 121A" - This statute and regulations (MA 760 CMR 25) authorize the exemption
of qualified projects from real and personal betterments and special assessments. The law requires the
creation of Urban Redevelopment Corporations, which serve as the entity that develops all types of
projects including residential development in areas considered to be blighted or substandard. Chapter
121A also uses tax exemption as a mechanism to induce development in areas with high property tax
rates, or areas not conducive to private investments. The most frequent application of Chapter 121A has
* Department of Housing & Community Development, Web Posting entitled "Urban Redevelopment Corporation Fact Sheet",
<http://www.state.ma.us/dhcd>, accessed July 15, 2000
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been in the construction of low- and moderate-income housing. Except for 12 1A projects in Boston that
are administered by the BRA, all qualified projects under this program are administered by DHCD.
An Urban Development Corporation, or chapter 12 1A entity, is officially established by a certificate
issued by the Secretary of State of the Commonwealth. Non-profit organizations, for-profit corporations,
joint ventures and public/private partnerships as well as insurance companies and banks can qualify under
special statutory provisions. Urban Development Corporations are exempt from property taxes but they
have to make three types of substitute payments to the municipality:
m Minimum Statutory Payment - a mandatory payment of one percent of the fair cash value of the
property plus 5 percent of the gross income of the project from all sources. This payment is
collected by the state and returned to the municipality.
m Excess Income Payment - any excess profit up to the level of taxes otherwise assessed must be
returned to the municipality. 12 1A entities cannot earn more than 8 percent return on investment.
- Negotiated Payment - payment above the minimum statutory payment negotiated between the
developer and the municipality, paid directly to the municipality.
New York City Chapter 421-a 36 - Department of Housing Preservation & Development administers the
421-a, Tax Incentives Program (TIP) in New York City. There are two zones established in the city for
which different rules apply. Projects located outside the "Exclusion Area" (between the 14* and 96*
Streets) can benefit from the following post construction exemption from the increase in real estate taxes
resulting from the development. Construction period exemption of up to 3 years plus 3 7:
m 10-year (2 full years plus 8-year phase out)3 8
m 15-year (11 full years plus 4-year phase out)
m 20-year (12 full years plus 8-year phase out)
- 21-year (12 full years plus 9-year phase out)
All rental units in the building become subject to rent stabilization for the duration of the benefits. The
initial rents are set by TIP.
36 New York City Department of Housing Preservation & Development, Web Posting "Building Owner Information-Tax
Incentives for Affordable Housing" <http://www.ci.nyc.ny.us./html/hpd/html/tax_incentives/ahp/html>, accessed July 16, 2000
3 The longer exemption periods apply in northern Manhattan and the other boroughs, and to projects that receive government
assistance or contain 20% affordable units.
38 This program shields against the increase in tax assessment due to new development. The taxes payable are based on pre-
construction assessment. In the first two years, the pre-construction taxes are payable. In the following 8 years, the exemption
phases out starting from 80% exemption from the increase in taxes to no exemption at all.
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Market-rate projects located in the "Exclusion Area" are ineligible unless they receive government
assistance, contain 20 percent affordable units, or the owner participates in the 421-a Affordable Housing
Production Program. The 421-a AHP projects can benefit from a 10-year (2 full year and 8-year phase
out) post construction exemption. An 80/20 mix can benefit from the longer exemption period. The
developer has a choice to develop the affordable units either on-site or off-site. Generally one affordable
unit must be financed or constructed for every five units receiving tax abatement. TIP also provides
"negotiable certificates". The affordable housing developer enters the TIP and receives certificates (one
certificate allows property tax exemption for one market rate unit). He/she then sells these certificates to
a developer of a market-rate project in the Exclusion Area. Negotiable Certificates usually sell for
$10,000 to $20,000 each.
2.4 Rental Assistance
Rental assistance covers the shortfall in rents collected from low-income tenants. This form of assistance
results in higher gross income, thereby increasing the NOI.
Section 8 Housing Assistance
In 1974, Congress revamped the national housing policy by providing federal subsidies directly to private
owners to produce and maintain affordable housing. The Section 8 Housing subsidy expanded upon the
1937 United States Housing Act by offering a new type of subsidy that filled the rent gap for low-income
families. One of Section 8's prominent demand-side features is that it offers a wider range of housing
choices to low-income families. The direct rent subsidy leads to better neighborhoods and higher quality,
unsubsidized properties accessible to these families. This housing policy was a critical catalyst in the
creation of mixed-income communities and a major step toward de-concentration of poverty. The
program quickly became the primary source of federal subsidy for rental housing as 200,000 units of
Section 8 were added to the stock of affordable housing each year. This growth continued until 1995
when the government stopped issuing certificates and vouchers for three years. In 1999, total Section 8
assistance touched over 3 million units, more than double the size of the public housing program.39
Despite the freeze, Section 8 still remains the largest source of rental housing subsidy in the U.S.
However, the program's long-term viability is challenged as contracts with participating landlords are
expiring. The continued affordability of many properties is at risk as owners opt out of the program and
choose to convert to unsubsidized market-rate properties.
39 "Opting in: Renewing America's Commitment to Affordable Housing", HUD publication, April 1999
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HUD offers two primary types of Section 8 assistance: project-based assistance and tenant-based
assistance. Under both scenarios, a household contributes approximately 30 percent of its income toward
the rent of a privately owned housing unit.
Tenant-Based Certificates and Vouchers - In a certificate tenancy, the landlord agrees to a contract rent
(a fair market rent set by HUD for each area with a periodic inflation-based rent escalations) and to
receive federal subsidy on a certificate-holder's behalf. The tenant contributes a percentage of his/her
income for rent; the rent subsidy covers the difference between the tenant's contribution and the contract
rent. In a voucher system, the rent subsidy amount is fixed. If tenant elects to occupy a unit with a higher
rent than the fair market rent, the tenant is responsible for the difference. The vouchers and certificates
are "portable" in the sense that they remain with the tenant who can choose among units owned by
participating landlords across the country.
Project-Based Assistance - In Project-Based Section 8, subsidy is tied to units or housing developments.
When a family moves out, the unit is offered to another eligible family. The household that vacated has
given up the subsidy. HUD contracts directly with property owners or state and local housing agencies.
Under the Mod Rehab program, the agencies enter into contracts with owners who must make at least
$1,000 per unit in repairs in order to meet HUD housing quality standards. Contract rents are approved
up to 120 percent of an area's fair market rent (FMR).
Section 8 Programs to Date - From 1974 to 1983, the Section 8 New Construction/Substantial
Rehabilitation (NC/SR) stimulated the production of new affordable housing without direct federal
mortgage subsidy. HUD offered long-term rent guarantees (20-40 year contract) plus Federal Housing
Administration (FHA) mortgage insurance that allowed developers to obtain private conventional
financing. This program was curtailed in 1983 in an effort to reduce social spending. Other Section 8
programs included the Loan Management Set Aside Program (LMSA), implemented from 1976 to 1996,
that provided subsidy to older projects with cash flow problems; and the Property Disposition Program,
established in 1978, that helped HUD sell foreclosed properties to private owners who were ensured
financial stability through 15-year project-based rent subsidies for up to 100 percent of the units. The
more recent Multifamily Assisted Housing Reform and Affordability Act (MAHRAA) of 1997, also
known as Mark-to-Market program represents a market-sensitive solution to the problem of affordability
and its long-term preservation. The program "allows HUD to mark FHA-insured mortgages on properties
with expiring project-based Section 8 contracts to market rents without causing a default in their FHA
Chapter 2
insurance. The existing mortgage will be split into a reduced first mortgage and a non-performing second
held by HUD. Using comparable market rents, the first mortgage will receive a reduction in debt
service"'.
Affordability Requirements - Initially, federal assistance was set at 80 percent of AMI. Later
Congress enacted federal preferences that gave prospective Section 8 tenants with income below
30 percent of AMI priority placement. This was suspended in 1996. In 1981, this requirement
was adjusted to below 50 percent AMI.
* Andrea M. Feldman, "Section 8 Reform-Carving out a Future for Affordable Housing" 1998 Guide to Affordable Housing,
Multi Family Executive, October 1998
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Major Requirements Affordability Requirements
1986 IRS Equity - credit allocation to each state based on
$1.25 per capita
-10% of each state's allocation is
reserved for non-profits
-limited partnership structure
- credits are claimed annually in equal
installments over a 10-year period
- State must allocate credits to projects
based on Qualified Allocation Plans
(QAPs)
-4% credit for acquisition triggered by Tax
Exempt Bond financing, 9% credits for
rehab and new construction with
conventional debt financing or CDBG,
HOME, FHLB AHP
- 20% of units for HH earning
50% AMI or less or 40% of
units for 60% AMI or less
-30-year compliance period
-restricted flat rents equal to
30% of corresponding AMI less
utlity expenditures




- credit allocation based on the lesser of
50% of Federal LIHTC or $4M
-limited partnership structure
- credits are claimed annually in equal
installments over a 5-year period
-provided to qualified Massachusetts'
projects placed in service on or after
January 1, 2001. DHCD can authorize
credits annually for the next five years,
ending Dec 31, 2005.
Grants - accordance with Consolidated Plan
or Debt - 15% to non-profits
-local funding match equal to 25% of
grant
Grants - funds target housing, community
or Debt development, economic development and
social service activities
-Submission of Consolidated Plan to HUD
-Submission of Citizen Participation Plan
to HUD
- 20% of units for HH earning
50% AMI or less or 40% of
units for 60% AM[ or less
-30 year compliance period
-restricted flat rents equal to
30% of corresponding AMI less
utlity expenditures
- 20% of units for households
earning no more than 50%
AMI, in rental projects with
more than 5 HOME-assited
units
- activities must benefit
households earning less than
80% AMI
Grants - FHLBanks 10% annual income set-aside - funds must be used to serve
or Debt to provide subsidies to members families and individuals earning
-Members must make long-term mortgage below 80% AMI
loans


















Major Requirements Affordability Requirements
Capital
Debt -at least 95% of bond proceeds must be
used toward " Qualified Project Costs"
-land acquisition must not exceed 25% of
bond proceeds
-cost of bond issuance paid with bond
proceeds may not exceed 2% of the face
bond amount
-not more than 5% of total square footage
of a project may be set aside for non-
residential space and not more than 5%
of total project income may be derived
from commercial rents.
-must set aside either 20% @
50% AMI or less
-rent restrictions must be
maintained for 15 years after
occupancy at 50% of the units
-low-income rents cannot
exceed 30% of 50% AM[ for

















-all rental units in the building become
subject to rent stabilization for the
duration of the benefits.
-number of abatement schedules. 80/20s
can benefit from a 20-year post
construdtion (12-year full exemption and
8 year gradual taxation)
-choice to develop affordable units on-site
or off-site
- 20% affordable units for
houswholds at 50% AMI
-also "negotiable certificates": affordable
hsg developer enters the program and
receives certificates (one certificate allows
exemption for one market rate units), then
sells these certificates to a market-rate
developer in the Exclusion Area.
NA -all communities must use a more
expedited public approval process
(Comprehensive Permit) for low and
moderate income housing zoning
applications
- State Housing Appeals Committee can
overrule an adverse local decision if less
than 10% of the total year-round housing
units in that community is low and
moderate income housing.
-projects must be assisted
federal or state subsidy for
construction or substantial
rehabilitation
-25% @ 80% AMI or at least
20% @ 50% AMI or less.
-15-yr rent/income restrictions
period for new construction
-project must have oversight by
the subsidizing agency
governed by a regulatory
agreement which restricts rents
and income levels.
-all subsidized units in rental
projects count toward the 10%
affordable housing threshold,
Grant - fair market rents are established by HUD - renters must earn below 50%
for each area. AMI
- renter contributes 30% of his/her income
toward rent. Federal Government pays
the difference between tenant's











In response to a severe shortage of housing that was affecting households of all income levels, the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts created the State Housing Assistance for Rental Production (SHARP)
Program. Created in 1983 and administered by the Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency (MHFA),
SHARP was designed as a public/private partnership aimed to address the rental housing crisis by
providing funding to induce the private sector to develop a large number of mixed-income rental housing
projects throughout the state. While successfully meeting the objectives of the Program in the early years,
a majority of these properties suffered serious financial distress in the economic downturn of the 1990s.
Despite major financial restructuring efforts, the properties have yet to recover. In fact, parties are
currently in litigation. Flaws in the capital structure, lack of proper incentives, and misalignment of risk
and return expectations all played a role in the breakdown of this much needed Program. We have
undertaken an in-depth analysis of SHARP a) due to it being a mixed-income program; and (b) based
upon the premise that one can often learn more from failure than from success.
3.2 Background
The political and economic context of the 1980s points to the impetus behind SHARP. The following are
important factors that greatly contributed to the creation of the Program.
Housing Shortage - In the early 1980s, Massachusetts faced a severe shortage of rental housing as a
result of the economic downturn of the 1970s and the consequential stagnation of the housing market.
The lack of new supply helped fuel rapid inflation in housing costs in the 1980s, which in turn was
causing rents to rise at unprecedented levels. These events threatened the ability of the Commonwealth to
retain businesses, placing future economic development at risk. The state of the development market at
the time (high land and construction costs as well as very high financing rates) had essentially halted
private rental development. The impact on lower-income households was extremely pronounced as
virtually no affordable housing was being produced.
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Lack of Federal Support - In the early 1980s, the Reagan administration decided that the Federal
Government should not be in the affordable housing business and, consequently, removed the
government's stimulus for the production of affordable rental housing. This federal policy decision,
combined with the phase out of the production arm of HUD's Section 8 Program', shifted the
responsibility of rental and affordable housing creation to the state level.
State's New Role - In response to the federal government's elimination of the Section 8 housing
production program, the Commonwealth, under the governorship of Michael Dukakis, organized a Task
Force to devise a viable housing program. The goal was to stimulate rental housing production (both
market-rate and affordable) at a minimal cost to the Commonwealth. The Task Force recommended to
the Governor that a new state housing program be created incorporating some features from programs
proposed for other states, as well as features of the existing rental housing program (the 13A interest
reduction mortgage program2) Massachusetts currently had in place, but with two important
modifications. First, interest rates would only be subsidized down to five percent rather than the previous
one percent; and secondly, the subsidy would be phased out over time and repaid in its entirety. While
the federal Section 8 Program that was being replaced provided a "deep subsidy"3 , the new Program
would be based upon a "shallow subsidy" feature that would considerably lower the cost burden to the
Commonwealth. SHARP also differed in that the Section 8 Program required 100 percent of the units to
be occupied by low-income households and was generally targeted toward the elderly. The new Program
would be designed to attract mixed-income, family-oriented households with only 25 percent of the units
being set-aside for low-income households. Fundamental to the new Program was the Commonwealth's
desire to strengthen the partnership with the private sector.
Tax Reform Act of 1981 and Syndication - In formulating the structure of SHARP, the Commonwealth
levered off the enormous tax incentives created by the Tax Reform Act of 1981. This Act provided
liberal depreciation allowances on rental property and unlimited use of passive losses to offset other
income. Real estate investments that produced "paper losses" were therefore attractive to investors for
'The Section 8 Rental Certificate Program increases affordable housing choices for very low-income households by allowing
families to choose privately owned rental housing. Typically, families apply to a local public housing authority (PHA) for a
Section 8 certificate. The PHA pays the landlord the difference between 30 percent of the household's adjusted income and the
unit's rent.
2 The 13A Program was the Commonwealth's mini-version of the federal Section 236 Program. Under the Program, lenders
received payments amounting to the difference between debt expenses at market interest rates and the debt expenses at 1%.
Savings were used to lower rents in the development.
3 "Deep" or "Shallow" subsidy refer to the government cost of reducing effective mortgage interest rate so affordable housing
can be produced or sustained. SHARP was designed as a "shallow subsidy" program that reduced effective interest rates down to
5 percent rather than one percent as in the 13A Program, known as a "deep subsidy" program.
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the tax deferral benefits they provided. Developers could either keep the losses for their own use or, as
was generally the case, sell them through syndication to investors in high-income brackets who valued
these benefits quite highly. Both developers and the Commonwealth recognized the value of these tax
benefits and specifically categorized the SHARP subsidies as "loans" so that the developers/investors in
the SHARP projects could increase their tax "losses" and the Program would be able to attract the
necessary equity to make the projects feasible.
Tax Reform Act of 1986 - The Tax Reform Act of 1986 had a substantial impact on the investment in
rental properties. The Act effectively barred non-corporate investors from using passive losses to shelter
taxable income from other investments and lengthened tax depreciation periods thereby reducing the tax
losses available to investors. The ability to deduct these losses was the primary tax incentive for these
investors to become involved in rental real estate and the Tax Act of 1986 fundamentally changed the
investing environment. However, this Act created Low Income Housing Tax Credits (LIHTC) which
provided a new tax incentive for investing in housing constructed for low-income households. In order to
keep SHARP viable during this major change to the tax law, the Commonwealth secured a special
provision to the law that allowed SHARP properties that had already received funding commitments to be
eligible for all of the units in the project (not just the low-income units). The SHARP properties that were
constructed after 1986 were also eligible for LIHTC, but only for those units that were set-aside for low-
income households. The developers syndicated both the tax credits and projected losses to investors.
3.3 SHARP's Goals
SHARP was designed to provide financial incentives to private developers in order to increase the rental
housing stock in the state. Both low-cost loans (subsidized fixed-rate first mortgages provided through
the issuance of tax-exempt and taxable bonds by MHFA) and operating subsidies (provided through
SHARP loans by the Commonwealth) were made available. The operational (SHARP) subsidy required
was projected to decrease over time on the assumption that the projected net operating income of the
properties would steadily increase. The primary focus of the MIFA under the SHARP Program was to
stimulate the maximum amount of production of rental housing units while minimizing the expenditure of
the State's limited resources. More specifically, SHARP was designed to:
= Stimulate production of privately owned, rental housing in which 25 percent of the units
would be set-aside for low-income households with rents for these units set at "fair
market" rates. As there was a strong need for rental housing for all market segments,
SHARP was designed foremost as a "rental production program" and not simply as an
"affordable rental program".
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. Facilitate public initiatives to construct affordable rental housing in what had become an
increasingly unaffordable market and provide expanded housing opportunities for lower-
income households.
- Provide subsidies that would act as a debt service "gap filler" that would enable
developers to construct new multi-family housing.
- Achieve the above with limited financial burden on the state.
The SHARP Program was attractive from a public policy standpoint for the following reasons:
. SHARP was designed as a "shallow subsidy" Program that reduced effective interest
rates down to five percent rather than one percent as in the 13A Program.
. Under SHARP, subsidy loans would be limited to 15 years and decline annually.
. The assistance given would be made in the form of a loan that would eventually be paid
back at the conclusion of the commitment period upon the sale or refinancing of the
property.
. SHARP required at least 25 percent of the developed units be set-aside for low-income
households and with the decrease in debt service achieved through tax-exempt financing,
many of the market-rate units might serve moderate-income households as well.
Additionally, SHARP would initially serve as an economic stimulus to the regional economy by
encouraging new construction, creating new jobs, and increasing tax revenues both locally and at the state
level. Essentially, the state was acting as the stimulus that the federal government was no longer
providing and relying on market forces for the success of the SHARP Program. The major premise was
that as inflation continued, market rents could be raised and the subsidy required to fill the gap between
"cost based" rents and "attainable rents"4 would diminish, and the need for the SHARP loans would be
gradually reduced and eventually eliminated.
3.4 Public/Private Partnership & Financial Architecture
In order to make affordable rental housing developments economically feasible in areas where market
rents would otherwise be unable to support conventional financing, a variety of mechanisms - such as
reduced mortgage interest rates, direct rent subsidies to tenants, state-funded interest reduction and/or
4 "Cost-based rent" is defined as the rent needed to support the mortgage loan and operating cost of a project. "Attainable rent" is
defined as the maximum rent at which the units can be rented on the open market. SHARP was put in place to bridge the gap
between the two.
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operating subsidies, federal development grants and tax credits - must often be interwoven. The nature of
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MIHFA - Created in 1966 by state legislation, MHFA offers below-market interest loans to developers of
multi-unit rental properties and first-time homebuyers through loan programs that increase the supply and
long-term preservation of affordable housing within Massachusetts. At the time of SHARP's initiation,
the MHFA had stimulated the investment of over $2.4 billion in housing in communities throughout
Massachusetts.
In contrast with state and federal public housing programs, MHFA does not finance publicly owned rental
housing. Instead, it induces the construction of privately owned and managed apartment complexes
marketed to a broad mix of households. As an adjunct to state-funded public housing programs, the
MHFA operates as a self-supporting mortgage bank and conduit between capital markets and the housing
industry. The Agency raises funds in the national bond market and lends out the proceeds as construction
and permanent mortgage loans. As housing revenue bonds, MHFA's debt issues are secured by the value
of underlying real estate; their bond debt service obligations are met by passed-through mortgage loan
payments; and their bonds qualify as a type of municipal bond and, therefore, yield interest earnings
which are free from federal taxation. In return for such income tax-exemption, purchasers of housing
revenue bonds accept interest rates below those of comparable taxable securities. The MHFA passes
these bond interest rate savings on to its mortgage loan borrowers (the developers) in order to stimulate
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construction activity in the public interest. Developers seek MHFA multi-family mortgages for their long
term-to-maturity, fixed interest rate, and high loan-to-value proceeds.
The Legislature designated MHFA as the sole lender and administrator for the SHARP Program. In order
to raise the capital necessary to fund the SHARP Program, MHFA sold both taxable and tax-exempt
bonds to private investors and used these proceeds to provide construction loans and first mortgages to
the developers. The Agency lends to developers at below-market interest rates who retain ownership, but
must set-aside at least 25 percent of their units for tenants who meet public housing eligibility criteria.
The first mortgages were priced to the developers at the Agency's cost of funds plus .5 percent to help
cover MHFA's general and administrative expenses. The interest rates on the first mortgages were priced
several hundred basis points below market-rate financing at that time. The mortgage debt service
payments from the developers would be used to repay the bondholders and support the administrative
expenses of the Agency. Historically, the MHFA has been able to maintain a high credit rating on the
bonds it issues. Maintaining a high credit rating is very important to the Agency in that it allows the
bonds to be sold at lower yields than bonds issued with a lower rating.' As a public purpose lender,
MHFA can help persuade local governments to expedite the development of their fair share of affordable
housing.
MHFA promotes its public purpose by attaching four key conditions to the SHARP financings.
Participating developers must:
- reserve at least 25 percent of the units they build for tenants whose incomes qualify them for
public housing;
a maintain their developments and the set-aside affordable units as rental housing for at least 15
years;
- accept a cap on direct profits from development operations: surplus income, if any, must be used
to fund replacement reserves and rent reductions;
m agree to other regulations, which in effect impose Agency rent controls on the set-aside units in
their developments.
Thus, MHFA serves the rental market in three ways: first, it induces private development increasing
overall availability of high quality rental housing. Secondly, it seeks to promote such development in
5 Bonds with a higher credit rating are deemed to be less "risky" to investors. Therefore, investors in these bonds are willing to
accept a lower yield (i.e. less return on their investment). Therefore, the money raised through the issuance of bonds with a high
credit rating costs the issuer (MHFA in this instance) less and this savings can be extended to the borrowers (the developers) in
the form of lower interest rates on their mortgages.
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market areas where rental housing development is less likely to occur without public assistance. And
finally, it works alongside direct subsidy programs to make a percentage of units affordable for low-
income applicants.
Commonwealth of Massachusetts - Prior to the construction of these developments, financial
projections indicated that the operating income of the properties would not be sufficient to cover the fixed
annual mortgage debt service so SHARP "subsidy loans" were offered to bolster the operating cash flow.
The SHARP subsidy loans were funded by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and administered by the
MHFA. The subsidy had the following key features:
1. the maximum SHARP subsidy for a project was based upon the difference between what it would
cost a developer to finance construction of each unit at prevailing tax-exempt interest rates and
what it would cost at a 5 percent interest rate. The difference represented the maximum allowable
SHARP subsidy.
2. the subsidy was designed as a loan - not a grant, and although there was no predetermined
"balloon" repayment date, SHARP was to be paid as the project could afford to do so; but in any
event at the sale or refinancing, which may take place at the termination of the SHARP subsidy,
or later during the term of the mortgage.
Federal Government/HUD - The SHARP Program relied heavily on Section 8, a federal program that
provides direct rental subsidy to low-income tenants. As previously discussed, SHARP was also designed
to take advantage of the tax incentives offered to real estate investors created by the Tax Act of 1981.
Later on, when the tax benefits of the 1981 Act were curtailed, SHARP leveraged off the Tax Act of 1986
which offered Low Income Tax Credits and encouraged private investors to participate in the
development of affordable housing.
Private Partners
Developers - SHARP re-established the private/public partnership for developing rental housing in order
to take full advantage of the private sector's expertise in development and real estate management. In
return, the developers/owners were able to earn profits through substantial development fees (10 to 20
percent of total development costs) and annual property management fees. The substantial tax losses
associated with the projects were attractive to investors so the developers created limited partnerships to
own the properties. Through syndication, the LIHTCs and tax losses would be passed through to the
limited partners (the investors). In return, the investors would provide the partnership with the capital
needed to fulfill the equity requirement of the project.
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Investors - The extensive tax benefits offered to investors in rental housing following the enactment of
1981 Tax Reform Act was the impetus for investor participation in the SHARP Program. These tax
incentives, however, were reduced substantially by the Tax Act of 1986 which concurrently created the
LIHTC. LIHTCs provide tax incentives specifically targeted to affordable housing. Although the tax
savings mechanism used by the investors to generate their investment return changed over time, their
interest in the SHARP Program was still driven by tax incentives.
3.5 Risk/ Return Characteristics
MHFA's Mission - As mentioned previously, MIHFA used its ability to offer below-market financing
with attractive terms to induce private developers into a "partnership" to build the badly needed rental
housing. MIHFA would supply the bulk of the capital needed and price it below market while the private
developers would supply the expertise to develop and operate the projects and a limited amount of equity.
But even with below-market financing, operating deficits were forecasted for the early years of the
SHARP projects. MHFA was dependent on the mortgage debt service payments due from the developers
to make the required payments to their bondholders. Timely payments on these loans were critical to
MHFA if it was to maintain its high bond rating. If the bond ratings were allowed to slip, the Agency
would become less competitive in the bond market preventing it from being able to sell their bonds at
lower yields. This in turn would reduce the "discount" they could pass on to their borrowers and, in turn,
reduce the effectiveness of the Agency in fulfilling its mission of inducing development through below-
market financing. Therefore, the State was to offer operating subsidies to the projects (known as
"SHARP subsidy loans") that would be administered by MHFA and used to bolster the properties'
operating cash flows allowing the debt payment due MHFA to be made. The SHARP loans were put in
place to ensure that the debt payments to the MIFA would not be exposed to substantial risk.
The State - The rental housing crunch was so significant it became a political issue. It had reached the
stage where it was affecting all households, regardless of income. Due to cutbacks on the Federal level,
the State had limited resources and was searching for ways to leverage its ability to increase the housing
stock. SHARP offered the opportunity to jump start construction provided the State would subsidize the
operational deficits of the newly constructed properties for a projected period that ranged up to 15 years.
The SHARP model forecasted rents increasing over time at 5 percent annually, a 5 percent vacancy
allowance and annual operating costs increasing at 5 percent. The model showed that under these
assumptions the properties would gradually be weaned off subsidies. The State would be paid back the
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money they infused into the projects as the projects achieved positive cash flows or when the properties
were sold or refinanced at a later date. The State was willing to absorb this risk because they were under
political pressure to increase the rental housing stock. The belief was that the economy would continue to
grow for at least the next decade bringing more and better paying jobs, and thus higher rents. Some of the
bonds that were issued to raise the money for these subsidies were backed by the State which, unlike
MHFA, had the power to raise additional funds from taxpayers if additional subsidies were needed. Both
MHFA and the Commonwealth saw limited risk associated with issuing these bonds, based on its overly
optimistic economic forecasts and the political environment called for immediate action.
Developers - Under normal market conditions the development of mixed-income housing is difficult.
When attempted during the prevailing market conditions of the 1980s, it became even more challenging,
and without subsidies, was simply not viable. The majority of the housing units being built at that time
were targeted to affluent households due to the higher profit margins and returns that could be realized.
Much of the construction at the time consisted of condominium projects. The high demand for this type
of housing directly competed with the resources for rental housing units and consequently drove up the
cost of land and increased overall construction costs. In order to be induced to construct mixed-income
housing, the developers had to be offered an attractive financing package that would allow them to reap
profits and returns that were at least comparable than those offered by constructing 100 percent market
rate units (i.e., condominiums). These factors played a major role in the design of the SHARP Program.
The capital structure of SHARP had a number of appealing components to the developers. The tax-
exempt bonds sold by the MHFA allowed the developers access to capital that was priced roughly several
hundred basis points below the market. The first mortgages also offered high loan-to-value (LTV) ratios
that allowed the developers to lever up to levels approaching 100 percent. The loans were fixed-rate that
insulated the developers from fluctuations in interest rates. If, as predicted, inflation continued to spiral
upwards, NOI would grow but the fixed payment on the loan would remain constant allowing debt
service to eventually be covered. And finally, the loans were non-recourse thereby protecting the
developer should default occur on the mortgage.
In the Program, developers were allowed to earn development fees ranging from 10 to 20 percent of total
development costs. When combined with the high LTV ratios offered on the mortgages, and the ability to
syndicate the tax benefits, there were instances in which the developers were able to structure their deals
whereby they had to put up very little of their own equity. With limited equity invested, loans that were
Chapter 3
non-recourse, and large development fees that were received upfront, the developers had very little at risk
in these projects.
The structure of the public/private partnership also allowed the developers to own and operate the
projects. This provided a number of benefits, one of which allowed the developers to be paid an annual
management fee that was based upon a contract amount. This provided a steady annual income that was
not based upon the operational success of the project. In essence, it was a relatively risk-free return for
managing and operating the project.
Another benefit was that by all projections, the properties would not be able to generate enough positive
cash flow during the first ten to fifteen years of operation to pay the full debt service payment on the first
mortgage. Therefore, SHARP subsidy loans were offered by the Commonwealth to fill the gap between
cash flow generated and the debt service on the first mortgages. These subsidy loans were not due for
payback until the properties either achieved positive cash flows or were sold or refinanced at a later date.
These subsidies were intentionally categorized as "loans" to allow the developers avoid having to declare
them as taxable income, thereby generating extra ordinarily large annual tax losses for their investors.
The net result to the developers were that for relatively little risk, they could build these properties with
capital priced below market; earn a substantial developer's fee; put little equity of their own into the deal;
have the ability to sell the tax benefits to investors providing additional capital to the partnership and earn
a steady annual management fee.
Investors - During the years that were covered by the Tax Reform Act of 1981 (1981-1986), investors
were looking for projects that had large paper losses so that these losses could be written off against other
income they earned. These losses could be taken regardless of whether or not the property turned a profit.
The investors based their expected return on these factors continuing for at least the next decade. The
major risks were if the tax laws were modified (which occurred in 1986) and if the investment partnership
defaulted on its loan which would subject the investors to recapture of their tax losses. Although the tax
laws did change in 1986, there were special exceptions made to the investors already committed to
SHARP projects that still allowed them to reap substantial tax benefits. The LIHTC which came as a
result of the 1986 Tax Act provided the investors with a more certain return as the credits were
guaranteed to be realized provided the property stayed in compliance and out of default. Therefore,
although the investors were subject to risks, they ostensibly did not perceive the risk to be very high.
Chapter 3
Bondholder's Risk Profile - MHFA has an excellent reputation and historically has received very high
credit ratings on their bonds. A large portion of the bonds that were issued were tax-exempt allowing the
interest earned by the bondholders to be tax-free. Both of these features allow the bonds to be issued at
lower yields allowing MHFA to access capital at below market rates. The bondholders were willing to
pay higher prices for these bonds as long as they felt secure about repayment in full and on time. The
bondholders felt assured that this was the case because:
- MHFA had an excellent reputation and track record and thus a high bond rating;
- the bonds were insured; and
- some of the bonds were issued as "moral obligation" bonds which meant that if MHFA could not
cover its obligations, MHFA was required to petition the Governor who in turn would request the
Legislature to cover the obligations. The Legislature is not required to do so, but is considered to
have a "moral obligation" to make good on the bonds.
With these assurances, the bondholders were willing to invest in these low-risk investments and provide
the capital for production of this social good.
3.6 Strengths & Weaknesses of the Program
The Program was extremely successful in its early stages and achieved one of its main objectives:
thousands of units were built during the boom years of the mid-eighties. Applications exceeded available
subsidy by over three to one. The SHARP portfolio eventually totaled 82 projects consisting of 9,350
units of which 3,131 (33 percent) were set-aside as low-income rentals. During the early years, the
significant pent-up demand for rental housing allowed the rents to inflate as had been projected.
However, years later a large percentage of the developments began to face serious financial difficulties.
The economic downturn that occurred in the early nineties, coupled with tax policy changes targeted at
investments made in real estate, had a significant impact on the SHARP portfolio. The unprecedented
growth in condominium development followed by the housing market collapse resulted in many of the
unsold condominiums flooding the rental market. SHARP developments experienced higher vacancy
rates and lower rent growth than projected.
One of the impacts the Tax Reform Act of 1986 had on SHARP was that it altered the way Massachusetts
could issue tax-exempt bonds to finance low- and moderate-income housing projects. The sweeping
changes in the tax treatment of potential investors in real estate and bonds forced the state to adjust its
policies and procedures and reaffirm its commitment to providing housing assistance to the needy. For
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example, 7,600 units in the SHARP Program were threatened by the Act until the Massachusetts
congressional delegation secured special tax credit transition rules.
In 1989, in response to the financial distress and anticipated operating shortfalls, MHFA began to
investigate restructuring options. By 1991, a restructuring program was put into place and many of the
SHARP owners agreed to modifications to the capital structure in order to maintain the financial viability
of their projects. MHFA opted to increase the subsidy (rather than lowering the interest rates on SHARP
mortgages in conjunction with additional capital contributions from the general and limited partners) in
order to fill the widening gap between the projects' cash flows and the mortgage payments.
Simultaneously, MHFA used its rights under management agreements to demand a more aggressive
market-based management of these properties to boost the net operating income and make a significant
improvement in financial performance.
An overall evaluation of the Program will help us determine the reasons behind SHARP's vulnerability
and why its limited accomplishments have been overshadowed by its shortcomings and failures.
Strengths
Improved Program - One of the major strengths of SHARP was its ability to build upon the framework
of prior housing programs and resolve some of their inherent problems. At its inception, SHARP had a
very important added benefit that quickly led to its acceptance by policy-makers - a "declining subsidy"
as opposed to a "flat or fixed subsidy" that had been used for public housing. SHARP was a more
progressive program in that the idea of people becoming better off and real estate values appreciating
overtime was embedded in the Program's structure. This was very appealing to policymakers and
legislators who insisted on diminishing the financial burden of housing programs on the state.
Initial Low Cost - Another major attribute of SHARP was its initial low cost to the state due to it being
designed as a "shallow subsidy" system in comparison to previous programs that centered on "deep
subsidy". Through its reliance on rent skewing rather than strictly on government rental subsidies,
developments that consisted of primarily market rate units could be constructed with the market rate units
helping to carry the costs of the 25 percent affordable units.
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Quality Housing - By building a strong partnership with the private sector and utilizing their expertise in
development and real estate management, the quality of the affordable housing produced was superior to
that of the past. The market rate units had to succeed in the competitive private market so quality design
and management were critical. Affordable units were required to be undistinguishable from the market
rate units resulting in projects that removed much of the stigma attached to this type of housing in the
past.
Leverage of State's Funds - By structuring SHARP in such a way that it took advantage of the liberal
tax incentives offered by the Tax Reform Act of 1981, and later the tax credits available through the Tax
Reform Act of 1986, SHARP provided very attractive financial incentives for investors to contribute
much needed capital to the projects. This resulted in private developers and investors partnering together
to deliver a social good while earning extraordinary risk-adjusted profits, while at the same time
permitting the state to leverage its limited funds to achieve its objectives.
Weaknesses
Unrealistic Assumptions - The idea of declining subsidy could only work if the assumptions underlying
the growth of net operating income were realistic. Unfortunately for all of the investors in SHARP, they
were not.
1) NOI Growth - As mentioned previously, the Program had a myopic perspective in projecting the
growth of NOI to rise steadily for the next 15 years. The Massachusetts economy had been booming over
the past few years and it was believed this would continue indefinitely. The forecasting model
completely ignored the cyclical nature of the real estate market and failed to incorporate any type of
downturn in the economy.
2) Housing Market - At the time SHARP was being enacted, the demand for housing was being driven
by income rather than population growth. Consequently, in the early part of the 1980's, the economic
boom provided a ripe environment for SHARP to have a healthy start and rapidly produce thousands of
quality affordable rental units. On the contrary, the latter part of the 1980's changed the situation
drastically. Lower wages, and the massive overbuilding of previous years chilled demand for the market
rate units, representing 75 percent of the unit mix and relied upon to carry the vast majority of the
operating costs and debt.
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3) Operating Expenses - Although the change in market conditions had a profound effect on SHARP's
poor financial performance, it was not the only reason. Initial forecasts of operating expenses by the
developers were often unrealistically low (approximately $2,500/unit when $3,500 to $4,000 would have
been more appropriate). The low operating cost projections by the developers resulted in their pro formas
showing higher NOI projections than more prudent estimates would have shown. Higher levels of NOI
allow for higher loan amounts. This points to an inherent incentive problem in SHARP where the
structure tempts the developers to underestimate the operating expenses so they can position themselves
to take better advantage of higher levels of inexpensive non-recourse debt. As operating information
became available over time, MHFA found that the actual operating expenses per unit averaged over
$4,000 per unit.
4) Total Development Costs - With the tremendous growth of the condominium market in the 1980s,
developers began offering units with higher and higher amenity packages (kitchen upgrades, health clubs,
etc.) to make their projects more marketable and at the same time capable of demanding higher selling
prices. This growing trend put pressure on the SHARP developers to include amenities in their units so
that they could compete more effectively in the housing market. The developers eventually convinced
MHFA that these amenities were essential features. This resulted in both higher construction and
operating costs than were originally budgeted for, which in turn required deeper subsidies to make these
projects financially feasible. The higher levels of debt were dependent on the projects being able to attain
higher rents, which in the end did not happen to the degree that had been anticipated.
Inexperience - As in virtually any new venture, it takes time for the various parties involved to fine tune
the operations to achieve a more efficient way of doing things. This was also the case with SHARP. A
number of the developers who were awarded funding were experienced in public housing through the
Section 8 Program, but were not well versed in housing that had to compete effectively in the private
market. SHARP was designed so that 75 percent of the units would compete in the open market. These
developers were not adept at marketing and often fell short of achieving competitive market rents. They
were used to operating in a "subsidized world" where the objective was to simply fill units with low-
income tenants (of which there were plenty waiting for a vacant unit) and rely on subsidies to make up for
operating deficiencies. This inexperience resulted in rents falling well short of the market and operating
costs exceeded comparable properties. Combined, this led to NOI levels that were far below expectations
and investment partnerships that were financially stressed.
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Misalignment of Interest - The SHARP Program had even more fundamental incentive problems
associated with it.
Developers - The developer's interests were not properly aligned with the other investment parties. Few,
if any, incentives were in place for the developers to work hard to maximize NOI so the developments
could be weaned off of the subsidy loans and become self-supporting. In reality, there was little upside
for them if operations did improve, and surprisingly little perceived downside if the properties failed to
meet projected levels of NOT. Simply put, with little, if any, equity invested in these deals, the developers
had little at stake after the projects were built. The increase or decrease in NOI did little to change their
bottom line because:
1. surplus income had to be reinvested in the developments or used for rent reductions;
2. they had already received hefty development fees which were paid upfront. Therefore, the
developers were more interested in "doing deals" and getting projects constructed so they could
receive their next development fee rather than working hard to maximize the on-going operations
of the properties; and
3. management fees were substantial and were for a contracted percentage amount of operating
revenues that included the annual SHARP subsidy loan funding. A much more effective form of
compensation would have been rewarding management based upon meeting achievable
established performance thresholds.
State - The state had more at stake in the early years of SHARP when the housing crisis and the political
issues surrounding it were more prominent and the emphasis was on production of rental housing. Once
SHARP managed to jump-start the construction of a significant number of rental units, the state's
incentive faded away. There was also a change in leadership at the State House and the Program was not
a focal point of the new administration's agenda. The on-going performance of these properties was not a
major concern to the state until the looming financial crisis, due to the properties not being able to reduce
their required operating subsidies and still remain current on their mortgages, became readily apparent.
Investors - Ironically, even in situations where significant operating shortfalls were experienced, these
properties remained viable and profitable investments for the limited partnership investors. Their returns
were structured around tax incentives rather than the properties actual performance. Therefore, there was
no incentive for these investors to impose more discipline on management to maximize the NO.
Operating tax losses were actually beneficial to them.
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3.7 Conclusions
There are many lessons to be learned from SHARP. Although the objectives of the Program were well
intended, the framework that was established to meet these objectives had serious structural flaws. In
hindsight, some of the major oversights committed by the designers of the Program include:
1. A capital structure conceived with shortsighted objectives is doomed to fail. The need to
construct a large amount of rental units in a hurry (whether due to political pressures or socio-
economic pressures, or a mixture of both) during an unprecedented time of appreciation in real
estate and development costs, led to the creation of a public/private framework that was based on
subsidies rather than the efficiencies of the real estate market.
2. Because the subsidies contractually declined over time, the net operational incomes of the
properties had to go up each year. If they didn't, there would be a default under the mortgage. A
financial architecture with no inherent debt service coverage or liquidity was grossly
inappropriate for an untested large-scale production program.
3. Real estate investments are subject to the cyclical nature of the real estate market which can
experience dramatic downturns when overbuilding is combined with an economic recession.
Financial models should be made with prudent assumptions based upon long-term historical
trends rather than myopic growth expectations.
4. When entering into partnership arrangements, it is imperative to fully understand the goals and
objectives (as well as the strengths and shortcomings) of each partner. Be certain that the
incentives for the various investment partners are properly aligned with their rewards. In
addition, returns must be commensurate with the risks taken. SHARP had conflicting goals
between the parties involved and some of the parties created additional difficulties due to their
inexperience. Until all parties are both capable and willing to work towards a common goal of
increasing the underlying value of the asset, the long-term physical and financial viability of the
project will be in jeopardy.
5. Compensation structures must have a performance-based incentives built into their framework.




For the past two decades, the "80/20" (80% market-rate units, 20% low-income units) housing finance
programs have played a significant role in the development of privately owned mixed-income rental
housing. Largely due to cutbacks in federal funding during the 1980s, the financing of affordable rental
housing has required a greater reliance on housing finance agencies' ability to raise low-cost debt capital,
primarily through tax-exempt bonds. Through the 80/20 Program, state and local housing agencies offer
below-market, tax-exempt debt financing for the acquisition, rehabilitation and/or new construction of
multifamily rental apartments in developments that reserve at least 20 percent of units for occupancy by
households whose income does not exceed 50 percent AMI. Utilized by developers of new market rate
rental housing and occasionally by owners of all-market rate developments seeking refinancing, the
program has been instrumental in the efficient production of multifamily rental for both market-rate and
affordable units.
80/20s are real estate developments driven almost entirely by the local and regional real estate market
dynamics. In contrast with most affordable housing programs that have deep subsidy requirements, an
80/20 Program requires minimal government support, and only in the form of a federal tax exemption to
encourage private investment in affordable housing. The below-market debt combined with the cross-
subsidization achieved by renting 80 percent of the units at full market price enables the owner to charge
lower rents for the remaining 20 percent of the units occupied by very low-income tenants (households at,
or below, 50% AMI) yet still have a financially viable project. Some 80/20s provide additional incentives
for the market-rate developers to participate in the program including density bonuses and real estate tax
abatements. These additional features reduce the per unit development and operating costs thereby
increasing the potential for returns comparable to projects that are 100 percent market rate.
Table 4.1 compares the 80/20 Programs administered by the MHFA and the New York City Housing
Development Corporation'. While both programs use the same primary financing vehicles (i.e. tax-
exempt bond financing and the 4% LIHTC), there are a number of noteworthy differences.
'A public benefit corporation organized in 1972 under Article XII of the New York State Private Housing Finance Law. Though
originally limited to making loans to authorized housing companies, since 1983, HDC has been enabled to finance multi-family
rental projects owned by ordinary general or limited partnerships and other entities.<http://www.nychdc.com/8020.html>
Chapter 4
Table 4.1







Debt Service Coverage Ratio
Credit Enhancement
MHFA 80/20
20% @ 50% AMI or 40% @ 60%
(rents charges cannot exceed 30%
of AMI limit)
Tax-Exempt Bonds +4% LIHTC





HUD/FHA Risk Sharing, LOC or
cash security as bond insurance
NYCHDC 80/20
20% @ 50% AMI or 25% @ 60% (rents
charges cannot exceed 30% of AMI limit)





FHA, Federal National Mortgage
Association-FNMA, State of New York
Mortgage Agency-SONYMA mortgage
insurance, Third Party (LOCs, surety bond,
bond insurance)









40B) MHFA is empowered to issue
site approval for a comp permit
application
None
15 years, or as long as the tax-




as long as 421-a benefits
15 years or as long as 421-a benefits, or
the tax-exempt bonds are outstanding
None
The most significant difference is the incorporation of the 421-a property tax abatement into the NYC's
80/20 Program. Projects financed through the 80/20 Program in NYC are eligible for the longer 20-year
421-a benefit schedule. This schedule calls for real estate taxes to remain at the pre-development level for
the allowable 3-year construction period and continue to remain at this level for another 12 years, after
which the taxes are gradually increased over the next 8 years culminating at full assessment.
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Strengths
The 80/20 Program has been an effective program from both the demand-side (renters) and supply-side
(developers and investors) perspective. Its strengths can be summarized as follows:
No Subsidy Requirements - This is a market driven program with sufficient incentives to encourage the
private developer to set aside the mandatory number of affordable units in an otherwise conventional
multifamily housing development. Experts in the field recognize that "successful development of mixed-
income communities - as with other types of development - depends upon a careful assessment of the
market. Such assessments provide not only the information needed to design a project to meet market
demand, but also the information lenders need to assess the potential risks and returns"2 . Thus, careful
planning and special attention to the fundamentals of real estate development and management ensures
quality housing that allows income mixing without the need for prohibitive costs to the government.
Design Quality - The market sensitivity of mixed-income projects (i.e. the need to attract and keep
market-rate renters), necessitates superior design and amenities including siting, architectural details and
finishes, and attractive common facilities that characterize a well conceived, market-rate community.
Design attributes such as unit size and configuration, development density, open space and the like
greatly influence the appeal of mixed-income housing. "It goes without saying that the stereotypical
high-rise public housing with skip-floor elevators, doorless closets, bleak design, poor construction, and
inadequate maintenance is unlikely to attract households of any income level"3 . These benefits are
equally enjoyed by various income groups through similar unit design and use of common facilities and
activities. In sum, low- and moderate-income families can take advantage of a much higher-quality
physical environment, not otherwise accessible to them through other housing programs.
Top-Quality Management - Aggressive market-based property management is another prerequisite for
any 80/20 project to succeed. Strong professional management is key to building a common culture and a
sense of community in these developments, which are as critical to the viability of these projects as are
well-maintained physical structures. Other highly valued attributes of quality management are safety,
security, cleanliness, and prompt and courteous handling of maintenance requests. This is a major benefit
to all tenants as well as an effective marketing tool. Unlike public housing where incentives are not in
2 Diane R. Suchman, "Mixed-Income Housing" The Urban Land Institute, 1995, p. 3.
3 Alex Schwartz and Kian Tajbakhsh, "Mixed-Income Housing: Unanswered Questions" Cityscape: A Journal ofPolicy
Development and Research, Volume 3, Number 2, 1997, p. 77
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place to encourage strong management, an 80/20 project's financial viability is largely contingent upon
competent management that fully understands the demands of a market-based rental project.
Better Neighborhoods - As with all real estate, location is a key determinant of market appeal. It goes
without saying that poorly located mixed-income developments are not attractive to middle- and high-
income renters who have locational choices. Remotely located housing in areas with abandoned
buildings, street crime, poor highway and public transportation access, and far from employment centers
will either have severe vacancy losses or will not meet the income-mixing goal. The economics of an
80/20 project force the developer to select more desirable neighborhoods and strong market areas in
which to develop mixed-income housing.
Market-Based Expertise - Given the need for market-oriented development and management expertise,
and without reliance on government subsidies, the vast majority of the 80/20s have been developed by
market-rate developers. This has allowed the real estate fundamentals to drive the development and
management decisions ensuring the long-term physical and financial viability of these developments.
Additional Incentives - Both the Massachusetts and New York City programs have important features
that have been extremely effective in encouraging participation in the program. In NYC, the longer tax
exemption period of the 421-a program linked to the 80/20 Program is even more vital than the low-cost
debt in realizing a healthy stream of cash flow4. In Massachusetts, MHFA reports that the ability to
obtain site approval for a Chapter 40B comprehensive permit application, often including a density bonus,
has been the main trigger for attracting reputable developers to build mix-income housings.
Weaknesses
Serving The Very Poor - The 80/20 Program has been criticized for its inability to reach the poorest of
the poor provide housing. MHFA reports that a number of its 80/20 projects are currently serving
households at or below 30 percent AMI (a sufficient number of low-income households that fell within
the parameters of 50% AMI could not be found). In these cases, however, the program has been
supplemented by federal and state rental assistance (Section 8 and MRVP6 certificates) 7.
4 Bill Sandholm, Rose Associates, Inc. (NYC-based development firm), personal interview, June 29, 2000
5 Nancy Andersen, Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency, personal interview, June 20, 2000
6 Massachusetts Rental Voucher Program
7 Alice Senturia, Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency, personal interview, July 7, 2000
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Higher Costs - Some experts have argued that mixed-income housing is a more expensive
undertaking for the production of affordable housing. Schwartz and Tajbakhsh have concluded "to
attract market-rate tenants and minimize vacancy losses, sponsors of mixed-income housing may
need to invest more resources in construction and maintenance than they would if their housing were
occupied solely by the poor"'. Quality housing indeed has a price. Achieving a higher quality
design, offering an attractive package of amenities, and benefiting from extensive market-based
development experience impacts the cost of development. If the 80/20 Program is rightfully
considered a market-rate program, then the cost of producing this type of housing should not be
deemed excessive.




This Chapter presents an overview of our Financial Model that was developed as a tool to explore a new
financial architecture for developing mixed-income housing. This Chapter first provides a detailed
description of the Model's assumptions, the calculation methodology, and the sources of data that were
consulted for costing and trending. Presented next is our Baseline Scenario and our proposed capital
structure. The Model is then used to run a number of sensitivity analyses which evaluate the impact of
changes in key variables on required development capital and investment returns. The Chapter concludes
with an analysis of the risk and return to each of the principal investors.
5.1 Assumptions and Methodology
Our project is largely modeled after several 80/20 projects that have been developed in the suburbs of
Boston. MHFA provided us with recent audited project and operational costs for several 80/20 projects it
has financed. Construction costs for one of the projects were for 1999 and, therefore, should be a very
good measure for comparison. A large development company that has a portfolio of 80/20 projects also
provided us cost figures for the development phase of their projects. Finally, for both operational costs
and growth rates we used audited ten-year weighted-averages from the SHARP portfolio to impose the
financial stresses of a significant real estate cycle on our Model.
Project Size - In determining the number of units for our Model, we separated out the developments in
the SHARP portfolio that are located in the suburbs. We found that they ranged from roughly 100 to 150
units. The 80/20 developments we analyzed ranged from 80 to 200 units. We decided to use the average
size of a SHARP development (125) which was also in keeping with the size of projects currently being
built under the 80/20 Program.
Unit Distribution/Mix - We found that the 80/20 projects developed in the suburbs typically had two-
thirds of the project built as 2-bedroom units and the remaining one-third as 1-bedroom units. We have
80 percent of the units targeted for households in the 120 percent AMI bracket and 20 percent of the units
set aside for households in the 50 percent AMI limit. The market-rate units were targeted for households
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at 120% AMI because the rents these households can afford to pay were in line with (and approximately
equal to) the rents being received in the 80/20 projects we analyzed.
Unit Size - We took the average square footage for 2-bedroom and 1-bedroom units of the 80/20
developments we believed were similar to our base Model. Our market research confirmed that the
market rents assumed in this Model are currently being charged for these unit sizes (See Appendix C).
Given that the Model assumes operation in two years (i.e. 2002), we are confident that this current level
of market rents is achievable. Our Model excludes 3-bedroom units not only for project cost-related
purposes but also in consideration of the impact on the Municipality's decision to offer tax abatement to
the Developer. Our Model, therefore, recognizes the trade-off between the project's financial feasibility
through real estate tax abatement/deferral and the project's likely fiscal impact to the Municipality due to
the higher cost of public service provision (i.e. impact on school budgets). To compensate, however, our
project contains fairly spacious 1-bedroom and 2-bedroom units.
SHARP Portfolio
The Model uses actual, audited data derived from a portfolio of 23 mixed-income SHARP properties.
These are all the SHARP properties for which 10 years of audited financial statements were available.
We believe that the operating performance of this portfolio from 1990 tol999 accurately represents the
potential cyclicality of the multifamily mixed-income rental market.
The higher ratio of affordable units in the SHARP portfolio as compared to 80/20 projects supports our
claim that the Model uses conservative assumptions. SHARP is considered a worst case scenario not only
because of a higher level of low-income units but also because of the inherent problems with the Program
including an ill-conceived capital structure and severe misalignment of interests discussed in Chapter 3.
The following Table 5.1.1 provides general information about these properties.
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Table 5.1.1
General Information on SHARP Portfolio
Total # # akt% Market #Lw % LowSHARP Properties Location #narkRate % are Income IncomeUnits Units
Anchor's Weigh Chelsea 87 65 75% 22 25%
Blue Hills Village Canton 9 73 74% 25 26%
Highland Apartments Cambridge 117 87 74% 30 26%
Church Corner Fall River 05 62 73% 23 27%
Kimball Court Apts Woburn 184 138 75% 46 25%
Littlebrook Hudson 96 72 75% 24 25%
Maiden Gardens Malden 140 105 75% 35 25%
Mariner's Hill Marshfield 90 67 74% 23 26%
Mill Valley Estates Amherst 148 89 60% 59 40%
No $toughton Vii age Stoughton 100 75 75% 25 25%
Olde Derby Village Norwood 139 104 75% 35 25%
Oxford House at Queen Cllnton 203 151 74% 51 25%
Plantation Tower Worcester 107 80 75% 27 25%
Pond Side at Littieton Littleton 90 58 64% 32 3%
Ramblewood Il Holbrook 138 103 75% 35 25%
Riverboat Village South Hadley 170 127 75% 43 25%
Ships Watch Fall River 99 74 75% 25 25%
Stone Brook Farm Burlington 203 151 74% 51 25%
Summer Hill House Boston/JP 75 56 75% 19 25%
Taunton Woods Taunton 120 90 75% 30 25%
The Millery Beverly 98 73 74% 25 26%
The Royal Worcester Worcester 155 116 75% 39 25%
Village at Mansfield Depo Mansfield 150 112 75% 38 25%
Total Portfolio 3,004 2,211 74% 790 26%
Growth Rates
Table 5.1.2 shows the annual percent changes in gross rental income, real estate taxes and operating
expenses of our portfolio. Detailed information on SHARP portfolio income and operating performance
as well as other data used in the Model is presented in Appendix A.
Table 5.1.2
SHARP Portfolio Growth Rates
SHAR P YEARS 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998_ 1999
Gross Rent - 0.09% -0.05% -0.03% 3.45% 2.36% 2.57% 3.44% 6.36% 4.80%
Operating Expenses - -1.82% 7.29% 0.87% 4.53% -2.38% 3.11% -1.98% -4.44% 9.70%
Real Estate Taxes - 7.78% -8.72% 4.69% 3.68% 0.11% -0.92% 3.46% 2.83% 2.99%
MODELYEARS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
11 12 13 14 15 16
The Model assumes the above rates as growth rates for each of the corresponding line item in the
operating pro forma. Growth rates in the Model years 11-16 are the same as years 1-6.
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Total Development Cost (TDC)
Land Costs
Land costs vary considerably from town to town and are largely dependent on the rents that can be
attained from units built in that particular location. In reaching a figure to use in our Model, we assumed
that the site contained no limiting factors (i.e. contaminated soil, disproportional amount of wetlands, etc.)
that could add substantially to the development cost. We contacted several real estate brokers to
determine the current cost of raw land that met the parameters of our project. We found that prices were
extremely dependent on location and whether the parcel was already approved for multi-family
development. We attempted to find prices for land that was not already permitted so that the Developer
could bring additional value to the project by using his expertise to move through the permitting process
in a more timely manner. The investment returns projected by our Model for the Developer takes into
account the risks encountered during the permitting process and value the Developer brings to this
process.
Hard Costs
Direct Construction - These costs were based upon the audited reports MHFA provided on the project
costs for three 80/20 developments that were constructed in the suburbs of Boston (including one built in
1999) and the costs disclosed to us by the Developer of 80/20 projects in the Boston area. The hard
(direct) construction cost for the 1999 development was $67 per square foot, exclusive of contingencies,
contractor's fee, and overhead. Our Model uses $80 per square foot to adjust for inflation and
contractor's fees and profit.
Construction Contingency - The Model's construction contingency is 7.5 percent of the direct
construction costs. Although the projects we were provided costs for had budgeted contingencies below
7.5 percent, we chose to be conservative.
Soft Costs
We have provided a fairly detailed breakdown of the various development costs that are categorized as
"soft costs". These costs were taken from the cost information provided by both MHFA and from the
development company. More specifically, the construction loan interest is assumed to be 3.5 percent of
the direct hard costs. The MHFA application, financing fee and construction inspection fees are currently
set by the agency at 0.3 percent, 2 percent, and 0.5 percent, respectively. Real estate taxes during
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construction are assumed to be 25 percent of post-development taxes for two years. Although individual
line items may be slightly more, or less, depending on the particular project, the combined total we depict
is roughly equal to the soft costs we analyzed. We provided a soft cost contingency of 5 percent, which is
in line with the projects we examined.
Developer Overhead
The allocation of Developer's overhead was based upon the cost certifications from MHFA.
Development Fee
The development fee is calculated as a percentage of "qualifying development costs" which is the result
of total development costs less developer overhead and less reserve allocation. The adjusted cost basis is
then broken down into three increments with a progressively lower percentage fee applied to each higher
increment of development cost. The rationale behind this is that there is some degree of "economy of
scale" in a development project - a large project that has development costs that are twice that of a
smaller project does not normally require twice the developer's time. This system is, therefore, more
equitable in determining a fair development fee for small projects and large projects. The resulting fee in
our project was approximately 6.2 percent total development cost (exclusive of development fee), which




First Year - The rents used for 50 percent and 80 percent AMI are based upon the MHFA's 2000 income
limits for the Boston Metropolitan Area. These rents are calculated using HUD's determination of AMI
for the Boston PMSA for 2000 ($65,500). The 120 percent AMI is our calculation following the same
formula used for 80 percent AMI.
Notes:
1) income is based upon a family of four - adjustments are made for smaller households;
2) 1 bedroom units average the income limits for 1 and 2 people;
3) 2 bedroom units assume dwelling can house 3 people and therefore uses 3 person income limit;
4) rent for 50 percent AMI are established using 30 percent of income less utility allowance;
5) rents for 120 percent AMI 30 percent of income, utilities are not deducted.
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50% of Area Median Income:
1 Person Limit = AMI ($65,500) x 50% = $32,750 x 70% = $22,950
2 Person Limit = AMI ($65,500) x 50% = $32,750 x 80% = $26,200
3 Person Limit = AMI ($65,500) x 50% = $32,750 x 90% = $29,500
4 Person Limit = AMI ($65,500) x 50% = $32,750
1 Bedroom Rent = ($22,950 + $26,200) x 50% x (1/12) = $2,047 x 30% = $614 less utility allowance
2 Bedroom Rent = ($29,500) x (1/12) = $2,458 x 30% = $738 less utility allowance
80% of Area Median Income:
income limits for 80% AMI calculated at 160 percent times the 50 percent median income limit (due to
unusually high incomes in the Boston area, the 80 percent AMI limit for 4 people is "capped" at the U.S.
median income of $50,200).
1 Person Limit = AMI ($65,500) x 50% x 160/o= $52,400 (use cap of $50,200) x 70% = $35,150
2 Person Limit = AMI ($65,500) x 50% x 160/o= $52,400 (use cap of $50,200) x 80% = $40,150
3 Person Limit = AMI ($65,500) x 50% x 160%= $52,400 (use cap of $50,200) x 90% = $45,180
4 Person Limit = capped at the U.S. median income of $50,200
1 Bedroom Rent = ($35,150 + $40,150) x 50% x (1/12) = $3,138 x 30%= $941
2 Bedroom Rent = $45,180 x (1/12) = $3,765 x 30% = $1,130
120% of Area Median income:
(formula used is identical to that used for 80 percent AMI with exception being that a cap was not placed
on income limit)
1 Person Limit = AMI ($65,500) x 50% x 240% = $78,600 x 70% = $55,020
2 Person Limit = AMI ($65,500) x 50% x 240% = $78,600 x 80% = $62,880
3 Person Limit = AMI ($65,500) x 50% x 240% = $78,600 x 90% = $70,740
4 Person Limit = AMI ($65,500) x 50% x 240% = $78,600
1 Bedroom Rent = ($55,020 + $62,880) x 50% x (1/12) = $4,913 x 30% = $1,474
2 Bedroom Rent = $70,740 x 50% x (1/12) = $5,895 x 30% = $1,769
Growth Rates - the annual growth rates used for rents is the weighted-average of the annual increase in
gross rents experienced by the SHARP portfolio.
Utility Allowance - Figures provided by MIHFA for an 80/20 project that was recently constructed and has
reached stabilized operations. Please note that a utility allowance deduction is only required for the
affordable units.
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Vacancy Allowance - The vacancy for the SHARP portfolio trended at below 5 percent - a number
typically used by underwriters in determining a project's effective income. We, therefore, chose to use 5
percent as a more conservative approach than the actual SHARP experience.
Annual Expenses
Operating Expenses - Based upon the weighted average of the SHARP portfolio and the weighted-
average of several 80/20 properties that had achieved stabilized operations.
Growth Rates - Derived from taking a weighted-average of the SHARP portfolio.
Real Estate Taxes - This expense was calculated by taking the SHARP weighted-average for 1999 and
then adding 2.5 percent to escalate the taxes for year 2000.
Growth Rates - calculated based upon the weighted-average of the SHARP portfolio. Although the
growth rates for the portfolio of SHARP properties have substantial volatility in the first few years, we
discovered in our interviews with developers that assessors often are uncertain how to tax mixed-income
projects. Often the taxes are assessed as if the project is 100 percent market rate. However, this does not
take into account that at least 20 percent of the project has "caps" placed on the rents. Therefore real
estate tax adjustments (abatements) are typical.
Real Estate Tax Abatement - The Model assumes a tax abatement mechanism similar to the New York
City 421-a program embedded in the NYC Housing Development Corporation's 80/20 Program. The 20-
year abatement is calculated based on a 10-year full exemption from the increase in real estate taxes due
to development and a 10-year phase out (90% exemption on year 1 11Ih, 80% exemption on year 12* and
so on). The predevelopment taxes, carried for the first ten years are assumed to be 25 percent of the first
real estate taxes calculated as above. (See Appendix E) Unlike the NYC program, our Model assumes that
the municipality will recover a portion of the unpaid taxes (50%) at the time of reversion in year 15.
Furthermore, the Model assumes a state's reimbursement of 75 percent of annual tax abatement to the
Municipality. This tax abatement lien is equivalent to a soft second mortgage. The Municipality stands
behind the first mortgage for repayment from the project's sale proceeds. The Developer is, however,
entitled to receive interest-only payment on the deferred portion of its development fee, commencing in
the sixth year of operations.
Replacement Reserve - Calculated based upon MHFA's program requirement of $275 per unit to which
we added $25 per unit to be conservative. This also is roughly equivalent to the amount set aside by the
SHARP portfolio.
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Growth Rates - Instead of using the SHARP growth rate which fluctuated greatly, we chose instead to use
a more conservative approach and apply the commonly accepted inflation rate of 3 percent.
Capital Structure
The following describes the Model's assumptions regarding the sources of debt and equity used to raise
the capital needed for an 80/20 mixed-income housing project.
Sources of Debt
Permanent Financing - The Model uses MHFA's tax-exempt bond financing for the permanent loan.
This is a 40-year mortgage note accruing interest at the current (July 2000) MHFA rate of 6.75 percent
plus a mortgage insurance premium of 0.375 percent and an MHFA override (administrative fee) of 0.5
percent, per annum. The debt service in the Model is thus based on a 7.625 percent interest rate and
amortization term of 40 years. The annual payment constant is 0.0805. The Model derives the loan
amount by first obtaining the maximum debt service based on the first-year's projected net operating
income divided by a debt service coverage ratio of 1.15, which is then divided by the annual constant of
0.0805.
Developer's Note - To better aligned a the interests of the Developer with the long-term operating
performance of the project, the Model proposes a deferred compensation mechanism to the Developer in
form of a subordinate loan. Seventy five (75%) percent of the Developer's total development fee is
financed by this note. This is an interest-only subordinate loan with the Applicable Federal Rate at 6
percent. The annual interest amount accrues until year six when interest-only payments to the Developer
commence. The Model assumes that the outstanding Developer's loan amount will be fully paid at the
time of reversion in year 15 (although it is subordinate in lien priority to the MHFA first mortgage and the
municipality's tax repayment second mortgage).
Sources of Equity
Federal LIHTC - Qualified projects financed with tax-exempt bonds automatically qualify for 4 percent
low-income housing tax credits. Therefore, proceeds from the sale of the credits are used as a major
source of equity in the Model. The credits are calculated by multiplying the Total Eligible Basis (Total
Development Cost less Land) by the percentage of the project's low-income units (20%) to obtain the
Qualified Basis. The maximum annual tax credits obtained by the investors is the product of the
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Qualified Basis and 4 percent tax credit rate. The current market-rate investment amount for these credits
is 78 to 82 cents per dollar of credits required'. This is the net equity capital that is contributed to the
partnership which owns the property. Adding the costs associated with syndication, legal work,
acquisition expenses, and a working capital reserve called the "load", the Model assumes a 0.94
syndication factor. The net equity raised through these credits is equal to the amount that the investors
are willing to pay (the product of the total allocated credits and 0.94), less the load. This load is heavily
negotiated and varies between 10 percent and 15 percent. The Model assumes a conservative 15 percent
for additional costs to the investors2
State LIHTC - The Model also assumes the use of state low-income tax credits. These credits are 50
percent of the federal LIHTC and are claimed over 5 years. The Model assumes a 0.39 syndication factor
for the state LIHTC. The state credits have a lower market value because they result in an incrementally
higher federal income tax liability. The net equity raised follows the same load calculation explained
above.
Additional Value from Operations - The tax credit equity investment amount discussed above is
calculated on a breakeven basis. This means that cash flow from operations is disregarded by assuming
that the net operating income is equal to the debt service. The tax credit calculation further assumes a
foreclosure in Year 15. This means that the sale price is equal to the amount of outstanding debt on the
property plus $1. Our Model, however, considers the additional value extracted from the annual cash
flow and the sale of the property (at a 9.5% capitalization rate) as another source of equity. The Model
assumes that the investors would be willing to invest more equity into the project if they could attain a 10
percent after-tax return on the cash flow and residual value upon sale (such cash flow and residual value
are often retained by the Developer through various financial structural mechanisms). This equity is
calculated with the assumption that the cash flow and net cash from sale is shared between the Developer
and the investors on a 25/75 basis, respectively. The Model incorporates the NPV of this 75 percent share
of investors' additional investment value, using a 10 percent discount rate, as additional equity available
for the project. In addition to raising sufficient equity to develop the project, aligning the interest of the
parties is undoubtedly another advantage of the investors' further participation in the operational risk of
the project.
1 Annando Perez, Lend Lease Real Estate Investment, personal interview, July 19, 2000
2 Armando Perez, Lend Lease Real Estate Investment, email communication, August 8, 2000
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5.2 Baseline Scenario
This section presents the results of running the Financial Model using the assumptions described above.
The purpose of the baseline scenario is two fold. First it proves that the new capital structure for
developing mixed-income housing proposed by this thesis is feasible. Second, it is used as a tool to
examine the sensitivity of variables that can be influenced in the conception of the project, including
location (land cost), income mix, and size of project.
General Description of the Project
The baseline scenario assumes a 125-unit multifamily mixed-income project located in the suburbs of
Boston, Massachusetts. The units are attached, townhouse style dwellings with wood frame construction.
Amenities include tennis courts, swimming pool and a small clubhouse. Table 5.2.1 shows the income
and unit mix of the project as well as the gross square footage for each unit type.
Table 5.2.1
Baseline Scenario: Unit & Income Mix
AMI 2 BR 1 BR Total %Total
(1,150 sf) (950 so
120% 67 33 100 80%
50% 18 7 25 20%
Total 85 40 125
Total Development Cost (TDC)
Table 5.2.2 shows that the project's TDC is approximately $19 million or $154,000 per unit. These totals
are inclusive of the land cost assumed to be $20,000 per unit. These costs are confirmed as being in line
with current market experience in metropolitan Boston area. The cost per gross square foot is based on an
efficiency ratio of rental square footage to total gross square footage of 88 percent. This ratio is an
average taken from other recent MHFA's 80/20 projects. Given that the rentable area is set per the above
market-adjusted unit size, the higher the efficiency rate, the lower the cost of constructing the project.
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Table 5.2.2












Architecture and Engineering $362,500 $2,900 $2.35
Survey and permits 100,000 800 0.65
Legal 112,500 900 0.73
Title and recording 31,250 250 0.20
Accounting & cost certification 6,250 50 0.04
Marketing & rent-up 143,750 1,150 0.93
Real Estate Taxes 91,673 733 0.59
Insurance 28,125 225 0.18
Appraisal 6,250 50 0.04
Construction loan interest 437,500 3,500 2.84
MHFA application fee 47,250 378 0.31
MHFA finance fee 314,750 2,518 2.04
MHFA construction inspection 78,750 630 0.51
Soft Cost Contingency 88,027 704 0.57
Soft Cost Total $1,848,576 $14,789 $11.98
Developer Overhead $500,000 $4,000 $3.24
Developer Fee $1,080,710 $8,646 $7.01
Total Development Costs $19,232,411 $153,859 $124.67
Rental Income
Based upon the assumptions detailed in previous section, the gross rental income included in the baseline
scenario is estimated to be approximately $2,187,000 in the first year. This rental income is calculated
based on 30 percent of monthly gross income of households at 120 percent and 50 percent AMI (Boston's
AMI is $65,500 per year). The utility allowance is deducted from the low-income rent. The following
Table shows the results of these calculations. It can be observed that approximately 92 percent of this
rental income is derived from the market-rate units. This confirms this project's heavy reliance on market
conditions. Also, 71 percent of the gross rental income is obtained from the 2-bedroom units. This is the
reason for the unit distribution skewed towards the 2-bedroom units with the 2/3 and 1/3 split.
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Table 5.2.3
Baseline Scenario: Rental Income
Net SQFT
Number of Units
% of Total Units
Monthly Income





























Net Operating Income (NOI)
The first-year NOI is approximately $1,457,000. This is derived from the gross rental income less 5
percent vacancy and further reduced by operating expenses of $537,500, the post-abatement real estate
taxes of $45,837, and a replacement reserve escrow deposit of $37,500. (See the 16-year projected
operation in Appendix B)
Maximum Supportable Debt
The maximum amount of debt that the above rental income from the project can support is approximately
$15,739,000. Table 5.2.4 shows how the Model has derived the loan amount using the first year NOI, a
7.625 percent interest mortgage interest rate, a 40-year loan amortization term, and 1.15 debt service
coverage ratio.
Table 5.2.4
Baseline Scenario: Calculation of Debt
Total per unit
Gross Annual Rental Income $2,187,407 $17,499
Vacancy (5%) (109,370) (875)
Effective Annual Rental Income $2,078,036 $16,624
Annual Operating Expenses (537,500) (4,300)
Real Estate Taxes (45,837) (367)
Replacement Reserve (37,500) (300)
Net Operating Income $1,457,199 $11,658
Debt Service coverage Ratio 1.15
Maximum Debt Service $1,267,130 10,137
Annual Debt Constant 8.0509%
Maximum Supportable Debt $15,738,965 $125,912
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Capital Structure
As shown in Table 5.2.5, the first mortgage loan of $15,738,965 (82% TDC) is subordinated by the
Developer's loan of $810,533 (4%). The total equity raised is comprised of federal and state tax credit
equity net of syndication expenses, and a one percent working capital/reserve. This "Rainy-day Fund" is
created to help mitigate all parties' financial exposure to unanticipated changes in the project's baseline
assumptions (including market fluctuations, construction delays, etc.). The project's capital structure (as
a percentage of total development cost) is, therefore, made up of 86 percent debt and 15 percent equity,
inclusive of the one percent working capital/reserve.
Table 5.2.5

































*covers syndicator's fee, acquisition costs, legal and organizational
costs, and working capital reserve
5.3 Sensitivity Analyses
This section presents how the Model is used to measure the sensitivity of key variables. Except for a few
exceptions, these are the variables that can be controlled by parties to the investment. For example, the
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Developer controls the income-mix or the location of the project, while the Municipality regulates the
density of the land, thereby directly impacting its cost per unit to the Developer. By sensitivity, we mean
the extent to which a change in a particular variable can impact the outcome of the Model or the project's
financial feasibility from the perspective of at least one party. In defining financial feasibility, we have
considered the following. Returns, at or above, the baseline IRR of the investors (11.6%) and the
Developer (36.8%) are regarded as desirable. Returns below what we have previously determined as
"fair" in the current market (i.e. 10% for the LPs and 20% for the Developer) are deemed unacceptable by
the respective parties. Returns that fall in between the minimum threshold and the baseline are regarded
as feasible if they are in line with the risks of the particular project. By conducting these sensitivity
analyses, it became clear that understanding the trade-offs and relationships between these variables is
critical in forming a partnership that protects the interests of all stakeholders/investors in mixed-income
housing and helps them all achieve their investment goals.
Relationship of Land Cost and Income-Mix
Table 5.3.1 shows the impact of varying land cost and the percentage of units set-aside for low- and low-
to moderate-income households on the Developer's return and, hence, the viability of the project in that if
the Developer cannot achieve a "fair" risk-adjusted return, he/she will not invest the resources necessary
in the project. Note that we have assigned the responsibility to cover any capital shortages to the
Developer, which results in the Limited Partners return remaining constant at 11.6 percent - our Baseline
Model assumption. On the same note, if the lower land costs result in the ability to raise more capital
than needed for the project, the Developer is awarded this "surplus" for locating the "under priced" land
or creating value with his/her expertise.
Before we examine our findings, it is important to review how land costs of $20,000 were reached. In our
Model, the cost of land was derived based upon market data. The factors weighed when arriving at a fair
price for land in a competitive market are many and include projected achievable density and market rents
for that particular location. Therefore, we did not feel it was appropriate to increase/decrease land cost by
more than ten percent and expect our baseline assumptions for density and market rents to remain
consistent. We realize that land costs per unit can vary greatly (based on land cost and ultimate density),
but had to establish and stay within certain parameters for our Model to be consistent. With this in mind,
a few general observations regarding the impact of land cost and income-mix on the project feasibility, as
measured by Developer's IRR, can be made.
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Table 5.3.1
Impact on Developer Return when Varying Income-Mix and Land Cost
Developer assumes all surplus/deficit
Income-Mix 8010/20 Income-Mix 75/5/20 Income-Mix 75/0/25
Dev Surplusl Dev Surplusl Dev Surplus/
IRR Deficit IRR Deficit IRR Deficit
2: $18,000 48.6% $240,560 28.5% ($235,901) 22.4% ($454,153)
- 18,500 45.5% 180,420 26.6% (296,042) 21.1% (514,293)
i 19,000 42.5% 120,279 24.8% (356,182) 19.9% (574,434)
19,500 39.6% 60,139 23.3% (416,323) 18.8% (634,574)
o 20,000 36.9% 0 21.9% (476,463) 17.8% (694,715)
U 20,500 34.3% (60,142) 20.6% (536,604) 16.8% (754,855)
21,000 32.0% (120,283) 19.5% (596,744) 16.0% (814,996)
-' 21,500 29.8% (180,423) 18.4% (656,885) 15.2% (875,136)
22,000 27.9% (240,564) 17.5% (717,025) 14.5% (935,277)
A fundamental objective in mixed-income projects is to de-concentrate poverty and create a community
of residents with varying incomes. Many housing experts contend that these communities are best served
when the incomes are truly mixed, with gulfs between the high-income households and the lower income
households minimized. In attempting to achieve this goal, however, it can be seen that even small
changes in the income-mix of the project can have substantial effects on the viability of the project. The
middle column of Table 5.3.1 shows the effect of shifting five percent of the units (6 apartments)
originally targeted to households at 120 percent AMI to households at 80 percent AMI, thereby creating a
layer of low to moderate income residents. If land cost is held constant at $20,000 per unit, to achieve
this mix, the Developer would be responsible for contributing $476,463 to make up for the shortfall. This
results in a drop in IRR to 21.9 percent - just slightly above our minimum threshold for the Developer to
undertake the risk of developing this project. Even if the Developer were able to purchase the land for the
equivalent of $18,000 per unit (a 10% reduction), he/she would still have a capital shortfall of $235,901
and a resulting IRR of 28.5 percent.
A question frequently asked regarding 80/20 Projects is why only 20 percent of the units is set-aside for
low-income residents? Column three of Table 5.3.1 allows us to examine the effect of shifting five
percent of the units from the market-rate households to the units set-aside for households at 50 percent
AMI. This results in a project with a mix of 75/0/25. This clearly has a substantial effect on the viability
of the project. At land costs of $20,000 per unit, the Developer will need to contribute $694,715 to fill
the capital shortage and his/her resulting IRR drops to 17.8 percent - below what could be deemed as a
"fair" risk-adjusted return for the Developer. The land cost per unit would have to drop to $18,500 before
a "fair" return could be realized from the project for the Developer, and to achieve this return he/she
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would have to be willing to invest an additional $514,293 of capital. This example shows just how
dependent these projects are on land costs and the cross-subsidization of the market-rate units to drive the
returns necessary to attract private market developers seeking a "fair" risk-adjusted return for their
investment.
Relationship of Density/Land Cost and Real Estate Tax Abatement
Table 5.3.2 allows us to examine the trade-off between the Real Estate Tax Abatement required to make
the project viable (as presented in our Base Scenario), and the manner in which a change in density
affects the project for both the Municipality and the Developer. In order to examine this relationship, we
have to make a rather broad assumption. Given that our baseline land cost per unit is $20,000, we are
assuming that the buyer agreed on this price based upon what the buyer perceived as the "attainable"
density for the land. In other words, the land price already has the "attainable" density built into it. This
is based upon the assumption that the 125 units we have earmarked for the project will result in a density
that, generally speaking, will not impose an undue burden on the municipality and is reflective of what
can be reasonably expected based upon what has transpired either in that particular Municipality, or under
similar circumstances.
Table 5.3.2
Relationship between Change in Density and Real Estate Tax Abatement
Change in Total Land Cost Developer Baseline First Year
Density Units per Unit IRR Abatement Abatement
-5% 119 $21,008 38.1% 134% $184,264
0% 125 20,000 36.9% 100% 137,510
5% 131 19,084 35.6% 66% 90,757
10% 138 18,116 34.9% 47% 64,630
15% 144 17,361 33.8% 16% 22,022
Note: Calculatons based upon fixing total land cost at $2,500,000 and maintaining
income-mix at 80/20. Any additonal real estate taxes resulting from the increase in
number of units is not subject to the abatement.
With this understanding, it is now possible to explore how a change in density can impact the cost to the
Municipality of the Real Estate Tax Abatement. The ability of the Municipality to weigh its options and
place a value on its alternatives is key in negotiations with the Developer. For instance, if the
Municipality's main objective is to accept the baseline project and allow the total number of 125 units, the
Municipality would have to offer the full abatement of the Baseline Scenario. The abatement for the first
year has been noted for reference. If the Municipality would prefer to reduce the abatement required,
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then accepting an increase in density of 15 percent (an additional 19 units) to the project will allow them
the ability to cut the first-year abatement to $23,002, which is equivalent to only 16 percent of the first-
year baseline abatement - a first-year savings of $115,488 to the Municipality. If the Municipality opts to
reduce the density to a level 5 percent lower than the baseline, it will need to grant a greater tax
concession. The 134 percent of baseline noted in the Table is in effect partial exemption from the
predevelopment taxes on the property plus a full abatement from the increase in taxes due to
development. It is important to note that increasing the density of the project has definite limits because
the cost to construct the additional units may be more than the value created and/or there may be
limitations due to site conditions or public services (i.e. - sewer). As shown, the ability to offset density
with tax abatement is a very powerful tool for Cities and Towns that are considered key players in the
development of mixed-income housing.
Tolerance of Key Variables
In the Table below, we have examined how the key variables in our Model would change if we were able
to capture the additional value available in the project, after the LPs received a return commensurate with
what the broader investment markets would typically require for an investment such as this. We
previously determined this "fair" return to be a 10 percent after-tax return. We have therefore preserved
the Developer's after-tax IRR of 37 percent and constrained the investors IRR to 10 percent after-tax and
brought the resulting equity into the project. The objective is to measure the tolerance of key variables
while still generating a 10 percent after-tax return for the LPs.
Table 5.3.3
Capturing Risk-Adjusted Market Pricing for LP Investment
Baseline Limit
Variable Value Value % Change
Land Cost (per unit) $20,000 $24,000 20%
Ratio of Moderate to Low-Income Units 0% 5% -
Ratio of Low-Income Units 20% 23% 15%
Ratio of Extremely LI units ( 30% AMI) 0% 5% -
Boston Area Median Income $65,500 $64,000 -2%
Debt Cost 7.125% 7.975% 12%
Direct Construction Cost (per sf) $80 $84 5%
We observe that the land price can go up to $24,000/unit (a 20% increase), the ratio of low-income units
can be raised by 15 percent to 23 percent of total units, or a 5 percent moderate-income tier can be
included without jeopardizing the feasibility of the investment from the LPs' perspective.
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Impact of Change in Key Variables
Table5.3.4 examines the change in the investors' and Developer's after-tax IRR associated with a 5
percent increase in key variables, assuming that the two parties will share the resulting surplus or deficit
of such an increase on a 75/25 basis (investors receive 75%, Developer 25%). The Table also ranks the
sensitivity of these variables.
Table 5.3.4
Impact on LPs and Developer of 5% Increase in Key Variables
75/25 share of surplus/deficit
Variables Dev IRR Change Rank Inv IRR Change Rank
Baseline Scenario 36.9% 11.6%
Land Cost ($21,000/unit) 35.3% -1.5% 6 11.1% -0.4% 6
DSCR (1.2) 34.8% -2.0% 5 10.5% -1.1% 5
125 units @ 75/25 28.9% -7.9% 2 8.8% -2.8% 2
125 units @ 70/5/25 32.1% -4.8% 4 9.9% -1.7% 4
131 units @ 80/20 36.2% -0.7% 7 11.4% -0.2% 7
131 units @75/25 27.8% -9.1% 1 8.5% -3.1% 1
Direct Hard Cost ($84/sf) 31.6% -5.2% 3 9.6% -1.9% 3
Tax Recovery @ 55% 36.7% -0.2% 8 11.5% 0.0% 8
As expected, increasing the ratio of low-income units by 5 percent, results in the most dramatic change.
We observe that a shift from a 80/20 income mix to a 75/25 ratio of market to low-income units makes
the project financially infeasible for the investors (IRR under 10%). A 5 percent increase in direct hard
costs to $84/sf also makes the investment infeasible for the LPs who would now achieve an IRR of 9.6
percent after-tax. A shift of 5 percent from the market units to the moderate-income units results in
"border-line" total return for the investors. The Developer, on the other hand, given his 25 percent
participation only, is less affected by a 5 percent increase, still achieving at least a 27 percent after-tax
IRR across the board.
Table 5.3.5 shows the change in Developer's IRR associated with a 5 percent increase in key variables,
assuming assignment of 100 percent of the surplus/deficit to the Developer.
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Table 5.3.5
Impact on Developer of 5% Increase in Key Variables
Developer assumes all surplus/deficit
Variables Dev IRR Change Rank
Baseline Scenario 36.9%
Land Cost ($21,000/unit) 32.0% -4.9% 6
DSCR (1.2) 26.2% -10.6% 5
125 units @ 75/25 15.4% -21.5% 2
125 units @ 75/5/20 21.9% -15.0% 4
131 units @ 80/20 35.0% -1.9% 7
131 units @75/25 14.2% -22.6% 1
Direct Hard Cost ($84/sf) 19.9% -16.9% 3
Tax Recovery @ 55% 36.2% -0.7% 8
Although the order of the ranking is the same as the previous Table (the change to a higher affordable
housing ratio affects the outcome the most), the impact of assigning all of the resulting surplus/deficit to
the Developer increases the impact on the Developer's IRR substantially. The scenarios in which the unit
mix is changed to 75/25 now result in an IRR that is well below the Developer's minimum threshold of
20 percent. This results in the project becoming infeasible for the Developer. The increase of $4/sf in
direct hard costs results in a "border-line" return of just under 20 percent.
Due to the principles governing the time value of money, the above Tables both show that a 5% increase
in the real estate tax recovery by the city or town in year 15, has the least effect on the total return
achieved by the LPs and the Developer.
Conclusion
All parties to an investment must have a reasonable expectation of receiving "fair" compensation on their
investment before they will take the risk associated with that investment. Housing low-income families
(the main criticism of the 80/20 program is its inability to widely serve lower-income tiers) is financially
infeasible (i.e. returns that are not commensurate with the risks) because adding units that do not generate
sufficient cash flow results in unacceptable returns unless the cost of producing or running these units can
be offset by a reduction in land cost/unit, or in operating costs. The role of local government is, therefore,
critical. Land use and zoning as well as local tax policies can offer this needed cost reductions and be key
components when building a framework to help solve the problem of affordable housing in suburban
areas. In fact, if adopted in tandem, they can be more effective allowing the Municipality the choice of
accepting a higher density for the project, and thereby offering a lower tax abatement. But municipalities
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must have sufficient incentives to adopt such programs and policies. They, too, are critical investors in
the project and must be rewarded fairly.
5.4 Analysis of Risk and Return for Public & Private Parties
When organizing a partnership it is extremely important to fully understand each party's risk exposure so
that a suitable reward package can be structured. In the long run, it is in each party's best interest that all
parties are rewarded fairly based on the amount of their investment and the risks they are subject to. The
goal is to create a partnership structure that provides sufficient incentives that each party will endeavor to
see that their reward is achieved. When determining fair compensation for an investment, investors will
look at the probability of whether they will actually collect their projected cash flows and secure the
return available to them. In general, the higher the risk associated with collecting their project cash flows,
the higher the return that will be demanded. In this section of the thesis, we will examine the various
parties that form our public/private partnership. We will analyze the risks that each party bears in our
Model and the returns they should be willing to accept for the risks taken.
Private Partners
In putting together an 80/20 Project, the biggest risks are in the early stages of the project. These include
"controlling" the land (either by purchasing it or securing an option to purchase it) and securing the
necessary permits. These risks are typically borne solely by the Developer. The Limited Partners
generally do not agree to enter into the partnership until all of these obstacles have been cleared.
Attaining financing commitments and securing the tax credits also holds a certain degree of risk. Finally,
the financial success of the property's operations can be uncertain, but this risk can be mitigated to some
degree. Below is a detailed analysis of the parties making up the private partnership portion of the project
and the risks they face in the investment.
Developer
The Developer is the impetus behind the whole project. He/she begins with a vision and orchestrates the
process from beginning to end. The job is inherently risky - especially during the early stages of the
project when all of the risks during this phase of the development are borne by the Developer. Once the
project is approved and the permanent financing has been committed, a partnership that has been formed
takes control of the project. The Developer is typically the General Partner in the partnership. The
partnership is legally structured so that the General Partner shoulders virtually all the risk for the
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liabilities of the project and is responsible for the day-to-day operations, which generally include
managing the project.
In our Model, the Developer is reimbursed for the expenses he/she incurs during the pre-development and
construction phases. A portion (25%) of the Developer's overhead and the development fee is assumed to
be paid upon completion of construction and the remainder is deferred, accruing interest at six percent on
the unpaid balance. Interest payments on the deferred amount begin in year six and the balance of the
loan is paid off in year fifteen when the property is sold. The Developer also receives 25 percent of any
operational cash flows from the property plus an additional 25 percent of any net sale proceeds.
Limited Partners
The investors in the partnership are Limited Partners (LPs) and as their name implies, play a very limited
role, and have limited liability for, the operations of the partnership. The LPs provide capital so the
Developer will have the equity necessary to proceed with the project. In order to fully analyze the
potential benefits and returns of a project such as the one we modeled, we have divided the LP interests
into two categories: the "Cash Flow Benefits" which is the LPs investment returns based upon the
positive cash flows of the property (including any capital gain at the time of sale); and the "Tax Based
Benefits" which is derived solely from the tax benefits available from our Model. Please note that these
are not two different entities; we are merely separating the two driving forces that provide the means for
the LP to receive their returns so the risks associated with each can be clearly outlined.
Limited Partners - Cash Flow Benefits
The risks associated with the Cash Flow Benefits (CFB) are somewhere between those faced by the
Developer and those associated with receiving the Tax Based Benefits. CFBs only receive a return on
investment if the property is able to generate a positive cash flow. Our Model shows positive cash flow
from operations each year. The structure of our partnership is such that these LPs will receive 75 percent
of this cash flow stream. This cash flow stream is by no means guaranteed, but the assumptions we have
used in our model were done in a conservative manner and the structure of our debt is such that the risk of
not receiving their intended return is low to moderate. CFBs also incorporate the tax cost of 75 percent of
any capital gain at the time of sale.
Limited Partners - Tax Based Benefits
The substantial motive for the LPs to invest in real estate is to receive the considerable tax benefits
generated by real estate investments - especially if LIHTC are available. In our 80/20 project, the tax
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benefits include LIHTCs along with the "tax losses" that are generated by the property. Unlike the CFBs,
which are uncertain, the TBBs are highly probable and, barring a foreclosure within the first 15 years of
operations, carry very little risk.
Public Partners
State
One of the responsibilities of the State Government is to provide for the welfare of their constituents. The
dynamics of the private market generally results in supply meeting demand, but the State needs to supply
incentives for the construction of affordable housing due to it being otherwise economically unfeasible.
Generally speaking, Municipalities are slow to meet the need of affordable housing in their own
communities. This can be for a variety of reasons including the cost to the Municipality (households in
affordable units require the same public services but affordable units generate lower tax revenues) and the
stigma attached to affordable housing leading many residents to encourage their local government to take
a "Not In My Back Yard" approach to the issue. Therefore, the State needs to provide strong incentives,
or carry a big stick, to persuade Municipalities to provide their fair share of the affordable housing needs.
A stick the Commonwealth of Massachusetts can wield is the legal power afforded them through Chapter
40B, which requires that the affordable housing units in a municipality be equal to ten percent or more of
the overall housing stock.
In order to make the partnership more attractive to the Municipality and to help spur construction of
affordable housing, we are proposing two incentives aimed directly at the Municipality. First, the State
would annually reimburse the Municipality for a portion (75%) of the annual real estate tax abatement
that, when combined with the 50 percent repayment of the full amount of the tax abatement due to the
Municipality from the sale of the project, will effectively equal a 9 percent return to the Municipality over
the fifteen year period. In order for the Municipality to have unrestricted use of such tax abatement
repayment, the number of affordable units located in the Municipality must have reached the 10 percent
quota as mandated by Chapter 40B by the time of sale. If the 10 percent quota has not been achieved by
the time of sale, the Municipality must contribute the 50 percent tax abatement repayment to an
Affordable Housing Trust Fund they control that is dedicated to the development of additional affordable
housing within the Municipality.
A second incentive is to offer bonuses to any Municipality that offers a real estate tax abatement such as
the one outlined in our Model that results in the construction of affordable housing over the next five
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years. Three different bonuses will be offered: "Scattered-Site"; "Increased Affordability"; and "Priority-
Need". These bonuses will allow Municipalities the opportunity to gain additional credits above and
beyond the actual number of affordable units constructed, thereby allowing them to reach the Chapter
40B mandate more quickly, and with fewer affordable units, than what would be normally required under
the mandate. This will provide a substantial incentive to Municipalities that actively endeavor to provide
affordable housing in their jurisdiction. After five years, the State would reserve the option to review
these policies and adjust them accordingly.
We judge the risks associated with these policies to be quite low. The incentives offered are just that -
incentives, not threats - although the power of Chapter 40B looms in the background. There may be
some policy risk in that the bonuses toward the mandate of Chapter 40B and there is a financial cost3 to
the State, but if this "jump starts" the production of affordable housing, the overall political reaction
should be favorable.
MHFA
MHFA raises capital for 80/20 projects by issuing tax-exempt bonds. Since the bonds are tax-exempt,
bondholders are willing to pay MHFA a premium (accept a lower yield) over comparable bonds that are
taxable. MWA can then afford to offer debt that has a lower interest rate than the market. This is how
the Developer is able to attain debt from MHFA at below market cost. If MHFA is to maintain its ability
to offer financing to low-income housing developments, it is crucial that they receive the debt service
owed to them. If defaults occur, MHFA would not be able to make the payments to their bondholders,
reducing their credit rating in the short run and possibly placing the entire financial soundness of the
Agency at risk. The debt payments to MHFA must be able to be met with a high degree of certainty for
the Agency to be willing to invest. Their risk tolerance is quite low. MHFA is a first mortgage on the
property and will be first in line to receive any sale proceeds to pay off the outstanding loan balance.
Municipality
Our Model calls for a tax abatement by the Municipality that gradually declines (the amount of the
abatement is reduced thereby increasing the amount of real estate taxes paid) over the life of the project.
The Municipality will receive from the property a base amount of property taxes each year equal to the
tax levy of the parcel prior to development and the State will reimburse the Municipality for a portion of
the abatement. At the time of the sale, the Municipality will be paid 50 percent of the abatement (for
3 Model estimates a total of $1.54 million in total state reimbursement of real estate tax abatement to the Municipality over 15
years for 25 low-income units. This is equal to $342/month/low-inome unit.
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details, see above under State). The Municipality's claim on the proceeds of the sale is in second position
behind that of MHFA. The reimbursement from the State for a portion of the abatement holds little risk,
and although the recapture of the abatement is uncertain, the Municipality stands to recapture a higher
amount of taxes than the net amount they abated due to the partial reimbursement from the State.
5.4.1 Assessments of Investment Risk
In order to assess the risks each party to the project is exposed to, we have broken the analysis into the
various "project phases" or "investment objectives" that occur over the span of the project. The degree of
risk is rated and a brief description of each phase or investment is given.
Project Phase: Pre-development and Entitlement
Degree of Risk: High
Parties Bearing Risk: Developer
Notes: During pre-development, the Developer begins to have cash outlays along with the time he/she
has invested in the project. Activities include securing the land (generally through an option or purchase),
preliminary design and site analysis. This is all done prior to actual entitlement. Land purchased to fit
the requirements of our Model rarely allows enough units to be built "as of right". The Developer has to
go before a number of agencies and boards to attain the required variances and approvals. MHFA has the
power to grant Comprehensive Permit (Chapter 40B) site approvals, which reduces this risk substantially,
but lawsuits to halt the development are always a threat. Much of the costs incurred and value of the
Developer's time are lost if the project does not gain approval.
Project Phase: Financing
Degree of Risk: Moderate
Parties Bearing Risk: Developer
Notes: Whether financing can be secured will depend largely on how the lender perceives the risk of the
project. The experience of the Developer in 80/20 development will be weighed along with the financial
projections for the project.
Project Phase: Federal Tax Credit Allocation
Degree ofRisk: Very Low
Parties Bearing Risk: Limited Partners - Tax Based Benefits
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Notes: The LPs do not enter into the partnership until after the credits have been successfully allocated to
the project by the appropriate tax credit allocation agency. However, if tax-exempt financing is used as
assumed in our Model, then the credits (4%) are automatically allocated to the partnership. Upon
completion of the project, tax credits are allowed to be taken once the unit is actually occupied by a
household that fits HUD's parameters for "Very Low-Income". The credits are a guaranteed dollar-for-
dollar reduction of federal taxes. Therefore, as long as the LPs have a federal tax liability, the credits will
be worth their full value. The only risk facing the LP is if the property falls out of compliance (the units
set aside for very low-income households are not rented to households that fit the HUD parameters). If
non-compliance occurs, a portion of the taxes saved will be "recaptured" and repaid to the government by
the LPs. Provided management is experienced and competent, non-compliance is rarely an issue.
Therefore, the risk of not receiving the full tax benefits offered by LIHTC is very low.
Project Phase: Construction
Degree of Risk: Moderate
Parties Bearing Risk: Developer
Notes: Construction overruns could be a risk but our Model budgets for both higher construction costs
and construction contingency than were actually incurred by the developments we analyzed. If there are
overruns, the Developer will be responsible for the extra costs which ultimately may be added to the
project's total development costs. An experienced developer should be able to bring construction costs
within our contingency allowances. Negotiations will be held to try and extend the financing to cover
these costs. In order to avoid the risk of cost overruns during construction, LPs often structure their
agreement so that capital is contributed after construction is complete.
Project Phase: Rent-Up
Degree of Risk: Moderate
Parties Bearing Risk: Developer and Limited Partners - Cash Flow Benefits
Notes: The low-income units typically rent-up very quickly, so the real risk is renting the market-rate
units at pro forma rents. How quickly the property rents-up will depend on several factors: the appeal of
the project and unit design to potential renters, the current demand for rental units, and the marketing
expertise of the management company. The design and marketing factors can be controlled but the
market cannot. Proper forecasting techniques can mitigate the risk to some degree, but many unforeseen
factors can influence the market demand. The longer the project takes to reach 95 percent occupancy (5
percent vacancy was built in to the forecast), the less positive cash flow there will be. The Tax Based
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Benefit return is independent of the cash flows of the project so they have no risk from this phase unless
there is a default and foreclosure within the first 15 years of project operations.
Project Phase: Operations
Degree of Risk: Low to Moderate
Parties Bearing Risk: Developer and Limited Partners - Cash Flow Benefits
Notes: Once the property has achieved full occupancy and has been in operation for a couple of years
(often referred to as being "stabilized"), the risk of failure is relatively low provided management is
experienced as well as competent and the real estate market follows historical trends. Our Model allows
for 5 percent vacancy even though the SHARP data shows mixed-income properties often experience
vacancy rates slightly below this level. The Model also uses growth rates for gross rents, operating
expenses and real estate taxes from the SHARP data which subjects the Model's pro forma to the stress of
a substantial downturn in the economy. Therefore, the risks associated with not achieving the cash flows
we have forecast should be considered low to moderate.
Investment Objective: Tax Loss Benefits
Degree of Risk: Low
Parties Bearing Risk: Limited Partners - Tax Based Benefits
Notes: One of the primary reasons real estate is attractive to investors is the ability to "write off' against
otherwise taxable income, the depreciation allowance along with interest paid on mortgage notes. It is
important to note that these losses are not indicative of the actual operating performance of the property.
These "paper losses" are allowed regardless of how the property performs and can be taken for our entire
15-year holding period as long as the property remains a viable operation (i.e. the property can continue
to pay the annual debt service and pay the real estate taxes and operating expenses incurred). The risk
that these "paper losses" and corresponding tax benefits may not be realized is, arguably, quite low. The
property would have to become financially distressed and be foreclosed upon for the tax benefits to be at
risk. If this occurred, a portion of the tax credits previously taken would be subject to the risk of
recapture. In our Model, the fact that the debt service coverage ratio on the first mortgage is 1.15 helps
insure that sufficient cash flow will be available to pay operating expenses and the debt service on the
first mortgage. The note to the Developer for the deferred development fee has no payments due for the
first five years which should give the property time to become stabilized and rents should have grown by
that point to easily absorb this additional debt. We further assume that the Developer note and mortgage
provides for no foreclosure remedy. The real estate tax abatement also helps ease any unforeseen cash
flow difficulties. There is also the slight risk that Congress could change the tax laws thereby altering the
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amount of losses that can be taken, although this would represent a systematic, as opposed to project
based, risk.
Investment Objective: Repayment of First Mortgage
Degree of Risk: Low
Parties Bearing Risk: MHFA
Notes: In our Model, we have taken a conservative approach to estimate Net Operating Income (NOI is
the cash available for debt service) and have grown rents and expenses based upon the parameters we
derived from the SHARP data. In addition, the terms of the deferred note to the Developer and the tax
abatement over the first 5 to 10 years, respectively, should help ease any unforeseen financial stresses on
the property. Finally, we have also calculated the amount of money that MHFA will lend to the project
based on a Debt Service Coverage Ratio (DSCR) of 1.15. Adherence to these conservative structural
features should result in a low amount of risk to MHFA enabling the Agency to receive full and timely
repayment of their loan on the project. The loan received from the MHFA is a first mortgage. If default
does occur, they will have a first claim on the property.
Investment Objective: Tax Abatement Repayment
Degree of Risk: Moderate
Parties Bearing Risk: Municipality
Notes: Whether the Municipality receives full repayment of the taxes committed to them is largely
dependent on how much NOI increases prior to the time of disposition. The assumptions we have used
which result in our NOI forecasts are conservative and our opinion is that the expected residual value
should be attained. The Municipality is the second mortgagee on the property. If default occurs, they
will stand second behind the MHFA for any proceeds from foreclosure.
Investment Objective: Deferred Development Fee
Degree of Risk: Moderate
Parties Bearing Risk: Developer
Notes: The Developer is third in line at the time of sale for receiving his deferred development fee. The
risks the Developer faces on whether or not the fee will be received is the same as the Municipality's Tax
Abatement Recapture with the added risk of having to fulfill the obligations to MHFA and the
Municipality before receiving the deferred fee.
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Investment Objective: Sale Proceeds
Degree of Risk: Moderate
Parties Bearing Risk: Developer & Limited Partners - Cash Flow Benefits
Notes: The Developer and LP stand fourth in line before they will receive any proceeds from the sale of
the property. The first mortgagee (MHFA), the second mortgagee (the Municipality) and the Developer's
deferred development fee will be paid in full before any proceeds are received. Whether the property
appreciates over the fifteen years is largely dependent on the economy, real estate market, and condition
of the property at the time of sale. The twenty percent set-aside units are required to remain affordable
for 30 years, therefore the sales price at Year 15 will be lower than if it the property was allowed to
convert to 100 percent market rate. Note that the prospect for converting the development to 100 percent
market rate after 30 years will provide a significant upward pricing difference from the perspective of a
buyer of the property in Year 15, or thereafter.
Table 5.4.1
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5.4.2 Returns Commensurate with Risks
Real estate development is often regarded as being a relatively risky investment, which for the most part
is true. But, as we just pointed out, investing in real estate projects does not necessarily have to be a risky
venture. Real estate investments can be structured so that the risks are carved out in "layers". Each
"layer" represents a different degree of risk and can be allocated to the investor which has the investment
profile that meets that level of risk. When structured properly, parties willing to shoulder more risk will
have the potential to receive higher returns reflective of that degree of risk. Parties seeking a lower
degree of risk and a more assured return, should only receive returns reflective of that risk profile.
Legally and practically this can be arranged through a partnership arrangement. Parties will be agreeable
to entering into the partnership provided they feel they are being properly rewarded for the risks they are
bearing. This brings us to the question of what returns should the various parties in our Model be willing
to accept for the risk exposure associated with their investment in our partnership? In determining if the
returns are commensurate with the risks taken by the parties in the partnership, we need to find suitable
risk/return comparisons for each party.
Developer
We have seen that the Developer shoulders virtually all of the risk during the early stages of the project
and that the degree of risk is substantial. Moreover, 75 percent of the development fee and overhead are
deferred. This deferred compensation is only received if the property remains sound and appreciates in
value as forecasted. This is also true of his claim on 25 percent of the cash flow and 25 percent of the
capital appreciation. Therefore the majority of the Developer's return is based upon the performance of
the property and subject to the risks of the market. Having the majority of the Developer's compensation
being received at the "backend" of the deal provides a strong incentive for him/her to conduct the
development and operation of the property in an efficient and effective manner.
The appropriate return for the Developer is difficult to assign an absolute number to in that he/she bears
virtually all of the risk in the project and the degree of risk can vary significantly from project to project.
In our Model, the compound annual average return the Developer earns is 36.8 percent, after-taxes
(equivalent to approximately 50% before taxes assuming a 27% marginal effective tax rate). (see Table
5.4.2.1). Each development will come with its own particular risks and the risk during the early phases
can be substantial. We view 36.8 percent as a "fair" return for our Model Project, but there will be
projects in which this return may be unnecessarily considered high on a risk-adjusted basis. If some of
the risks during the early stages of the project can be diminished, we have seen comparable real estate
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investments offering after-tax returns ranging from 15 percent to 30 percent.4 With the ability of MHFA
to grant Comprehensive Permit (Chapter 40B) Site Approvals for 80/20 projects, this helps mitigate many
of the pre-developments risk and may warrant compound average annual after-tax returns between 20-30
percent. We have therefore established a rather wide range for the Developer's return with a floor of 20
percent and a ceiling of 37 percent. Returns below this floor will not provide the financial incentive for
the Developer to undertake a project of this type and a return above 37 percent is considered excessive.
Table 5.4.2.1
Developer's Investment Analysis
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Year Initial Before Tax Taxable Tax (Lossy After Tax Net Cash Reimb. of Current Net After Tax
Investment Cash Flow (Loss)/ Income Cash Flow From Sale Upfront Portion of Investment Flow
Outlay* @25% Income -(3)*(0.35) (2)+(4) @25% Investment Developer's (1)+(5)+(6)+(7)+
Outlay Fee (8)
0 (167,429) 0 (167,429)
1 (167,429) 0 (167,429)
2 (167,429) 0 (167,429)
3 502,286 270,178 772,464
4 47,517 (3,138) 1,098 48,616 0 48,616
5 50,149 (2,971) 1,040 51,189 0 51,189
6 39,982 (3,311) 1,159 41,141 0 41,141
7 38,296 (3,307) 1,158 39,454 0 39,454
8 49,446 (2,785) 975 50,421 0 50,421
9 49,096 (2,718) 951 50,047 65,081 115,128
10 58,378 (2,260) 791 59,169 65,081 124,250
11 80,429 (1,285) 450 80,879 65,081 145,959
12 123,746 547 (191) 123,554 65,081 188,635
13 139,541 1,285 (450) 139,091 65,081 204,172
14 137,981 1,336 (468) 137,514 65,081 202,594
15 120,350 753 (264) 120,087 65,081 185,167
16 112,381 564 (198) 112,184 65,081 177,264
17 120,714 1,037 (363) 120,351 65,081 185,432
18 134,557 1,740 (609) 133,947 903,961 1,149,756 2,187,664
($502,286) $1,302,564 ($14,512) $5,079 $1,307,643 $903,961 $502,286 $2,005,658 $4,217,262
* Assums land option cost of 3% of land price per year for three years prior to IRR 36.87%
construction plus 15% of total soft cost over three years NPV @ 20% $278,762
Limited Partners - Cash Flow Benefits
The return that the cash flow benefits portion of the LP investment (75% of both after-tax cash flow and
appreciation on the property) is subject to the same uncertainty and risks as the Developer bears on his
portion of the after-tax cash flow and appreciation. However, the LPs do not bear the pre-development
risk that the Developer does. Therefore, their return expectations should be adjusted downward
accordingly.
' These returns are comparable to Opportunity Funds that invest in "risky" real estate ventures including development. As
reported in an article in the Pension Real Estate Association (PREA) Quarterly, Spring 2000, "Opportunity Funds: The
Convergence of Real Estate and Private Equity", investors in Opportunity Funds typically seek long-term net private equity
returns of 20-30 percent.
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Finance theory instructs us that returns on investments can be thought of as being composed of two
components: the risk-free rate and a risk premium. Treasury Bills are often regarded as being risk-free
since the U.S. Government backs them and the return of the investment is guaranteed. Currently, 15-Year
Treasury Bills are yielding approximately 5.75 percent5. A reasonable approach to determining a fair
return for the cash flow benefits (CFB) is for the LPs to receive a return that is 5.75 percent plus a
premium for the risk of the investment. Based upon our analysis, it is safe to say the risk exposure of the
LPs' investment to receive the CFB is certainly lower than if it were invested in the stock market. In fact,
total returns (the combined return for tax benefits and cash flow) for real estate investments are often
regarded to be approximately one-half as risky as investing in the stock market6. Since we are presently
concentrating solely on the CFB portion of the investment, which is the riskier component of total return,
we will assume it carries three-quarters the risk as the stock market. The S&P's average return over the
past 10 years (of a "bull" market, nonetheless) has been 18.2 percent7, which results in a risk premium of
approximately 12.5 percent (18.2% less 5.75%). Therefore, the LPs should be willing to accept a pre-tax
return in the vicinity of 15.1 percent on their investment (5.75% plus three-quarters of 12.5%). This
equates to an after-tax return of approximately 9.8 percent (15.1% x (1-0.35)).
Table 5.4.2.2
LPs Cash Flow Benefits-Calculation of Net Sale Proceeds
Sale Price @ 9.5% Capitalization Rate $19,971,128
Cost of Sale at 2% (399,423)
Net Sale Price $19,571,705
Total Development Cost $19,232,411
Capital Expenditures 697,459
Tax Depreciation* 0
Adjusted Tax Basis 19,929,870 $19,929,870
Capital Gains (358,165)
Tax Liability @ 35% $125,358
Net Sale Price $19,571,705
Capital Gains Taxes 125,358
Outstanding Mortgage (13,971,108)
Outstanding Developer's Fee (1,084,675)
Real Estate Tax Recovery @ 50% (1,025,435)
Net Cash Proceeds from Sale $3,615,844
* Deducted as part of the tax credit investment analysis
5 Wall Street Journal, August 18, 2000, Section C, p. 18.
6 Based on the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM): The expected risk premium of an investment=p multiplied by the expected
risk premium of the market [ra- rr = p(rm-rf)]. The Beta for real estate is widely regarded to be 0.5 due to the low correlation of
real estate with other investment classes.
' Information obtained from documents distributed during Pension Real Estate Association (PREA) Conference at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Center for Real Estate, June 2000.
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For our Model we have rounded this required return up to 10 percent and based the equity contribution
($1,660,000) for the "Added Value" on an IRR of 10 percent. (See Tables 5.4.2.2 and 5.4.2.3)
Table 5.4.2.3
LPs Investment Analysis-Cash Flow/Appreciation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Year Capital Before Tax Taxable Tax savings After Tax Net Total
Cash Flow Income* (Uabilitiy) Cash Flow Proceeds Investment
@75/ -(3)*(0.35) (2)+(4) from Sale Flow
@ 75% (1)+(5)+(6)
0 (1,660,541) (1,660,541)
1 142,552 142,552 (49,893) 92,659 92,659
2 150,448 150,448 (52,657) 92,659 92,659
3 119,946 119,946 (41,981) 97,791 97,791
4 114,889 114,889 (40,211) 77,965 77,965
5 148,338 148,338 (51,918) 74,678 74,678
6 147,288 147,288 (51,551) 96,419 96,419
7 175,134 175,134 (61,297) 95,737 95,737
8 241,287 241,287 (84,450) 113,837 113,837
9 371,237 371,237 (129,933) 156,837 156,837
10 418,623 418,623 (146,518) 241,304 241,304
11 413,944 413,944 (144,881) 272,105 272,105
12 361,051 361,051 (126,368) 269,064 269,064
13 337,143 337,143 (118,000) 234,683 234,683
14 362,143 362,143 (126,750) 219,143 219,143
15 403,670 403,670 (141,284) 235,393 235,393
16 423,785 423,785 (148,325) 262,385 2,711,883 2,974,268
($1,660,541) $4,331,478 $4,331,478 ($1,516,017) $2,632,659 $2,711,883 $3,684,001
IRR 10%
* Before tax cash flow is all taxable because tax dedwtions are already taken into consideration as part
of the breakeven tax credit investment analysis
Limited Partners - Tax Based Benefits
For the tax-based benefits (TBB) component of the LP investment, in which we only included the equity
raised from selling the federal tax credits, our analysis has shown that such benefits are exposed to very
limited risk. In fact, it would be hard to argue that such projected benefits should require much more of a
return that perhaps a 100-150 basis points over a 15-Year Treasury Bill (the yield spread applicable to an
"A" credit). For the sake of consistency, however, we will determine the return based upon same process
as we used for the CFB. We will assign these projected benefits a very generous risk premium equal to
one half that of the S&P premium - 6.25 percent (12.5% x 0.5). When added to the risk-free rate of 5.75
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percent, the result is a pre-tax return of 12.0 percent (5.75% + 6.25%). This equates to an after-tax return
of 7.8 percent (12.0% x (1-0.35)).
For our Model, we spoke to syndicators of LIHTCs to ascertain what the market was currently willing to
pay for the benefits in a tax-credit investment such as the one we modeled. Projects with LIHTCs have
generally received a net investment between $0.78 and $0.828 for each dollar of tax credit available.
Based upon this information, we used the figure of $0.80 as the amount our project could expect to
receive from investors for the available LIHTCs. These deals are structured so that investors receive all
the tax benefits, not just the LIHTCs; but the industry quotes the price based upon net equity invested in
the project divided by the tax credits available. Another party to these investments is often a syndicator
who brings the investor and Developer together. The "load" that the syndicator charges is approximately
15 percent, which is paid by the investors, and when added to the net price paid for the tax credits,
represents the gross price paid for the tax credits, or their total investment in the project for the TBB.
Table 5.4.2.4
Federal Low Income Tax Credit Calculation
Gross Price/Credit 0.94
Total Cost to the Investors $1,259,852
Load @ 15% ($188,978)
Net Equity to the Project $1,070,874
Total Development Costs $19,232,411
Land Costs ($2,500,000)
Total Eligible Basis $16,732,411
Percentage Low Income 20%
Qualified Basis 3,346,482
Tax Credit Rate 4%
Max Annual Tax Credit $133,859
Our risk-adjusted analysis indicates that for the TBB, the LPs should be willing to accept an after-tax
return of 7.8 percent. With this in mind, we calculated the return our project would give to investors if
they paid the market rate of $0.80 for the LIHTCs. Our analysis using our Model 80/20 Project shows
that the federal tax benefits alone (excluding cash distribution of any type and assuming foreclosure in
Year 15) generate an after-tax return of 14 percent. Based upon the risks involved in this Model 80/20
project, we assigned an after-tax return of 10 percent to the TBB which seems more than fair based on the
8 Armando Perez, Lend Lease Real Estate Investment, personal interview, July 19, 2000
100
Chapter 5
limited risks associated with receiving these "statutory" benefits. At a 10 percent after-tax return, a NPV
analysis shows that there is an investment value surplus of $171,025, net of the applicable syndication
"load" (See Table 5.4.2.6). This appears to indicate that at the market price of $0.80 per credit, investors
are still requiring to be paid a substantial risk premium for perceived risks that are arguably difficult to
identify.
History has shown us that the amount investors are willing to pay for LIHTCs has risen over time. This
has been attributed to the market becoming more efficient and the perceived risks of investing in tax-
credit projects diminishing over time as investors became more comfortable with the risks associated with
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0 (1,259,852) 0 0 0
1 0 0 0
2 133,859 (498,878) 174,607
3 133,859 (494,494) 173,073
4 133,859 (486,390) 170,237
5 133,859 (480,189) 168,066
6 133,859 (472,094) 165,233
7 133,859 (466,286) 163,200
8 133,859 (457,727) 160,204
9 133,859 (450,685) 157,740
10 133,859 (444,027) 155,410





16 (370,469) 129,664 (1,890,852)
($1,259,852) $1,338,593 ($6,662,287) $2,331,800 ($1,890,852)
*Assues breakeven operations (I.e. NOI=arm7ual hard debt service obligations












































For instance, in the years immediately following the enactment of the Tax Act of 1986 when LIHTCs
were created, investors were only willing to pay slightly over $0.50 for the credits. This has gradually
increased over time to reach the $0.80 average we have today. If the historical performance of these
80/20 projects continues to show very little risk for the returns offered, as we believe they will, the
amount investors should be willing to pay for these credits should rise (and their return expectation
decrease) to bring them into line with other investments of similar risk. Our Model indicates that the
market should recognize that these LIHTCs are still not fully valued. In fact, our analysis indicates that
existing investors may be earning after-tax returns that are approximately double what they should be.
As there is no market for state tax credits yet, we have used the same logic and parameters as the federal
tax credits to calculate the LPs return and the net equity raised from the state tax credits. The following
Tables present the Model's results.
Table 5.4.2.7
State Tax Credit Calculation
Gross Price/Credit 0.39
Total Cost to the Investors $130,141
Load @ 15% ($13,014)
Net Equity to the Project $117,127
Annual Federal Tax Credit $133,859
Maximum Annual Tax Credit @ 50% Fe $66,930
Table 5.4.2.8
LPs State Tax Credit Investment Analysis
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Year Capital State Low Additional Tax Savings (Uability) Net After Tax
Contribution Income Tax Federal Taxable from Federal Taxation Investment
Credit Income Assoc. of SUHTC Flows
w/ SUHTC - (3)x 0.35 (1)+ (2)+(4)
0 (130,141) 0 0 0 (130,141)
1 0 0 0 0
2 66,930 66,930 (23,425) 43,504
3 66,930 66,930 (23,425) 43,504
4 66,930 66,930 (23,425) 43,504
5 66,930 66,930 (23,425) 43,504
6 66,930 66,930 (23,425) 43,504





Limited Partners - Total Return
As previously mentioned, when returns from real estate are typically measured, the CFB and the TBB are
not separated, but are calculated together to determine the total expected return to the LPs. To complete
our analysis of the LPs investment, we will look now at the total return on total capital invested by the
LPs to verify our framework. Our analysis indicates a total after-tax return on the total capital investment
of $3,050,000 by the LPs to be 11.6 percent (See Table 5.4.2.10).
A fair risk-adjusted return for the LPs should follow the same logic used in our determination of the TBB
when we assigned a risk premium equivalent to one-half that of the S&P. Interestingly, our resulting risk-
adjusted after-tax return of 8 percent is substantiated by the NACREIF performance benchmark of 8
percent9. Nonetheless, our final calculation was to allow the LPs a generous total after-tax return of 10
percent (with an NPV of $310,515), indicating that the returns of the LPs are indeed higher than would be
justified when compared to investments of similar risk.
Table 5.4.2.9
Calculation of Sale Proceeds for Aggregate LP Investment
Sale Price @ 9.5% Capitalization Rate
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9 Information obtained from documents distributed during PREA (Pension Real Estate Association) Conference at Massachusetts




LPs Aggregate (Tax Credit and Cash Flow) Investment Analysis
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Total Before Tax Taxable Additional Net Taxable Tax Saving After-Tax Federal Low State Low Cash Dist. Net After Tax
Investment Cash Flow Income Federal Income (Liability) Cash Flow Income Tax Income Tax from Sale @ Invest Flows
@ 75% (Loss) Taxable (Loss) from from from Credit Credit 75% (1)+(7)+(8)+(9)
Income Operations Operation Operations @ +(10)
Assoc w/ (3)+(4) -(5)x(0.35) 75%
SUHTC (2)+(6)
(3,050,534) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 (3,050,534)
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
190,069 (310,709) 66,930 (243,780) 85,323 275,392 133,859 66,930 476,181
200,597 (294,113) 66,930 (227,183) 79,514 280,111 133,859 66,930 480,900
159,928 (327,782) 66,930 (260,853) 91,296 251,226 133,859 66,930 452,015
153,185 (327,415) 66,930 (260,485) 91,170 244,355 133,859 66,930 445,144
197,784 (275,737) 66,930 (208,808) 73,083 270,866 133,859 66,930 471,655
196,384 (269,080) (269,080) 94,178 290,562 133,859 424,421
233,513 (223,724) (223,724) 78,304 311,816 133,859 445,675
321,716 (127,209) (127,209) 44,523 366,239 133,859 500,099
494,983 54,159 54,159 (18,956) 476,028 133,859 609,887
558,164 127,228 127,228 (44,530) 513,634 133,859 647,494
551,926 132,309 132,309 (46,308) 505,618 505,618
481,401 74,537 74,537 (26,088) 455,313 455,313
449,525 55,877 55,877 (19,557) 429,968 429,968
482,857 102,686 102,686 (35,940) 446,917 446,917
538,226 172,290 172,290 (605302) 477,925 316,106 794,030
($3,050,534) $5,210,257 ($1,36,685) $334,648 ($1,10Z037) $50Z840 $5,713,097 $1,338,593 $334,648 $316,106 $4,534,783
IRR 11.6%
State
In attempting to measure the risks and returns for the State, we run into the difficulty of measuring what
could be regarded as a "moral obligation" to provide incentives to help produce affordable housing. They
also have the responsibility to do this in a cost effective manner. The framework of our Model allows the
State to provide incentives to the private market and to the Municipality to encourage production of
affordable units. The risk is minimal in that the reimbursement to the Municipality for a portion of the tax
abatement is a pre-determined amount. The Developer must make the property succeed to earn his
compensation and there is no provision for the State to make up any investment benefit deficits as many
other housing programs have historically called for.
MHFA
Determining the returns that MHFA should receive for its position in the project requires a different
approach than that of the investors and Developer. MHFA raises its capital by issuing tax-exempt bonds
and the resulting interest rate the Agency receives is dependent on interest rates in the taxable and tax-
exempt markets for bonds at the time of issuance. It is also MHFA's mission as a quasi-public agency to
provide financing for low-income housing projects. Therefore, it aims to provide capital as inexpensively
as possible to make these projects feasible, but has constraints due to being self-funding. In other words,
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MHFA has to act as a responsible lender and must make sure it is able to cover its debts to its
bondholders from the repayments on loans it makes. The interest rate we used was based upon MHFA's
current loan rates. The DSCR in our Model is 1.15 (which is slightly higher than the 1.1 minimum
amount MHFA allows) and the assumptions used for our pro forma are generally conservative. In
summary, the interest rates on the loan are market driven and the risks of our Model fall within the
parameters of MHFA's underwriting guidelines, so MHFA's risk and return appear to be well aligned.
Municipality
The Municipality certainly plays a critical role in providing housing for its residents that fall under the
guidelines of low-income. As previously mentioned, these households often include teachers, policeman
and other employees of the Municipality. Like all government agencies, the Municipality wishes to
maximize the value of its tax dollars. Mixed-income housing offers the Municipality an opportunity to
provide low-income housing in a cost efficient manner. Our Model is structured so that the
Municipality's real estate abatement helps reduce operating costs and, therefore, allows more debt to be
raised to finance the project.
Through our proposed partnership with the State, the Municipality has the opportunity to effectively
eliminate any financial cost associated with developing affordable housing. The opportunity to have the
State absorb most of the cost of the tax abatement should be motivating as it frees the Municipality of the
majority of this financial burden. The added incentive of receiving 50 percent of the abatement at the end
of the holding period has risk, but with the Developer's fee and the Developer and LPs net sales proceeds
subordinated to the abatement repayment, the Developer and LPs will work hard to make sure there is
sufficient appreciation in the value of building for them to achieve a profit. Most of the risk in the
development has been shifted away from the Municipality to other parties who are experienced at
managing the risk they are exposed to, and therefore, should be able to handle it more effectively. All in
all, the Municipality has the opportunity to earn a fair risk-adjusted financial return of 9 percent (see
Table 5.4.2.11) and, when combined with the opportunity to increase the number of units credited
towards their Chapter 40B goal of 10 percent through participation in the bonus program, an excellent





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
State Net Municipality's
Real Estate Actual Real Tax Reimbursement of Abatement to Tax Recovey Net InvestmentYear Taxes Estate Taxes Abatement Real Esate Taxes Municipality from Project FlowPaid (2)-(1) @75% (3)-(4) @ 50% 5)+(6)(3)*0.75
1 183,347 45,837 (137,510) 103,133 (34,378) (34,378)
2 197,611 45,837 (151,775) 113,831 (37,944) (37,944)
3 180,380 45,837 (134,543) 100,907 (33,636) (33,636)
4 188,839 45,837 (143,003) 107,252 (35,751) (35,751)
5 195,789 45,837 (149,952) 112,464 (37,488) (37,488)
6 196,004 45,837 (150,167) 112,625 (37,542) (37,542)
7 194,201 45,837 (148,364) 111,273 (37,091) (37,091)
8 200,920 45,837 (155,083) 116,313 (38,771) (38,771)
9 206,606 45,837 (160,769) 120,577 (40,192) (40,192)
10 212,784 45,837 (166,947) 125,210 (41,737) (41,737)
11 229,338 64,187 (165,151) 123,864 (41,288) (41,288)
12 209,340 87,705 (121,635) 91,226 (30,409) (30,409)
13 219,158 111,584 (107,574) 80,680 (26,893) (26,893)
14 227,223 136,726 (90,497) 67,873 (22,624) (22,624)
15 227,473 159,573 (67,900) 50,925 (16,975) 1,025,435 1,008,460
$3,069,013 $1,018,142 ($2,050,871) $1,538,153 ($512,718) $1,025,435 $512,718
IRR 8.9%
Conclusions
Our analysis has shown that the Limited Partners in these types of projects are earning returns far in
excess of comparable investments facing similar risks. Although this conclusion may be regarded as bad
news for these investors, the other parties to the public/private partnership should be optimistic, as this
will allow more equity to be raised at a lower cost. We hope this analysis helps bring more transparency
and efficiency to the investment structure of 80/20 projects, which may ultimately help to accomplish, or




Conclusions & Policy Implications
This thesis is hoped to have laid the foundation for a new mixed-income housing program in
Massachusetts. It calls for a new public/private partnership that is consensual in nature, and attempts to
openly and realistically assess the objectives of each partner so that a viable framework can be clearly
defined. Our search for a new financial architecture has confirmed that the building blocks of an effective
program are: a valid purpose, achievable goals, defensible assumptions, and proper alignment of risk and
reward for all investment partners. We have analyzed both current and previous affordable housing
programs and learned much from their strengths and weaknesses. The new capital structure we advance
has carefully molded the appealing aspects of several of these programs into a framework anchored by the
principles of successful mixed-income housing development.
This chapter presents our conclusions derived from an extensive review of current literature on affordable
housing programs and policies as well as examples of successful mixed-income housing development
projects. The Financial Model we created was instrumental in helping us reach and quantify these
conclusions. Using the Model as a template to generate various scenarios helped shape our understanding
of the numerous moving parts, and their relative importance in this type of undertaking.
1) The need for affordable housing is everywhere, for all walks of life.
Cities and suburbs suffer equally from the shortage of quality affordable housing. This ubiquitous need
for safe, decent and affordable housing is currently unmet for people from all walks of life whose income
is insufficient to pay market rents - especially in real estate boom periods. It is not just the unemployed or
households dependent on welfare that need assistance, but the elderly, disabled and many working
families have critical housing needs that must be met if well-balanced, healthy and safe communities are
sought.
Given that a severe affordable housing crisis is accelerating - due to a steadily increasing number of low-
income households with housing needs, combined with a shrinking supply of unsubsidized units




2) It is imperative that real estate development and management fundamentals be
followed.
Location - By definition, a viable mixed-income housing development must be thoughtfully located in
neighborhoods where the difference between the market rent and affordable rent helps sustain the cross-
subsidization. Locating these developments in more desirable locations has social, as well as economic,
benefits. Bringing low-income families into well-served communities, or allowing what would otherwise
be displaced residents to remain in their hometowns, offers these families the opportunity to benefit from
the existing (and often superior) school systems, police protection, sanitation, and other public services.
Of course, better neighborhoods usually translate into higher land prices, a major determinant of the
project's financial feasibility. This issue is discussed in more detail below.
Quality Design - Superior design is key to competing for market tenants. Developers of mixed-income
housing must invest more resources in design and construction to make these developments competitive
in the market. Resources allocated to spacious units, architectural details, desirable amenities, quality site
design and landscaping are monies well spent if the financial health of the development relies heavily on
market tenants that have many housing choices. We vouch for not being "penny wise and pound foolish".
Our Model confirms that even with a total project cost of $154,000/unit, considered to be on the high-end
of current projects, the baseline project performs more than satisfactorily with superior returns for all
investors.
Strong Management/Marketing - Preserving the quality of a market-dependent affordable housing
development, is equally as important as creating the project. Experience has shown that developers with
sound market-based management and marketing expertise are the most success at maximizing the
potential profits of mixed-income development while providing housing to all households on a long-term
basis.
Financial Feasibility - A major lesson learned from the SHARP program is the importance of
undertaking a project that is capable of generating sufficient NOI to support its annual debt service from
the start. In other words, an affordable housing project must be treated as any real estate investment with
the requirement of realistic and prudent forecasts of income, expenses and overall feasibility. A
reasonable debt service coverage ratio and loan-to-value ratio can ensure that the lender and the borrower
are both protected from unanticipated market conditions. Our Model addresses this issue through a 1.15
DSCR, an 86 percent LTV, and a one percent working capital reserve fund.
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3) Unrealistic assumptions are irreversible.
We cannot stress enough the importance of realistic assumptions that are based on a clear understanding
and incorporation of real estate market volatility. It is no news to real estate experts that rents do not
trend perpetually upward. The use of growth rates obtained from a prominent portfolio of mixed-income
multi-family properties is our way to correct for this problem. To the best of our knowledge, this
approach has never been taken before. Even when this type of data is not available, however, it is still
possible to project growth rates that reflect dips and hikes in rents and costs over a 15-year, or longer,
investment horizon.
4) Debt is debt.
Again, one of the important lessons from SHARP is the misconception about debt in affordable housing
programs. The parties seemed to perceive an almost non-existent default risk associated with the SHARP
loans when, in fact, these loans should have been considered as second mortgages on the properties.
Therefore, we strongly emphasize that to the extent that "soft loans" are used in the capital structure of
affordable housing programs, they must be regarded as real, albeit risky, debt. The owners must be held
accountable to meet all debt obligations until the debts are repaid in full. Our Model is consistent with
this principle through the repayment of the structured, "soft" tax abatement debt at 50 percent, due upon
sale or refinancing.
5) Mixed-income housing rewards all parties at a reasonable cost to the
government.
Mixed-income housing as a means to alleviate the social problems of concentrated poverty and relieve the
economic burden of housing the very poor in large developments is indeed the current direction of U.S.
housing policy. Use of government-sponsored mechanisms to leverage private funds is one effective
solution to the financial problems of affordable housing development and preservation. The mixed-
income financing mechanisms offer financial rewards for the private investors at a sensible cost to the
government. Furthermore, the involvement of the private sector brings the market discipline that has long
been absent from federally-assisted housing programs.
The 80/20 Program is considered in this thesis as a viable solution to the problem of affordability in the
more affluent suburbs where working families are being priced out of housing in their own communities.
Recognizing that the supply of affordable units for working families continues to tighten as private
109
Chapter 6
developers focus new construction on the high-end market where higher profit margins can be attained,
we conclude that it is indeed possible to offer a reward package to the investors of a mixed-income
housing projects that, ironically, matches or dominates that available in other types of real estate
development or investment of similar risk.
6) Pricing of the tax credits needs to be improved.
The market for tax credits has gradually become more efficient over the past 14 years. We believe that
this trend will continue because these credits are arguably undervalued resulting in returns in excess of a
very reasonable after-tax return of 10 percent to the investors. Our Model indicates that there is room at
the negotiating table to raise more equity. With more equity, these projects can achieve affordability for a
larger number of low-income households, add a moderate-income tier, reach out to lower-income
families, or reduce required densities.
7) Aligning the interest of all parties is key to long-term viability.
We strongly recommend that programs be conceived with the long-term investment performance of the
projects considered equally as important as the production of rental units. There are many adverse
consequences when this type of public/private projects fails mid-stream. In addition to financial distress
for all investment parties, political issues arise often leading to the curtailment of public and private funds
and the suspension of these much-needed programs. Furthermore, these programs need to be structured
so that developments are not threatened by conversion into fully market-rate developments earlier than
anticipated, adversely affecting those people in most critical needs, the very people the program intended
to support.
This thesis concludes that the key to long-term viability is properly aligning the interests of all
stakeholders/partners in the project. Unfortunately, from the perspective of interest alignment, the term
public/private partnership is arguably an overused misnomer. An effective partnership is based on a
consensual agreement as to how to allocate the risk and return of these projects to its partners. The
project must be feasible for every party. Without the right incentives tailored to each party's interests and




LP Investment - First, the Model allows for the tax credit investors (LPs) to participate in the
development and operational risks of the project, and compensates them accordingly. As discussed in
detail above, the investors are able to achieve fair returns that are in line with the risks involved. The LPs
thus have sufficient incentives to invest in mixed-income projects and are further encouraged to oversee
the decisions and actions of Management and to monitor its performance beyond the narrow maintenance
of their compliance status.
Developer - The Developer bears the greatest risk as the "deal-maker" for the project. This risk is more
weighed towards the early stages of the project (site control, entitlement and financing/credit allocation)
for which the Developer is typically compensated early on. Our Model provides for the Developer's
long-term performance through both a current and deferred compensation mechanism. The Developer
also shares risk and reward with the investors through a 25 percent interest in the cash flow and net sale
proceeds. In this way, the Developer's risks and rewards are more evenly spread over the investment
period. Being rewarded fairly and incrementally, the Developer is continuously motivated to honor
his/her obligations towards the project and the partnership.
Municipality - We believe it is of the outmost importance to make a meaningful place for the
municipality at the table. As we found in the previous Chapter, a well-conceived public/private
partnership will provide for the Municipality's role not as merely tax collector/regulator, but also as a
critical "investor". In return for taking the financial and political risks associated with a reduction in
property taxes and zoning relief, the partnership can be structured so that the Municipality can be fairly
rewarded. We have envisioned a reward package with both monetary and non-monetary value,
leveraging off state law and financial resources.
In order to make the partnership more attractive to the Municipality and to help spur construction of
affordable housing, we are proposing two incentives, financial and regulatory, aimed squarely at the
Municipality. Piggybacking these two incentive mechanisms makes use of the trade-off between tax
abatement and density. With a protected IRR of approximately 9 percent, and a Chapter 40B bonus, we
believe that the financial and regulatory interests of the municipality are well aligned with the other
involved parties.
First, as a financial incentive, the State would reimburse the Municipality for a portion of the annual real
estate tax abatement that, when combined with a 50 percent repayment of the full amount of the tax
abatement due to the City from the project, will effectively equal a 9 percent return to the Municipality
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over the fifteen year period'. In order for the Municipality to have unrestricted use of the 50 percent tax
abatement repayment, the number of affordable units located in that Municipality must have reached the
10 percent quota as mandated by Chapter 40B at the time of sale or refinancing. If the 10 percent quota
has not been achieved by that time, the Municipality must contribute the full tax abatement repayment to
a Municipality controlled Affordable Housing Trust Fund that is dedicated to the development of
additional affording housing in the Municipality.
A second incentive offered to the Municipality would provide a bonus system as municipalities strive to
meet the Chapter 40B 10 percent mandate. Three different types of bonuses are proposed: "Scattered-
Site"; "Increased Affordability" and "Priority-Need". Although these bonuses are incentives aimed at
municipalities, they will indirectly (i.e., positively) affect the Developer's negotiations with the local
boards and public agencies. The end result will be more flexibility with regard to project sizes and
income-mixes that will further benefit the communities and the tenants of mixed-income housing
developments, yet be economically feasible. The State would reserve the option to review these policies
after five years and adjust them accordingly.
The "Scattered-Site" bonus provides an incentive to a municipality for granting comprehensive permit
approval for mixed-income housing projects that is scaled to the project size. The smaller the size of the
project, the greater the multiplier effect towards the 10 percent goal. This will encourage municipalities
to offer appropriate incentives to, and negotiate with, developers to develop on scattered sites throughout
their jurisdiction, further aiding the ambition of mixed-income housing advocates to de-concentrate
affordable housing. We propose that the following multipliers be applied to increase the total number of
units that will be counted towards the Chapter 40B 10 percent goal as follows.
Table 6.1
Scattered Site Bonus Configuration
# of Units In Bonus towards
Development Multiplier Chapter 40B10%e6 Mandate
0-50 2 # units x 2
51-100 1.75 #units x 1.75
101-150 1.5 #units x 1.5
151-200 1.25 # units x 1.25
201 & above 1 no bonus
In our Baseline Scenario, the Municiplaity would be reimbursed 75 percent of the abatement each year.
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The "Increased Affordability" bonus will provide an additional incentive to the municipality to grant
permits to mixed-income developments. Under current law, mixed-income rental projects that are
"subsidized" and meet the guidelines preserving affordability, such as those under the 80/20 Program, are
allowed to count all of the units (not just the affordable units) in the project towards the Chapter 40B 10
percent goal. We propose that as a supplement to this, if additional units above the required 20 percent
(which are set-aside for households at, or below, 50 percent AMI) are added to the project and set-aside
for households at, or below, 80 percent AMI, the project would earn a bonus toward its Chapter 40B 10
percent goal equivalent to the total number of low- and low to moderate-income units in the project.
Our baseline project can be examined to determine if these two bonus systems are economically viable.
As shown in Table 5.3.1, converting 6 market-rate units to low to moderate-income units (for households
earning 80 percent, or less, AMI) is still financially feasible for the Developer and the LPs. Therefore, the
bonus system would allow the municipality to count this 125-unit project as a 219-unit project towards
the Chapter 40B 10 percent goal.2 This is in effect a 75 percent increase in the number of units credited
toward Chapter 40B, which will provide a substantial incentive to municipalities that actively endeavor to
provide affordable housing in their jurisdiction. We further propose that the additional low to moderate-
income units added to the project be restricted to households that have resided in the municipality for at
least the past five years. This "Local Preference" provision would allow communities to help meet the
housing needs of their middle-income residents who are being priced out of housing in their own
community.
The "Priority-Need" bonus addresses the time-sensitivity of these projects given the acute shortage of
affordable housing in extremely strong real estate markets such as the market the Boston area is currently
experiencing. Consistent with the over-arching goal of affordable housing production, we propose an
additional 25 percent increase in total number of units credited towards the Chapter 40B 10 percent goal
if the municipality approves a comprehensive permit application within 12 months from the enactment of
this bonus program. This overall bonus would decrease to 15 percent for permit approvals within 12 to
24 months and would be reduced to 5 percent for permit approvals within 24 to 36 months from the
enactment date.
2 The credit of 219 units is derived as follows. Under existing law, being an 80/20 Project qualifies the baseline project for a 125
unit credit towards the Chapter 40B 10% goal. The size of this project qualifies for a 150% "Scattered-Site" bonus bringing the
total credit to 188 (125 x 1.5). The baseline project includes 25 units set-aside for households at 50% AMI. If 6 market-rate
units are replaced with 6 units set-aside for households at, or below, 80% AMI, then the total number of units qualified for the
"Increased Affordability" bonus is 31 (25 + 6). When this is added with the "Scattered-Site" bonus, the result is 219 units (188 +
31) credited to the Chapter 40B 10% goal.
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MHFA - As for the first-mortgage lender (MHFA), we believe that the Agency's interest is aligned with
the other parties through stressing the importance of initial feasibility and long-term viability.
State - The State's participation through the state tax credits and reimbursement of three quarters of the
tax abatement to the Municipality is believed to be a more cost-effective way to support affordable
housing production and preservation, as compared to previous state programs such as SHARP. In fact,
the adoption of this proposed local tax reimbursement program is estimated to cost less than half of what
the Commonwealth's financial commitment was under SHARP3.
The new financial architecture for developing mixed-income housing presented in this paper is believed
to have taken into consideration the underlying interests of the important partners to the public/private
partnership. Each partner needs incentives both to participate and to perform. We believe the framework
described herein justifies participation for each of the partners and significantly improves their alignment
of interests and incentives to perform. In addition, the design of the capital structure has taken into
consideration the unpredictability of real estate cycles and provided mechanisms to help these
developments successfully perform amid adversity.
Although reasonable returns and well-aligned incentives lay a solid foundation for successful
partnerships, for optimal success all partners need to fully embrace the fundamental objectives of mixed-
income projects. New developments cannot simply be isolated projects that have the look and feel of
something that has been thrust upon a municipality and grudgingly accepted simply to reach the State's
Chapter 40B mandate of 10 percent affordability. These developments need to be thought of as a new
neighborhood and woven into the fabric of the community. Forward looking cities and towns realize that
they need a diverse population to flourish and the challenge to achieve this will only become more
difficult as the years pass. We believe that the financial architecture and public policies we have
discussed will serve as building blocks for the construction of new private/public partnerships and
ultimately lead to the development of mixed-income housing in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts in a
manner such that everyone wins.
3 Model estimates a total of $1.54 million in total state reimbursement of real estate tax abatement to the City/Town over 15 years
for 25 low-income units. This is equal to $342/month/low-inome unit. SHARP's total appropriation of $480 million for 3,131
low-income units results in $852/month/low-income unit. Even adding the cost of the state tax credit ($223/month/low-income
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Total 3004 1 3,670 3,603 3,866 3,899 4,076 3,979 4,103 4,022 3,843 4,216
Growth Rate - -1.82% 7.29% 0.87% 4.53% -2.38% 3.111% -1.98% -4.44% 9.70%
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Village at Mansfield Depo 150 4.99% 692 756 688 723 782 748 726 748 785 829
Total . 3004 1 1,233 1,329 1,213 1,270 1,316 1,318 1,306 1,351 1,389 1,431
Growth Rate 7.78% -8.72% 4.69% 3.68% 0.11% -0.92% 3.46% 2.83% 2.99%
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Project Pro Forma (Years 1-16)
Year Year Year Year Year Year Year Year
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Incon
Gross Rertal Income $2187,407 $,189,375 $2188,2D $,187,624 $Z263,097 $2316,506 $2376,40 $457,776
Vacancy (59. (109,370) (109,4@) (109,414) (109,381) (113,15) (1 15,825) (118@) (122,88)
Efiective Gross Incorm 2,078,036 2,079,906 2,078,866 2,078,243 2,149,942 2,200,681 2,257,238 2,334,887
Expenses
Oratirg Expeses (537,5) (527,718) (566,188) (571,114) (56,95) (582,777) (60,902) (589,004)
Real Elate Taxes (183,347) (197,611) (18,3) (188,85) (195,7) (196,00) (194201) (200,920)
Tax Abeterrmt 137,510 151,775 134,543 143,003 149,9E2 150,167 148,364 155,083
Replacemert Reserve (37,5p (38,625) (39,784) (40,977) (42,207) (43,473) (44,777) (46,120)
Net Operatirg Incorm $1,457,199 $1,467,727 $1,427,051 $1,420,315 $1,64,913 $1,528,@ $1,565,723 $1,653,927
Debt Serne
Tax-Exen-t IHFABonds (1,267,133) (1,267,133) (1,267,133) (1,267,133) (1,267,133) (1,267,133) (1,267,13) (1,267,130)
Developer DerredCorp 0 0 0 0 0 (65,081) (65,081) (65,061)
BeforeTax Cash Flow $190,069 $200,57 $15%928 $153,185 $197,784 $196,384 $233,513 $321,716
Arrrtization- Ferrmnertloan 67,034 72,145 77,646 83,567 89,939 96,797 104,177 112,121
Atization - Dweloper loan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Catal Reserves 37,500 38,625 39,784 40,977 42207 43,473 44,777 46,120
Depredation (608,451) (60,451) (368,451) (6,451) (68451) (6,451) (6,451) (6,451)
Taxable ncome (313,848) (297,084) (331,093) (330,722) (278,522) (271,79) (226%984) (128,494)
General Partner (1%0  (3,138) (2,971) (3,311) (3,307) (2,785) (2,718) (2,2) (1,25)
United Patners (M) (310,709) (294,113) (327,7) (327,415) (275,737) (26,0E) (23,724) (127,209)







$15,738,985 $15,671,931 $15,59,785 $15,52,139 $15,438,572 $15,34B,63 $15,251,837 $15,147,69
(1,267,130) (1,267,130) (1,267,13) (1,267,13) (1,267,13) (1,267,13) (1,267,13) (1,267,130)
1,200,096 1,194,985 1,189,484 1,183,53 1,177,191 1,170,333 1,162,953 1,155,009
67,034 72,145 77,646 83,567 89,939 96,797 104,177 112,121
$15,671,931 $15,59,785 $15,52,139 $15,435,572 $15,348,633 $15,251,837 $15,147,69 $15,035,98
Year Year Year Year Year Year Year Year
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Income
Gross Rental Income $2,614,091 $2,739,567 $2,742,033 $2,740,662 $2,739,839 $2,834,364 $2,901,255 $2,975,817
Vacancy (5%) (130,705) (136,978) (137,102) (137,033) (136,992) (141,718) (145,063) (148,791)
Effective Gross Income 2,483,386 2,602,589 2,604,931 2,603,629 2,602,847 2,692,646 2,756,192 2,827,026
Expenses
Operating Expenses (562,852) (617,449) (606,211) (650,404) (656,062) (685,782) (669,460) (690,280)
Real Estate Taxes (206,606) (212,784) (229,338) (209,340) (219,158) (227,223) (227,473) (225,380)
Tax Abatement 160,769 166,947 165,151 121,635 107,574 90,497 67,900 44,315
Replacement Reserve (47,504) (48,929) (50,397) (51,909) (53,466) (55,070) (56,722) (58,424)
Net Operating Income $1,827,194 $1,890,374 $1,884,136 $1,813,611 $1,781,735 $1,815,068 $1,870,437 $1,897,257
Debt Service
Tax-Exempt MHFA Bonds (1,267,130) (1,267,130) (1,267,130) (1,267,130) (1,267,130) (1,267,130) (1,267,130) (1,267,130)
Developer Deferred Comp (65,081) (65,081) (65,081) (65,081) (65,081) (65,081) (65,081) (65,081)
Before Tax Cash Flow $494,983 $558,164 $551,926 $481,401 $449,525 $482,857 $538,226 $565,047
Amortization - Permanent loan 120,670 129,871 139,774 150,432 161,902 174,247 187,534 201,833
Amortization - Developer loan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Capital Reserves 47,504 48,929 50,397 51,909 53,466 55,070 56,722 58,424
Depreciation (608,451) (608,451) (608,451) (608,451) (608,451) (608,451) (608,451) (608,451)
Taxable Income 54,706 128,513 133,645 75,290 56,441 103,723 174,030 216,852
General Partner (1%) 547 1,285 1,336 753 564 1,037 1,740 2,169
Umited Partners (99%) 54,159 127,228 132,309 74,537 55,877 102,686 172,290 214,684







$15,035,538 $14,914,868 $14,784,997 $14,645,223 $14,494,791 $14,332,889 $14,158,642 $13,971,108
(1,267,130) (1,267,130) (1,267,130) (1,267,130) (1,267,130) (1,267,130) (1,267,130) (1,267,130)
1,146,460 1,137,259 1,127,356 1,116,698 1,105,228 1,092,883 1,079,596 1,065,297
120,670 129,871 139,774 150,432 161,902 174,247 187,534 201,833
$14,914,868 $14,784,997 $14,645,223 $14,494,791 $14,332,889 $14,158,642 $13,971,108 $13,769,276
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Added Value from Operations (Years 1-16)
Year Year Year Year Year Year Year Year
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Net Operating Income $1,457,199 $1,467,727 $1,427,058 $1,420,315 $1,464,913 $1,528, 4 $1,55,723 $1,653,927
Debt Service
Tax-Exempt II-FA Bonds (1,267,130) (1,267,130) (1,267,130) (1,267,130) (1,267,130) (1,267,130) (1,267,130) (1,267,130)
Developer Deferred Comp 0 0 0 0 0 (65,081) (65,061) (65,061)
Taxable Income $190,069 $200,597 $159,928 $153,185 $197,784 $196,384 $233,513 $321,716
LP Share @75% 142,552 150,448 119,946 114,889 148,338 147,288 175,134 241,287
Developer Share @25% 47,517 50,149 39,982 38,296 49,446 49,096 58,378 80,429
Year Yea Year Year Year Year Year Year
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Nd Operating 1rKn $1,827,194 $1,890,374 $1,88A136 $1,813,611 $1,781,735 $1,815,068 $1,870,437 $1,897,257
Deb Service
Tax-ExerrIt M-IFA Bonds (1,267,13) (1,267,130) (1,267,130) (1,267,13) (1,267,13) (1,267,13) (1,267,130) (1,267,13)
Developer Deferred Corp (65,061) (65,061) (65,1) (65,061) (65,061) (65,061) (65,061) (65,061)
Taxanblen r $494983 $I164 $51,926 $481,401 $449,125 $48Z857 $538,226 $i5,047
LPShare @75% 371,237 418,623 413,944 361,051 337,143 362,143 403,670 423,785
Developer Share @25% 123,746 139,541 137,961 120,35) 112,381 120,714 134,557 141,262
Breakeven Tax Credit Pro Forma (Years 1-16)
Year Year Year Year Yea Year Year Year
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
N Operaing inoorre 1,287,130 1,217,130 1,287,130 1,287,130 1,287,130 1,332,210 1,332,210 1,332,210
Det Service
Tax-ExerilV-A~Brds (1,267,13) (1,27,13) (1,267,13) (1,267,13) (1,267,13) (1,267,13) (1,267,1M) (1,267,1M)
Developer DerredCoyp 0 0 0 0 0 (6501) (601) (651)
BelioreTax CashlowR $0 $D $0 $D $0 $0 $0 $0
ArTirtzion-Ferranert loan 67,034 72145 77,646 83,557 89,9 797 104,177 112,121
Armitizion - Dveloper loan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
capital Reserve 37,50D 3 818 39,1 3,845 41,6 4, 41,923 41,03
DWpreddtion (6M41) (6M41) (6M41) (M41) (M41) (GM41) (6M41) (451)
Taxie Incorre
General Pabw 1A 0
United Patners ()
(=917) (49,44) (41,3 (48,.9) (47202) (4,2 ) (47,727) t'MfZ66
(4878) (44,44) (4%39) (48),1p (472,o4 (4f2p) (47,727) (4569)
Year Year Year Year Year Year Year Year
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Net Operating Income $1,332,210 $1,332,210 $1,332,210 $1,332,210 $1,332,210 $1,332,210 $1,332,210 $1,332,210
Debt Service
Tax-Exempt MHFA Bonds (1,267,130) (1,267,130) (1,267,130) (1,267,130) (1,267,130) (1,267,130) (1,267,130) (1,267,130)
Developer Deferred Comp (65,081) (65,081) (65,081) (65,081) (65,081) (65,081) (65,081) (65,081)
Before Tax Cash Flow $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
Amortization - Permanent loan 120,670 129,871 139,774 150,432 161,902 174,247 187,534 201,833
Amortization - Developer loan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Capital Reserves 39,269 43,078 42,294 45,377 45,772 47,845 46,707 48,159
Depreciation (608,451) (608,451) (608,451) (608,451) (608,451) (608,451) (608,451) (608,451)
Taxable Income (448,512) (435,502) (426,384) (412,643) (400,777) (386,359) (374,211) (358,459)
General Partner (1%) (4,485) (4,355) (4,264) (4,126) (4,008) (3,864) (3,742) (3,585)
Limited Partners (99%) (444,027) (431,147) (422,120) (408,516) (396,770) (382,495) (370,469) (354,875)
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Appendix C
Rent & Unit Size Comparables
122
# of Year # of Unit Size Monthly MonthlyProperty Units Built Bedrooms (Sq. Ft.) Rental RentISF
Avalon Essex 154 2000 1 779 $ 1,331 $ 1.71
One Avalon Drive 1 824 1,431 $ 1.74
Peabody, MA 1 955 1,566 $ 1.64
1 992 1,741 $ 1.76
2 1,174 1,586 $ 1.35
2 1,225 1,799 $ 1.47
2 1,400 1,916 $ 1.37
Avalon Oaks 204 1999 1 764 $ 1,422 $ 1.86
One Avalon Drive 1 955 1,447 $ 1.52
Wilmington, MA 1 815 1,542 $ 1.89
1 992 1,567 $ 1.58
2 1,174 1,737 $ 1.48
2 1,400 1,757 $ 1.26
2 1,225 1,847 $ 1.51
Avalon at Faxon Park 171 1998 1 698 $ 1,280 $ 1.83
500 Falls Boulevard 1 915 1,360 $ 1.49
Quincy, MA 1 780 1,380 $ 1.77
1 967 1,510 $ 1.56
2 1,013 1,640 $ 1.62
2 1,112 1,750 $ 1.57
2 1,353 1,910 $ 1.41
Avalon West 120 1997 1 776 $ 1,295 $ 1.67
100 Charlestown Meadows Drive 1 1041 1,435 $ 1.38
Westborough, MA 2 1386 1,955 $ 1.41
2 1561 1,995 $ 1.28
Avalon at Lexington 198 1994 1 853 $ 1,752 $ 2.05
100 Lexington Ridge Drive 1 1,045 1,952 $ 1.87
Lexington, MA 2 920 1,850 $ 2.01
2 1,186 2,040 $ 1.72
2 1,350 2,425 $ 1.80
Applebrlar Apartments 164 1989 1 818 $ 1,305 $ 1.60
One Applebriar Lane 1 900 1,480 $ 1.64
Marlborough, MA 2 1,096 1,680 $ 1.53
2 1,446 1,935 $ 1.34
Canton Arboreteum 156 1989 1 667 $ 1,395 $ 2.09
1 Arboretum Way 2 872 1,580 $ 1.81
Canton, MA 2 921 1,635 $ 1.78
The Arboretum 312 1989 1 750 $ 1,500 $ 2.00
1 Arboretum Way 2 995 1,750 $ 1.76
Burlington, MA 2 1025 1,845 $ 1.80
Winsor Ridge at Westborough 300 1972 1 780 $ 1,205 $ 1.54
1 Winsor Ridge Drive 2 960 1,510 $ 1.57
Westborough, MA 2 1020 1,525 $ 1.50
Winsor Village at Waltham 707 1972 1 885 $ 1,325 $ 1.50
976 Lexington Street 2 1,030 1,550 $ 1.50
Waltham, MA










Allowable Development Fee Calculation
First $3,000,000 of QDC @ 10
Next $2,000,000 of QDC @ 7
Over $5,000,000 of QDC @ 5
Total Development Fee
Paid from Equity @ 25%















Interest Rate 6% Applicable Federal Rate (AFR)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Beginning Balance $810,533 $859,165 $910,714 $965,357 $1,023,279 $1,084,675 $1,084,675 $1,084,675
Payments 0 0 0 0 0 65,081 65,081 65,081
Interest 48,632 51,550 54,643 57,921 61,397 65,081 65,081 65,081
Principle 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ending Balance $859,165 $910,714 $965,357 $1,023,279 $1,084,675 $1,084,675 $1,084,675 $1,084,675
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Beginning Balance $1,084,675 $1,084,675 $1,084,675 $1,084,675 $1,084,675 $1,084,675 $1,084,675 $1,084,675
Payments 65,081 65,081 65,081 65,081 65,081 65,081 65,081 65,081
Interest 65,081 65,081 65,081 65,081 65,081 65,081 65,081 65,081
Principle 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ending Balance $1,084,675 $1,084,675 $1,084,675 $1,084,675 $1,084,675 $1,084,675 $1,084,675 $1,084,675
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Appendix E
Real Estate Tax Abatement Calculation
126
Model's Assumption of
Real Estate Tax Abatement
Real Estate Taxes
Exemption from add. Taxes'


















Exemption from add. taxes






















I Redeblopmnwt Taxes on Parcel is assumed to be equal to 25% of Yr. I Taxes or $45,837
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Nancy Andersen, Manager of Multifamily Development, Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency
Scott Dale, Senior Development Director, AvalonBay Communities, Inc.
Gregory Dignan, Appraiser, T. H. Reenstierna LLC
Werner Lohe, Chairman, Housing Appeals Committee, Massachusetts Department of Housing and
Community Development
Susan Lynch, Portfolio Manager, Massachusetts Housing Finance Authority
William McLaughlin, Vice President of Development, AvalonBay Communities, Inc.
Armando Perez, Principle, Lend Lease Real Estate Investments
Peter Roth, President, New Atlantic Development Corporation
William Sandholm, Chief Operating Officer, Rose Associates, Inc.
Alice Senturia, Portfolio Manager for SHARP/RDAL, Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency
Steven Tise, Partner, Tise Diamond Associates
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